What does behavioral economics have to do with lifeboat safety?
Lifeboat safety has been a major topic recently with davit related incidents and injuries hitting a fever pitch in recent months. In a recent interview with Tradewinds Ove Roessland , CEO of lifeboat manufacturer Schat Harding, was quoted as saying ““Schat Harding welcomes any initiative that improves safety at sea, and the safety of lifeboats in particular.” “With respect to hooks, all the evidence is that properly designed on-load release hooks, when correctly maintained, are safe and fulfill the function they were designed for – to get seafarers and the boat safely away.” (Via BR)
[Continue Reading →]
Related Posts:
Tags: · lifeboat, maritime safety, Science, solas
Safety at Sea=PAP
By John G. Denham
In my naval experience I hated inspections more than storms. Most of the inspectors were knowledgeable, competent but tended to harp on what they knew and nit-picked technical items the average sailor barely understood. There were two exceptions: the Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) and the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). The ship was either determined ready and capable or it was not. I played several roles in those processes and gleaned an important lesson: a ship operates best when Policy, Attitude and Procedures are in sync.
Every ship at sea operates within some form of policy, be it the companies or the Master’s. The policy normally dictates the attitude in which procedures are executed. Success starts with a realistic policy. A policy that demands 100% effort all the time has little chance of success, whereas a reserve margin for emergencies provides probable achievement. If one can not pick-up the beat, the race may be lost.
The maritime situation today is rapidly changing; sailors are technicians, ships are mechanical, electronic packages of modern technology, the old buckets are disappearing, replaced by behemoths with a hand full of people in charge. Modernization and maximum-efficient processes are the order for survival.
Competency is not accomplished overnight or is a high test score an indication of skill. Competency, knowledge, skill, and experience are hard to acquire and are increasing in demand. There are groups, organizations and societies of highly qualified and experienced ex-mariners, licensed masters, captains, mates and engineers that have left the sea and sought employment in related trades and associated professions. Some have formed companies that provide special services to shipping companies e.g., pollution prevention, personnel and vessel manning, license and certification preparation, insurance, cargo operations, ship handling, navigation and seamanship etc. [Continue Reading →]
Related Posts:
Tags: · john denham, maritime safety, safety, safety-at-sea
Imagine, if you can, the confluence of events that would have to take place to leave you with marine flares being your primary method of signaling distress. The number of devices that have to fail or become unavailable to you is amazing. Your radios, GMDSS, SARTS, ERPIRBs, any number of SATCOM devices all have to be down (or gone) for pyrotechnics to be the best option. The things are the ultimate litmus test for a bad day at sea; i.e. If you ever find yourself launching a flare and you are not practicing, you are definitely having one. If you find yourself reading the directions on the label then things are much, much worse.
Perhaps because the use of pyrotechnics in an emergency is so rare, there are a lot of misconceptions about the devices, their practicality, and how to best use these “last ditch” signals. Here are some things all mariners should consider before pulling the trigger (or pulling the lanyard, or lever, or…): [Continue Reading →]
Related Posts:
Tags: · lifeboat, maritime safety, rescue at sea, sar, solas, USCG
Pilotage Paradox
by Paul Drouin
The Cosco Busan accident, as with many others that have the same root cause, can be categorized into what I call the pilotage paradox. For on the one hand, we wish to confide the safety and con of the vessel to the pilot, yet on the other insist it is the crew and captain that are ultimately responsible and accountable for the safe conduct of the vessel.
In the seven minute interval between leaving the inner harbour and striking the bridge pylon, the pilot gave 13 helm orders without the slightest indication on the bridge of the Cosco Busan that anything was amiss. We know this because the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has left an amazing amount of information on their public docket website, including transcripts of the bridge voice recordings.
Leaving berth 56 (Port of Oakland) and passing under the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge is a relatively simple matter, even under blind pilotage conditions, as only two course changes bring you through the span. The Delta-Echo span of the bridge is wide, with a horizontal clearance of 673 meters, and is equipped with a RACON dead center of the span. For the Cosco Busan, winds were light and the vessel would be stemming the flood current as it passed under the bridge. This maneuver should not give an experienced 3rd Mate cause to sweat, much less an experienced pilot.
Under keel clearance was not great for the Cosco Busan, however, and as a consequence hydrodynamic forces on the hull caused by the flood tide would have been strong as the vessel’s sidebody came to obstruct the flow, which was setting at approximately 130° (T) near the bridge and anywhere up to 168° (T) further from the bridge. [Continue Reading →]
Related Posts:
Tags: · accident, allision, bay bridge, cosco-busan, cosco_busan, disaster, Marine Incidents, maritime pilots, maritime safety, ntsb, oil, safety, San Francisco, san franscisco bay
gCaptain On Twitter
gCaptain On Facebook
gCaptain On LinkedIn