‘Profoundly Concerned’: NTSB Chair Calls Out Training Gaps in Shipboard Firefighting

By Daniel Katzive (gCaptain) –

Training failures which contributed to the deaths of two firefighters on a RoRo ship at Port Newark in July 2023 are part of a broader nationwide shortfall in shipboard firefighter training, according to the chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, Jennifer L. Homendy.

“I am profoundly concerned with ongoing failures to appropriately train our nation’s firefighters despite the NTSB sounding the alarm time and again following tragedies in all modes of transportation,” said Homendy in a statement joined by three others of the NTSB board.

The chair’s statement was included with the NTSB’s full report into the fire aboard the Grande Costa D’Avorio on July 5, 2023, which was released on Tuesday. The report’s conclusions were first aired at a hearing three weeks ago and include recommendations for better shipboard firefighting training as well as design changes to containment doors on RoRo vehicles and on discontinuing use of passenger vehicles to push non-running cars on board during the loading process.

The tragic incident echoes previous NTSB investigations of vessel fires. Following the 2020 Roll-on/Roll-off Hoegh Xiamen fire in Jacksonville, Florida, firefighters sustained serious injuries when an over-pressurization event occurred after they opened a garage deck vent. While no recommendations were made, the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department (JFRD) responded proactively by revising their Shipboard Fire Attack Decision Model and sending personnel to advanced training. Similarly, a 2022 investigation of the Spirit of Norfolk fire in Virginia revealed that city firefighters lacked awareness of marine vessel firefighting risks.

“This is not the first time we’ve seen vessel fires that resulted in land-based firefighter fatal and non-fatal injuries; nor is it the first time we’ve identified a lack of land-based training in vessel firefighting,” stated Homendy.

Homendy’s statement pointed to the Fire Department of New York as a good example of a department with an effective program for response to marine vessel fires. As detailed in the NTSB’s report, the FDNY’s Marine Division employs between 100 and 120 personnel year-round, and more during the summer months, and is overseen by a designated chief. The division has a ship simulator at its training facility and routinely sends its firefighters to a one-week marine firefighting school in Fort Lauderdale as well as a 5-day hands-on course run by the Virginia Port Authority.

In contrast, the report says, most of Newark’s firefighters and chiefs had no tactical shipboard firefighting training and had never been on a large vessel. The most recent training prior to the fire had been held in 2014, and only two of the responding firefighters had attended those sessions. The lack of training extended to the engine company tasked with operating Newark’s two fireboats—according to the report, Newark Fire Division did not participate in exercises and meetings held by the New Jersey Fire Boat Task Force due to lack of funding for overtime.

Even after the fire, according to the NTSB chair’s statement, Newark firefighters have only been provided with a four-hour Shipboard Firefighting Awareness class and participated in vessel tours. “This is far from the training firefighters need and deserve to appropriately respond to vessel fires,” she said.

The Port of Virginia was also praised by NTSB board members for its collaborative efforts across agencies and stakeholders to coordinate fire response and training protocols. “Though it may not be a universal standard, the Port of Virginia was specifically recognized during the Board meeting as a model of best practices,” said board member J. Todd Inman in a statement joined by the chair and other board members.

The NTSB report provides a detailed description of the firefighting efforts undertaken by the crew and responding firefighters, as well as the frantic efforts to locate the two firefighters who went missing below decks and became trapped between cars. It faults the NFD for entering the vessel’s garage decks after CO2 had been deployed, contrary to shipboard firefighting convention, allowing oxygen to reenter the space and endangering the firefighters with fatal consequences.

The report also delves into the proximate cause of the fire itself, which originated in a Jeep Wrangler being used to push non-operational cars onto the ship. The NTSB found the use of a passenger vehicle rather than a “Power Industrial Truck” for this job was inconsistent with Occupational Safety and Health Administration rules. The transmission fluid on the overworked Jeep likely boiled over and ignited on a hot engine surface.

In terms of vessel design, the report notes that controls to operate the heavy hydraulic doors leading from the weather deck to the fire zone were located inside the compartment itself. Crew members, even wearing SCBA equipment, were unable to close the doors and safely exit the compartment. As a result, the large door was left open, limiting the effectiveness of the CO2 system. The report recommends changes to RoRo ships with this configuration and indicates Grimaldi Deep Sea, the vessel’s owner, has already made modifications on similar vessels it operates.

In addition to the deaths of two firefighters, the report notes that six additional emergency responders were injured. The damage to the vessel was estimated to be over $23 million.

The NTSB’s investigation was conducted in cooperation with the Coast Guard which is expected to issue its own report soon.

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