Are Ships Obsolete in an Age of Drones and Missiles? Admiral Stavridis Says NO

by John Konrad (gCaptain) In Admiral James Stavridis’s recent hard hitting Washington Post OpEd, he reminds us that warfare often defies easy narratives, and his analysis of the state of naval power in the drone era hits squarely at a key tension: Are large surface warships obsolete, or are they still essential to maintaining global stability?

For gCaptain readers, this is more than just academic—it’s the future of stability and risk in maritime industry’s future. Stavridis presents a nuanced perspective that navigates between two seemingly contradictory truths: surface ships are vulnerable, but are not obsolete.

Stavridis starts with the remarkable fact that Ukraine, a nation without a traditional navy, has crippled a significant portion of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. This was accomplished using intelligence and unmanned drones—a potent combination that has reshaped how we think about naval warfare. At first glance, this might signal the death knell for large surface warships. If drones and missiles can neutralize a fleet with no navy to speak of, what chance do hulking destroyers and cruisers – let alone merchants – have in the face of similarly equipped adversaries?

However, Stavridis rightly points out that the story isn’t that simple. The vast majority of global trade still relies heavily on large ships, and while drones are rewriting the rules of naval engagement, we can’t abandon the seas to them just yet. As long as world trade moves across the ocean’s surface, we’ll need ships to protect vital sea lanes. In this regard, Stavridis underscores that the U.S. Navy, and by extension allied navies, still has an irreplaceable role. China, with its aggressive shipbuilding program, clearly understands this—and the U.S. should take note.

What Stavridis’s article gets absolutely right is the dual-track future of naval warfare: the need unmanned systems and we still need surface fleets. Surface warships may be vulnerable, but they are indispensable for now. He draws a historical parallel to Pearl Harbor, when battleships gave way to carriers, but reminds us that even today, we need carriers, destroyers, and cruisers to project power and protect commercial vessels from threats like Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Inflation is already surging due to port congestion and diversions around Africa to avoid the Red Sea but the sobering reality is that with large numbers of ships sinking, global trade would grind to a halt, creating an economic crisis not seen since the Great Depression. Such an economic collapse would devastate nations, and a world deprived of food and fertilizer shipments would face widespread famine, starvingmany millions. Even the most aggressive nations would recoil at such dire consequences.

A more likely scenario is an arms race where more ships of all types and flags are armed with more radars, armed guards, drones, missiles and defensive weapon systems.

Stavridis leaves us wanting more regarding the practical logistics of balancing these two forces. While he says that technology like anti-drone lasers and missile defense systems are essential, questions remain: How quickly and at what cost can we realistically scale up these defenses? How many systems like CWIS do we have in storage to be mounted on sealift ships during war? How quickly can new techolongies be deployed at sea? What types of ships in what regions will need the strongest defensive systems? Do ports, shipyards and naval bases also need to be protected from drones? How many salvage ships, tugboats, fireboats and drydocks would be needed to mitigate and repair ship damage?

Surface warships will certainly be relevant for convoy protection, but the U.S. lags behind China in shipbuilding pace. Allied efforts to expand naval fleets range from slow progress (e.g., Australia, Japan, France) to near-utter failure (Canada, New Zealand, Denmark).

In the United States, many advocate for Army and Air Force spending over naval forces, while the US Coast Guard and US Merchant Marine receive little public or media attention for funding. Even within the Navy, pushes to expand the fleet of submarines and aircraft carriers often overshadow the need for smaller, well-armed frigates capable of protecting ships, ports and supply lines. 

Also Read: Army Commands D.C. Spotlight, But It’s the Navy and Merchant Marine Fighting the Future Fight by John Konrad

While armies, air forces, and submarines excel at projecting power, our future economic stability will hinge on protecting trade—as it did in earlier times—rather than waging war. Historically, safeguarding ocean-going vessels from enemy threats has been the most crucial priority, even during wartime. In the current Red Sea crisis, however, traditional military assets like armies, air forces, carrier strike groups, and submarines are proving ineffective at defending merchant ships. Surface warships like the powerful Arleigh Burke-class destroyer are excelling in this role, but there simply aren’t enough warships in all of NATO’s mighty arsenal combined to do the job effectively because NATO has focused more on land and air power than sea.

Would an adversay like China even have to declare war if it armed it’s vast merchant, maritime militia, coast guard with anti-ship missiles while it’s Navy – now larger than the United States’ – protects the Chinese Merchant Navy from us? Could they simply sink allied merchant ships bound for the United States sending North America into a deep economic depression?

Is it possible that many (certainly not all) China’s warships are smaller and less capable than ours because they aren’t inteded to project power but instead protect trade?

If we’re going to maintain both unmanned and surface capabilities, how does the U.S. Navy plan to close the gap?

Stavridis’s point that “the bad guys get smarter eventually” is especially poignant. Russia has already adapted to some drone tactics in Ukraine, and we’re sure to see adversaries evolve even more creative ways to neutralize both surface ships and drones alike. It’s a constant arms race, and that’s exactly why this debate matters so much. The future of the sea is not either drones or ships—it’s both, operating in tandem, and for the U.S. to succeed, it needs to stay ahead in both domains.

This situation poses a significant problem. While the Department of Defense is committed to developing drone swarm capabilities, it’s not equally focused on shipbuilding. Today every single U.S. Navy shipbuilding project faces delays. Furthermore, the Coast Guard lacks robust anti-drone and missile defense systems. Additionally, there are fewer than a hundred U.S. Merchant Marine ships engaged in international trade, and these vessels lack even non-lethal defense systems.

If a naval drone and missile arms race has already started, the Pentagon seems oblivious to this new reality. 

In conclusion, Stavridis offers a sobering but hopeful outlook. The rise of unmanned systems doesn’t mark the end of surface warships, but it does signal the need for navies around the world to evolve. For the U.S., that means accelerating shipbuilding, advancing missile and laser defenses, and ensuring we’re not outpaced in drone warfare. The maritime world is transitioning, but like any good ship captain knows—smooth seas never made a skilled sailor.

His conclusion is stark but important. Should the United States spend money buulding more surface warships or drones?

His answer? Both, please!

Related WaPo Editorial: Opinion  More surface warships or more drones? Both, please.

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