U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Chair Mr. Jason Neubauer speaks at a press conference ahead of the Titan submersible hearing in North Charleston, South Carolina, on Sept. 15, 2024. (USCG Photo by Kate Kilroy)
In the months leading up to the catastrophic implosion of OceanGate’s Titan submersible, the company’s desperation for cash had already set the stage for tragedy said director of engineering Phil Brooks at this week’s coast guard hearing. The company was teetering on the brink of financial ruin, so much so that they asked him to work without pay.
Brooks, who left just five months before the disaster, testified that the company’s decisions were being driven by their dire financial situation and fear of bankruptcy, compromising safety in the process. When he suggested postponing a dangerous trip due to severe weather, he was flatly overruled. “They had people that paid and they had to go through with it,” he stated, encapsulating the chilling reality of a business more concerned with dollars than human lives.
Also Read: U.S. Coast Guard Releases Titan Submersible Discovery Footage
OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who died piloting the Titan, bore the brunt of criticism during the hearing’s first two days. Tony Nissen, former director of engineering, portrayed Rush as impulsive—making crucial decisions based on speed and cost, and frequently changing his mind. Nissen revealed that Rush ultimately fired him for insisting on scrapping the Titan‘s first carbon fiber hull due to safety concerns.
“He would blame everything on everyone else,” said Lochridge, director of marine operations for OceanGate, at the hearing. “It was bullying.”
Rather than scanning the first hull for defects or establishing a finite lifespan for dives, OceanGate opted for an untested acoustic monitoring system to detect potential failures. Lochridge didn’t mince words, calling the Titan “an abomination” and its carbon fiber hull “disgusting.” Both Lochridge and Nissen were unequivocal—they wouldn’t have risked diving in it.
The company’s cutting corners didn’t stop at scheduling. Brooks warned that their launch platform—a makeshift setup too small for proper sub maintenance—was a disaster waiting to happen. Forced to perform complex work in 15-foot swells on a flimsy platform, Brooks eventually refused. “It was just too dangerous,” he admitted, his voice filled with the frustration of knowing he couldn’t stop what was coming.
But even more troubling was Brooks suspicion that the sub’s pressure hull could be cracked—a suspicion brushed aside because shipping the sub back to their facility was deemed too expensive.
OceanGate’s Titan was a marvel of marketing, not engineering. CEO Stockton Rush gambled on an experimental carbon-fiber design that no classification society had approved. Why? Because carbon fiber, though innovative, is perilously unpredictable under deep-sea pressures. According to Roy Thomas, a senior engineer at the American Bureau of Shipping, carbon fiber hulls can catastrophically fail without warning—an engineering nightmare.
“Carbon fiber breaks suddenly when overloaded, without early signs of trouble,” Thomas explained. Yet, Rush dismissed the need for class certification. The result? A sub made of materials that degrade under UV light, can suffer hidden damage, and are prone to fatigue failure—a recipe for disaster at 12,000 feet below the surface.
OceanGate’s business model was as questionable as its engineering. To bypass strict passenger-vessel regulations, it marketed wealthy clients as “mission specialists” with minimal operational roles. In reality, they were paying passengers on a vessel not certified for such operations.
The Coast Guard had already ruled in 2012 that OceanGate’s sub was a passenger-for-hire operation, effectively banning it from U.S. waters. Yet, the company continued its dangerous game by relocating to international waters, where oversight was scarce, and risks were high.
Guillermo Sohnlein, OceanGate’s co-founder, downplayed the regulatory issues, arguing that the Coast Guard’s rules made it impossible to operate a profitable submersible business in the U.S. He stepped down as CEO in 2012 but held onto his stake in the company, a silent witness to the unfolding tragedy.
As the hearings continue it’s becoming clear the story of OceanGate is not just one of a failed business venture; it’s a story of human lives sacrificed at the altar of profit. In the end, it wasn’t just a submersible that imploded—it was the trust of everyone who believed that safety, not money, was the company’s guiding principle.
OceanGate – which suspended operations after the tragedy – said it has been fully cooperating with the Coast Guard and NTSB investigations since they began but hasn’t commented on the near bancrupcy.
Up next is a carbon fiber expert from Boeing who should address many of these questions. Notably, testimony scheduled for Wednesday is an engineer at the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory regarding the Titan‘s wreckage many hope will reveal the physical cause of the implosion.
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