Design Flaw and Inadequate Training Led to Fire on New Staten Island Ferry, NTSB Reports

A new passenger ferry’s engine design and insufficient training for engineering crew members resulted in a fire aboard a Staten Island Ferry in 2022, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported on Tuesday.

On December 22, 2022, a fire erupted in the engine room of the Sandy Ground passenger ferry while it was navigating New York Harbor with 884 people on board. The crew’s efforts to contain and extinguish the fire, along with the prompt response from good samaritan vessels, ensured the safe evacuation of all passengers. The incident caused $12.7 million in damage to the vessel.

Following its investigation, the NTSB issued a safety alert and five safety recommendations, including proposed regulatory changes to design requirements for diesel engine fuel oil return systems.

According to the NTSB, the fire was triggered when oilers on the Sandy Ground closed both day tank fuel oil return isolation ball valves while managing fuel oil levels, causing the fuel oil system to overpressurize. This over-pressurization led to the rupture of fuel oil filters on the main engines, resulting in a spray of fuel oil that ignited. A delay in shutting down the main engines exacerbated the fire.

The Sandy Ground, the second of three Ollis-class ferries built by Eastern Shipbuilding Group for the New York City Department of Transportation, had been in service for just six months before the fire. The ferries were not originally equipped with fuel oil return isolation valves; these were added post-delivery to regulate day tank fuel oil levels. However, the vessels lacked a mechanism to relieve pressure in the fuel oil return lines if both valves were closed, leading to the overpressurization.

In response, the NTSB recommended that the Coast Guard update marine engineering regulatory requirements to ensure diesel engine fuel oil return systems on U.S.-flagged vessels are designed to allow unimpeded return flow or include a pressure relief valve. The NTSB also urged the Coast Guard to develop interim design guidance to prevent overpressurization.

The American Bureau of Shipping was similarly advised to propose these design requirements to the International Association of Classification Societies.

The investigation also revealed that engineering crew members were inadequately trained on the new Ollis-class ferries’ fuel systems. They did not receive follow-on training after the installation of the fuel oil return isolation ball valves on the Sandy Ground. Unlike other Staten Island ferries, the new vessels lacked relief valves in their fuel oil return systems. Consequently, the crew believed that the fuel oil system could not be overpressurized.

Highlighting the importance of understanding diesel engine fuel oil system return design and operation, the NTSB issued a safety alert to vessel operators. The NTSB noted that this was the second fire in two years investigated by the agency where closed valves led to overpressurization and subsequent fires. The first incident was a 2021 engine room fire on a towing vessel on the Mississippi River in Missouri.

Read the reports: Marine Investigation Report 24-17 and Safety Alert 94.

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