by Captain John Konrad (gCaptain OpEd) The US Navy’s top Admiral has just unveiled her new “warfighting navy” plan, and it’s a doozy. Let’s cut to the chase: the plan to transform the fleet into a high-octane, warfighting powerhouse is ambitious—to put it mildly. Admiral Lisa Franchetti’s new strategy, dubbed “Project 33,” aims to prepare the service for a potential war with China in 2027. But here’s the kicker: it’s built on a foundation of assumptions that are, frankly, dubious at best and downright dangerous in its assumptions at worst.
Let’s start with the good news. For the first time, we have a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) document that acknowledges the crucial role of U.S. Merchant Mariners and logisticians. Moreover, this plan takes a clear-eyed approach to the threat of war posed by China.
“This Navigation Plan drives toward two strategic ends: readiness for the possibility of war with the People’s Republic of China by 2027,” writes Franchetti. “We will work towards these ends through two mutually reinforcing ways: implementing Project 33 and expanding the Navy’s contribution to the Joint warfighting ecosystem.”
Allies and Rusting Warships
The vision of a “warfighting ecosystem” with the Joint Force and allies sounds nice on paper, but let’s be realistic. Coordinating so many relationships in today’s hyper-charged political seas is like herding swimming cats, especially when each military branch has its own priorities, budgets, and turf to protect. If you’re a merchant mariner, brace yourself for the bureaucratic quagmire as the Navy struggles to piece together a cohesive strategy from this mess.
Statements about “the power of allies” have become little more than a trope. Consider this: many of our “strongest allies” (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea) failed to send ships to the Red Sea for Operation Prosperity Guardian. Other historical strong partners (e.g., Canada, Denmark, New Zealand) participated but have weak and tiny fleets that lack capable destroyers. Some (e.g., France, Italy, Germany) bucked U.S. command and control by forming their own coalition. Even American partners like the US Army are doing little to help.
Let’s talk numbers. The Navy aims to get 80% of its surface fleet combat-ready in three years. This is the same fleet currently buried under thousands of days of maintenance backlog. Even if every shipyard and maintenance crew worked around the clock, they lack enough floating drydocks to handle the surge. And even if they had the drydocks, there’s no way to catch up without breaking a lot of equipment—and probably a few people—along the way. Who’s on the hook for all this? Commercial shipbuilders and repair facilities that are already stretched thin. If you’re in the ship repair business, like Detyens Shipyard, you might be excited by the prospect of more business. That would be the case with a commercial client, but Naval contracts come with delays, paperwork, and problems that eat into profits.
Also read: gCaptain OpEd: US Navy Shipbuilding Has A BIG Badger Problem by John Konrad
“As of now, maintenance for the surface Navy force – cruisers, destroyers, amphibious warships and Littoral Combat Ships – is about 2,700 days behind,” writes Sam Lagrone for the US Naval Institute.
Autonomous Warships
Now, let’s look at the Navy’s shiny new toys. The plan puts a big emphasis on scaling up robotic and autonomous systems. It sounds cool and futuristic, right? The problem is, we’ve heard this song before. The Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) has been the poster child for “over-promise, under-deliver” for years. In fact the previous CNO – Admiral Michael M. Gilday – made building USV’s a priority from his first day in office way back in 2019 yet his biggest sucess were small autonomous sailboats, not mighty AI warships. Integrating lethal weapons systems into large hulls in the next three years is like saying you’re going to build a Mars colony by 2027. It’s technically possible, but in the real world, it’s a logistical and bureaucratic nightmare with a slim chance of success.
Also read: A Navy In Crisis: It’s Time For The Conference Of Admirals
Even if a LUSV is built this means the Navy could very well be wasting valuable drydock space on tech that’s not ready for prime time, all while ignoring the conventional sealift, logisitics and support ships that are massively overworked and underfunded.
And speaking of funding, let’s address the elephant in the room: the Navy’s dream of a 381-ship fleet. To say that this is financially unsustainable is like saying the Titanic had a minor navigation issue. To put it bluntly: a 381-ship Navy would probably need 50% bigger budget. That’s hundreds of billions of dollars that, quite frankly, the Navy doesn’t have and Congress isn’t eager to provide. The Navy might say it wants more ships – and certainly needs more support (fireboats anyone?) salvage, and logisitcs ships – especially to narrow the 100 tanker ship gap – but when push comes to shove, the money just isn’t there. We’ve seen this before–grand plans that get gutted the minute someone asks… How are we going to pay for this?
Also read: US Navy Stonewalls Congress In Working Ship Reports
“A 380-ship Navy requires a bigger budget… Fundamentally, the Navy is on an unsustainable trajectory in terms of its costs,” Naval analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News.
A critical Manpower Shortage
But there’s more. The plan also aims to address the Navy’s manpower shortfall. The service is short about 22,000 sailors and intends to fix this by 2027—an ambitious goal, to say the least. The most acute shortage is among U.S. Merchant Mariner sailors aboard military sealift ships operated by the Navy. Here’s the rub: the maritime industry is already grappling with a talent shortage, and now the Navy is jumping in with an aggressive recruitment strategy. This could easily devolve into a zero-sum game, with commercial operators and the Navy vying for the same limited pool of skilled mariners. Let’s be real: while the Navy’s promises of improved quality of life sound great, for most sailors, life on a rusting navy supply ship based in Bahrain is a tough sell compared to a commercial gig.
Also read: U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command Could Sideline Ships Amid Mariner Shortage
What we’re looking at here is a classic case of the military trying to have its cake and eat it too. The Navy wants to build up its conventional capabilities, integrate cutting-edge tech, and fill its ranks with qualified “warfighters” (one of Franchetti’s favorite terms—she’s often seen wearing camouflage fatigues), all while operating under severe budget constraints. It’s a strategy that’s more about political optics than operational reality. For those of us in the commercial sector, this is both a warning and an opportunity. If the Navy can’t meet its own needs and allies are unwilling to help, guess who they’re going to lean on harder? But don’t expect smooth sailing—this is going to be a bumpy ride.
Time for Straight Talk and Hard Truths
The Navy’s “Project 33” is charting a perilous course, and the real threat isn’t the ambitious goals—it’s the refusal to confront the hard truths. Admiral Franchetti must lay bare the scale of our challenges to Congress, ditching the cheerleading for allies and joint force integration. Navy Admirals can’t keep pretending they can overhaul the fleet, adopt cutting-edge tech, and solve the manpower crisis with the flick of a wand. If they continue down this path of wishful thinking, we’re not just risking naval superiority; we’re gambling with national security. This isn’t the time for political optics or rosy projections—it’s time for hard truth. It’s time to sound the general alarm.
The CNO must hold our allies and other branches accountable and make it crystal clear that without a serious commitment from Congress to fund and support this plan, we’re setting ourselves up for massive numbers of service member deaths if war does break out with China which Franchetti thankfully admits in this document, is a possibility.
The reality is, many of our “strongest allies” are stretched too thin or unwilling to step up, and the other services are more focused on problems of their own meanwhile the US Merchant Marine is in the worst condition this nation has seen in almost a century.
In fairness to Franchetti she does outline the risks. “Few of my predecessors have assumed office without first observing that the Navy was facing heavy seas and our country difficult times. Today is no exception,” she writes. “Dynamic changes are at work in our nation and abroad – changes that serve only to emphasize the need for a determined military posture built upon a solid foundation of powerful Naval Forces.”
But is this enough? Franchetti needs to be the whistleblower, not the cheerleader. Being a whistleblower means more than writing internal reports few outside the defense industrial complex will read—it means standing up in Congress, headling mainstream media, and pushing back hard against the Joint Chiefs of Staff and White House plans that increasingly exlcude the Navy. If our senior Admirals don’t get honest and highly visible to the American public now—if they fail to make Congress and the American people understand the severity of the situation—we won’t just be unprepared for future conflict; we’ll be dead in the water.
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