Can The US Navy Deter War In The South China Sea?

by Admiral James Stavridis (Bloomberg Opinion) Summer may be fading, but things are heating up in the South China Sea. With China claiming essentially the entire water space — which is half the size of the continental US — many of the nations around the littoral have been pushing back, using their coast guards and merchant ships.

In June, a scuffle involving vessels from China and the Philippines near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal resulted in a Filipino seaman losing his thumb, crushed under the keel of a Chinese ship being maneuvered aggressively against his small craft.

Tensions between the two nations have continued to increase in a manner reminiscent of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, a conflict between Britain and Spain set off after a British sea captain had his ear severed by Spanish sailors in 1731. The war resulted in tens of thousands killed and hundreds of vessels lost.

Earlier this week, ships from the Chinese and Filipino coast guards found themselves engaging in the disputed waters of the South China Sea again, this time at Sabina Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands. Two ships collided, and each side blames the other for unprofessional seamanship leading to the smashup. What is clear is that the incident stemmed from the Chinese trying to stop the Philippines from operating around the shoal.

The Sabina Shoal is clearly within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone rightfully claimed by Manila. The issue has been adjudicated in the international courts, with China’s insistence on sweeping jurisdiction firmly rejected since a 2016 arbitration. Yet China continues to press its claims, enticed by massive oil and gas deposits, lucrative fishing grounds, and the potential to control the nearly 40% of global shipping that passes through the South China Sea.

Where is this heading, and what is the US role in calming disputes and deterring further Chinese aggression?

Let’s begin with a bedrock fact: The Philippines and the US are treaty allies, with a mutual defense agreement since 1951. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently visited Manila to cement the alliance and establish bilateral defense guidelines to enhance cooperation at every level.

This increased collaboration began in earnest with the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as president in 2022. (His predecessor, Roderigo Duterte, was far closer to China and a very difficult partner for the US.) Among other benefits, the Philippines has granted the US access to key military bases in the northern part of the islands — close to Taiwan.

Given that the US is obligated to come to the defense of the Philippines if an actual military conflict with China breaks out, it would be wise to further step up joint training with Manila’s navy, air force and coast guard units. Washington should facilitate the Philippines’ purchases of advanced US weapons and sensors, including better warships (some of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, now being decommissioned, might be appropriate). Manila also needs better radars and fighters, particularly the F-16, a simple but capable multirole combat aircraft.

Of course, all of this should be done in accordance with US law and policy regarding human rights — Duterte’s regime was rightly criticized for ruthlessness in carrying out what it said were counterterrorism and antidrug efforts.

In addition to working closely with Manila, the US should expand the international effort to push back on China’s territorial claims. This means first and foremost more “freedom of navigation” patrols. The idea is simple: by treating western Pacific waters as what they are — international “high seas” under United Nations parlance — we emphasize to China that we reject its claims of ownership.

I’ve conducted such operations many times — as a junior officer standing the deck watch on a destroyer, as operations officer aboard a cruiser, and as a commodore of a squadron of US destroyers. These meticulously planned operations lay out precise courses, points of turns, when to use (or not to use) radars and sonars, and how closely to approach Chinese vessels that may try to stop the operation.

In my experience, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s vessels have generally operated professionally and kept their physical distance, although they constantly pester our ships and badger them over VHF radio. In an increasingly tense environment, the US should carry out these missions in the company of allies, not only from the region, such as Australia and Japan, but also some North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, including British, French and German warships.

Such cruises can be integrated with larger exercises, such as the annual Balikatan war game involving more than 15,000 personnel from the US and Philippines.

Pushing back against China is a team sport. There is going to be an increasing number of flashpoints like the recent collisions in the Spratly Islands and Thomas Shoal. Let’s hope we don’t unleash a 21st century War of Jenkins’ Ear over something like the severed thumb of a Filipino sailor.

Admiral James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is the author most recently of “To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision.”

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