The 110-foot Coast Guard Cutter Key Largo, homeported in San Juan, Puerto Rico, caught in a squall in the Mona Pass
By Captain John Konrad (gCaptain) As another intense storm barrels down upon us—this time Milton, a hurricane of record-breaking intensity heading directly for Florida—it’s time to confront a harsh reality: FEMA’s disaster response system is fundamentally flawed. Time and again, we’ve witnessed the same predictable cycle: relief supplies positioned directly in the path of impending storms, vital maritime assets called into action far too late, and the underutilization of the U.S. Army’s robust watercraft and Department of Transportation’s disaster relief fleet.
This troubling pattern leaves vulnerable communities stranded and underscores a systemic failure to learn from past mistakes in providing disaster relief. This time, however, the lack of aid will be exacerbated by severe cuts to the Coast Guard’s budget and hurricane rescue capabilities.
One of the most baffling practices is FEMA’s tendency to stage relief supplies within areas most likely to be devastated by the very disasters they’re meant to mitigate. In a post on X today, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas provided a long list of assets he has already positioned in Florida.
The problem is that placing them in Florida right now positions them directly in the storm’s path. Even if these supplies are stored high and dry in well-built structures, roads will likely be blocked, requiring them to be helicoptered to the densely packed and hardest-hit areas near the coast.
The government’s default response when roads are blocked is even more flawed because it relies on deploying helicopters for resupply missions. While helicopters are invaluable for certain tasks, they are not the most efficient means for large-scale disaster relief. They consume enormous amounts of fuel and have significantly less cargo capacity compared to trucks, which, in turn, have significantly less than maritime vessels.
During Hurricane Maria, for instance, the Navy’s reliance on helicopters to deliver aid to Puerto Rico fell short of pressing needs. The limited lift capacity and high operational costs resulted in slower, less effective relief efforts. Similarly, after hurricane Helene, the airspace over affected regions became so congested with helicopters that the FAA had to impose restrictions to manage the swarm of aircraft, leading to the use of painfully slow mule teams. This aerial bottleneck not only hampered rescue operations but also highlighted the pitfalls of over-relying on helicopters.
This land and air approach not only puts critical resources at risk but also hampers immediate relief efforts when they are most needed. It’s akin to parking fire trucks inside a building that’s already ablaze. The aftermath of hurricanes like Katrina and Maria showcased warehouses full of supplies rendered inaccessible or destroyed because they were strategically misplaced.
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) possesses ships designated for disaster relief, yet they’re consistently activated after the storm has passed—when the need is most urgent and media pressures on government failures are most intense—but the response is too late.
These ships—including the Department of Transportation’s brand-new National Security Multi-Mission Training Ships and Military Sealift Command hospital ships—are specially equipped to provide power, housing, and medical facilities. Yet they remain docked during the critical pre-storm window when they could be strategically positioned just outside the danger zone and sail in directly behind the storm to dock immediately in the aftermath.
For this to occur, Secretary Pete Buttigieg or Admiral Ann Phillips, who heads MARAD, would need to proactively offer the ships to FEMA. However, this seems improbable given Buttigieg’s well-documented neglect of the merchant marine and Phillips’s reputation as the “Ghost Admiral”—a moniker that speaks volumes. In fairness, though, the failure to deploy MARAD’s disaster relief fleet in a timely manner has been a consistent shortcoming across the last three administrations.
Supplies prepositioned on land are ineffective because they’re either vulnerable to hurricane damage or must be positioned too far from the affected area to be immediately useful. Air operations can only occur if massive amounts of fuel are available. In a state like Florida—which lacks gasoline, diesel, or aviation fuel pipelines—this means relying on Jones Act oil tankers, of which we have a shortage.
Ships don’t have these problems. They can carry enough of their own fuel to operate for months and can sail right behind the hurricane, pulling into port immediately after the destructive winds hit.
Bureaucratic red tape and a lack of proactive planning lead to unnecessary delays that cost lives and prolong suffering. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by the time it takes to load and sail the relief ships down to Florida.
This results in the same dangerous and repetitive cycle nearly every time. I don’t have a crystal ball, but I predict this is how Hurricane Milton relief efforts will go:
As the hurricane approaches the coast, civilians are evacuated, and the Army prepositions supplies on land (WE ARE NOW HERE) that inevitably get damaged by the storm. In the aftermath, the U.S. Coast Guard surges in for rescue efforts. After hours or a couple of days, the Army and Navy attempt resupply via highways and helicopters, which proves inefficient due to road damage and the limited capacity of helicopters. Despite the Army possessing beach-landing watercraft and port logistics teams (as were deployed to build the failed Gaza Pier) capable of delivering aid directly to affected areas, these resources remain unused. After about ten days of failed attempts, public outrage intensifies to a level where politicians are inundated with calls and bad publicity. Then someone mentions the Department of Transportation’s fleet of disaster relief ships, and the Maritime Administration is finally ordered to load up and respond. However, by the time these ships arrive—a process that can take a week or more—the highways have reopened, and the immediate need has passed. The supplies are often left unused, and politicians criticize the high cost of the relief ships and delayed response, leading to funding cuts for future maritime relief efforts.
Here’s a novel plan: Load the ships before the storm hits, positioning them to provide immediate assistance once it’s safe to do so. Let them sail behind Milton and surge into Tampa directly after the storm leaves.
Perhaps the most glaring oversight in our disaster response strategy is the neglect of the U.S. Army’s watercraft units. These vessels are uniquely capable of accessing battered coastlines, delivering massive amounts of supplies, and providing logistical support in conditions where other ships and aircraft cannot operate. Despite their proven effectiveness historically, they remain an untapped domestic resource during humanitarian crises.
Over the past fifteen years, Army Watercraft Masters have witnessed countless missed opportunities where these assets could have provided immense aid and relief. From hurricane responses in Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and the Florida Panhandle to international disasters like the port explosion in Syria, coastal forest fires in Australia, wildfire relief in Maui, the bridge collapse in Baltimore, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan—where Army watercraft were actually the closest relief assets—we consistently disregarded deploying these vessels. Even during the massive 9/11 relief and evacuation efforts in New York City, Army vessels sat idle at docks in Baltimore, mere hours away, and never responded. The list of missed opportunities goes on, each one a testament to a systemic failure to utilize available resources effectively.
Humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti, primarily conducted via helicopters, face limitations due to scarce airfields and low cargo capacity. While a Coast Guard HC-144 aircraft carries only seven tons per trip, an Army 174-foot Landing Craft Utility (LCU) can transport 350 tons or 24 stacked containers. Despite their efficiency and vast cargo capacities, the Army’s watercraft base in Tampa and other bases have been decommissioned, citing “excess capability.” This decision reflects a lack of interest in humanitarian operations and maritime logistics.
Also read: Where Are The US Army Watercraft? 2017 article by CW4 MICHAEL W. CARR
These once large fleet of Army watercraft have been mostly cut from the Army budget and divested at auction, leaving us with barely enough remaining to help Florida after Milton moves on. The whittling down of this once-strong capability was most apparent in Gaza, where Army watercraft mostly failed to build and operate a simple humanitarian relief pier.
Over the years, gCaptain has highlighted the tragic loss of U.S. Army watercraft due to mismanagement and lack of utilization, but politicians and voters mostly shrugged. These assets could be game-changers in disaster scenarios along coastlines like Florida’s, but they languish in obscurity because FEMA and other agencies fail to integrate them into a cohesive response strategy and the Army doesn’t want humanitarian missions cutting into its budget. Instead, we expend far too much time “setting up processes to think about that,” conducting endless studies, and inventing new acronyms—all while ignoring the immediate solutions at our disposal.
Army watercraft and logistics teams capable of reopening ports have always been far from Americans’ minds when hurricanes strike. But what’s significantly more concerning is the lack of public outcry or even notice of the diminishing capabilities of the service most Americans expect to take a leading role: the U.S. Coast Guard.
Where are the Coast Guard helicopters flying over disaster zones like North Carolina to rescue people in the wake of hurricanes such as Helene? Budget constraints, aging equipment and maintenece problems have hampered the Coast Guard’s ability to respond effectively, and the American public remains unaware of the danger. In a hard-hitting exposé in August, Forbes contributor Craig Hooper revealed that many of the USCG’s MH-60T Jayhawk helicopters, essential for search and rescue missions, are grounded due to extended service life and maintenance issues. Grounding helicopters for safety reasons, while necessary, seriously reduces the USCG’s rescue capacity during crisis.
Also read: U.S. Coast Guard Cuts MH-60T Jayhawk Service Life, Grounds Helicopters
Craig Hooper
The lack of investment in maintaining and ultimately grounding Coast Guard helicopters not only hampers immediate rescue efforts but also undermines public confidence in a service expected to be the first on scene. It’s alarming that there’s so little public awareness or outcry or major media attention over these diminishing capabilities that have rescued untold numbers of Americans during previous storms and hurricane disasters.
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard has been quietly cutting back on boat stations over the years—stations that once provided immediate support during disasters. Many of these closures stem from recruitment and retention challenges that have led to a significant personnel shortfall, reportedly nearing a 10% shortage in the enlisted ranks. This staffing crisis has forced the Coast Guard to take cutters out of service, transfer tugs to seasonal activation, and shutter numerous boat stations.
“The Coast Guard’s actions will be politically contentious, and they should be,” wrote Hooper in November last year when 10 cutters and 29 boat stations were slated to be sidelined. “The Coast Guard desperately needs more support from advocates and stakeholders, and these service cuts might be the catalyst that spurs potential Coast Guard supporters into action. While the capability reductions are deeply troubling, they may be the only way forward. There’s no turning back now.”
Sadly, Dr. Hooper’s prediction proved inaccurate. The Coast Guard’s numerous issues—including a major sexual harassment scandal—have not been addressed in any presidential interviews or debates.
Compounding the matter, many cutters have been deployed overseas to help the Navy fill gaps due to their lack of small corvettes and frigates, further diminishing the Coast Guard’s domestic capabilities. These reductions not only strain the Coast Guard’s ability to perform critical missions like search and rescue but also open opportunities for increased illegal activities along America’s maritime borders. The lack of public awareness or outcry over this decline in maritime capability is alarming, especially at a time when the nation faces complex challenges at sea.
Put together, cutter layups, boat station closures, overseas operations and Jayhawk groundings will seriously limit the USCG’s ability to help Florida residents in the coming days.
Coast Guard, Army watercraft, and Maritime Administration cuts are not new and have not, at least this century, caused public outrage. One reason for that is—if the situation gets too bad—the U.S. Navy can always send in Military Sealift Command expeditionary supply ships to surge supplies quickly. The problem is those ships are now slated for cuts as well.
The Navy is grappling with significant manpower shortages that could lead to the sidelining of 17 support ships operated by their Military Sealift Command (MSC). Due to a lack of qualified civilian mariners—stemming from retention challenges and overworking existing personnel—MSC has drafted a “force generation reset” plan. This proposal would remove crews from two Lewis and Clark-class replenishment ships, one fleet oiler, twelve Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs), and two forward-deployed expeditionary sea bases, reallocating approximately 700 sailors to other critical vessels. The ships would enter an extended maintenance period, effectively reducing the MSC’s operational capacity at a time when demand for naval support is high.
Among the vessels potentially sidelined are the USS Lewis B. Puller and USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, which are mobile sea bases capable of holding vast amounts of fuel and supplies and serving as offshore command centers—perfect for disaster response. The EPFs are important too, as they can be loaded quickly and sail fast to any disaster zone.
The plan underscores the broader issue of a mariner recruiting crisis, where U.S. Merchant Mariners are facing unsustainable workloads due to a not enough people to fill-in when mariners take much deserved vacation time. This has led to mariners spending excessive time at sea with insufficient shore leave, causing many to quit the service. The potential loss of these support ships not only diminishes the Navy’s operational capabilities but also limits the Navy’s ability to surge assets when the Maritime Administration, Army and US Cost Guard are unable to respond to crisis.
A Call for FEMA Maritime Reform
The persistent shortcomings in America’s disaster response infrastructure demand immediate attention. We need a paradigm shift that prioritizes strategic pre-positioning of supplies outside of high-risk zones, timely activation of MARAD ships, and full incorporation of Army watercraft into disaster planning.
Coordination among federal agencies, the military, and local authorities must improve to create a unified front against natural disasters. This requires cutting through bureaucratic red tape that delays asset deployment and fostering a proactive rather than reactive response culture. While the outlook seems bleak, a new maritime bill proposed by Congressman Mike Waltz and Senator Mark Kelly offers a glimmer of hope. The bill would reinstate a maritime coordinator in the White House, potentially enhancing FEMA’s ability to coordinate assets more effectively during future disasters.
Natural disasters are inevitable; ineffective responses are not. As we stand waiting for the destructive winds of Hurricane Milton to land on Tampa Florida, the lessons of the past loom large but the maritime relief ships sit idle. It’s imperative that DHS, DOT, the White House and other responsible parties overhaul their strategies to ensure that when disaster strikes, relief is not a distant promise but an immediate reality.
The clock is ticking, and FEMA could order these ships to Florida today, but it’s highly unlikely they will. Instead, they’ll wait until citizens are outraged and political pressure is at its peak. Then they’ll call for the ships just as the highways are starting to clear. All they’ll accomplish is wasting taxpayer dollars to redirect the media’s attention away from Washington DC and failures that could have been avoided by dispatching these ships before Hurricane Milton strikes.
President Biden, Vice President Harris (or a Republican member of Congress) should contact Secretary Mayorkas or Secretary Buttigieg to dispatch a National Security Multi-Mission Vessel to Tampa immediately. The TS Patriot State is already on a shakedown cruise and could be redirected.
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