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Safety at Sea=PAP

By John G. Denham

In my naval experience I hated inspections more than storms. Most of the inspectors were knowledgeable, competent but tended to harp on what they knew and nit-picked technical items the average sailor barely understood. There were two exceptions: the Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) and the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). The ship was either determined ready and capable or it was not. I played several roles in those processes and gleaned an important lesson: a ship operates best when Policy, Attitude and Procedures are in sync.

Every ship at sea operates within some form of policy, be it the companies or the Master’s. The policy normally dictates the attitude in which procedures are executed. Success starts with a realistic policy. A policy that demands 100% effort all the time has little chance of success, whereas a reserve margin for emergencies provides probable achievement. If one can not pick-up the beat, the race may be lost.

The maritime situation today is rapidly changing; sailors are technicians, ships are mechanical, electronic packages of modern technology, the old buckets are disappearing, replaced by behemoths with a hand full of people in charge. Modernization and maximum-efficient processes are the order for survival.

Competency is not accomplished overnight or is a high test score an indication of skill. Competency, knowledge, skill, and experience are hard to acquire and are increasing in demand. There are groups, organizations and societies of highly qualified and experienced ex-mariners, licensed masters, captains, mates and engineers that have left the sea and sought employment in related trades and associated professions. Some have formed companies that provide special services to shipping companies e.g., pollution prevention, personnel and vessel manning, license and certification preparation, insurance, cargo operations, ship handling, navigation and seamanship etc. [Continue Reading →]

Pilotage Paradox

by Paul Drouin

The Cosco Busan accident, as with many others that have the same root cause, can be categorized into what I call the pilotage paradox. For on the one hand, we wish to confide the safety and con of the vessel to the pilot, yet on the other insist it is the crew and captain that are ultimately responsible and accountable for the safe conduct of the vessel.

In the seven minute interval between leaving the inner harbour and striking the bridge pylon, the pilot gave 13 helm orders without the slightest indication on the bridge of the Cosco Busan that anything was amiss. We know this because the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has left an amazing amount of information on their public docket website, including transcripts of the bridge voice recordings.

Leaving berth 56 (Port of Oakland) and passing under the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge is a relatively simple matter, even under blind pilotage conditions, as only two course changes bring you through the span. The Delta-Echo span of the bridge is wide, with a horizontal clearance of 673 meters, and is equipped with a RACON dead center of the span. For the Cosco Busan, winds were light and the vessel would be stemming the flood current as it passed under the bridge. This maneuver should not give an experienced 3rd Mate cause to sweat, much less an experienced pilot.

Under keel clearance was not great for the Cosco Busan, however, and as a consequence hydrodynamic forces on the hull caused by the flood tide would have been strong as the vessel’s sidebody came to obstruct the flow, which was setting at approximately 130° (T) near the bridge and anywhere up to 168° (T) further from the bridge. [Continue Reading →]