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Empty Army watercraft backed up onto a beach with tanks and equipment waiting to load

Army Logistic Support Vessel 2 - U.S. Army Vessel CW3 Harold A. Clinger, manned by a 163rd Transportation Detachment crew, got underway from its homeport at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July 2 to conduct the first of eight surface lifts between Kaneohe Bay and Kawaihae Harbor in support of 3rd Marines as part of the biennial Rim of the Pacific 2014 exercise. (U.S. Army photo by Gaelen Lowers,)

Government Watchdog Blasts US Army For Watercraft Failures

John Konrad
Total Views: 2593
October 19, 2024

by Captain John Konrad (gCaptain) The US Army continues to ask for more money claiming its the lynchpin in a future Pacific War but this week the Government Accountability Office released a report on the state of the Army’s watercraft fleet shines a light on the staggering incompetence of Army leadership when it comes to managing one of their most critical logistical assets. This damning document reveals that while the Army’s watercraft are supposed to play a pivotal role in supporting joint force logistics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, the entire operation is in a state of near-collapse.

Here’s a summary of just how bad things are: the Army’s watercraft fleet, designed to move and distribute supplies, personnel, and equipment throughout the Indo-Pacific theature, has seen its fully mission-capable rate plummet from an already lackluster 75% in 2020 to a pitiful 40% in 2024. That’s right—less than half of the Army’s 70 watercraft vessels are available at any given time. And we’re not talking about a temporary dip. This has been a steady decline – accompanied by large and purposeful divestitures – signaling not just a failure to maintain readiness but a complete inability to keep essential assets afloat—literally.

This is the fleet expected to support amphibious operations in the Indo-Pacific theater—a region the Department of Defense (DOD) prioritizes as the primary arena for future conflict with China. Yet, despite knowing this, the Army has struggled with maintenance issues for years, continuing to rely on handwritten systems (yes, in 2024!) to manage repairs, with some vessels languishing in shipyards for over five years. How does this happen? How does the Army allow its vessels to rot, unable to train personnel or support missions, and still expect to meet the logistical demands of a future war?

How can the American public and congress overlook massive failures in Army Watercraft operations and logistics during the construction of the Gaza Pier without demanding accountability?

Also read: U.S. Army to Divest a Majority of its Watercraft and Maritime Capability

Then there’s the question of modernization. Sure, the Army is developing a new watercraft strategy—great news, right? Except it’s been years in the making and remains in draft form with no clear indication of when it will be finalized or implemented. In the meantime, we are relying on decades old rust buckets. When readiness rates are this low, it’s not just a question of when new vessels will be built but how the Army plans to keep its current fleet operational in the face of these massive gaps.

So will the Army address the concerns GOA presents? That’s unlikely considering this is a rerun of what happened with the Corps of Engineers’ dredge fleet. Back in 2014, the GAO blasted Army leadership for how outdated equipment, procedures and a reluctance to adopt new cost-estimating measures had put the Army’s dredging capabilities in jeopardy. Despite that warning, nothing changed. In fact, things got worse. The McFarland, one of the oldest dredges, is still limping along after nearly six decades of hard service, with modernization efforts continually pushed back due to “budget constraints.” Meanwhile, Army officials twiddle their thumbs, delaying decisions on whether to retire or replace aging vessels. The dredging fleet’s condition is now even worse than it was a decade ago.

Also read: How the ‘West Point Mafia’ Runs Washington

In the past US Navy Admirals would become livid if warships were stuck in ports awaiting dredging and Army watercraft could not deliver supplies, help protect ports and provide armed guards on Merchant Marine ships. But today’s Admirals in the kinder and gentler DoD don’t publically push back against the so called West Point Mafia.

The leadership’s lack of urgency is appalling. According to the GAO, Army officials continue to delay action on even the most basic reforms, with governance bodies failing to meet regularly, make critical decisions, or implement the comprehensive changes needed. In a shocking display of ineptitude, the Army only recently established a Watercraft Enterprise Executive Board in February 2024—decades late and still without a proper governance framework. What they are able to accomplish happens at a snails pace. The first replacement to massive divestitures of equipment under the Trump administration was contracted in 2019 but not completed until last year.

Also Read: U.S. Army Watercraft: Lost at Sea -Opinion

The watercraft report also highlights repeated failures in vessel safety. One particularly outrageous case involved a bow ramp that detached and fell into the Pacific Ocean. Despite warnings dating back to 2010, the Army didn’t act until GAO intervention. This neglect almost led to catastrophic failure, and many vessels failed subsequent safety inspections. It took external pressure for Army leadership to move, and even then, repairs were delayed and inadequate.

And, of course, the Army continues to throw money at the problem without addressing the root causes. The Army has spent over $7 million on contractor support to sail vessels that their personnel can’t operate due to outdated manuals—manuals they won’t update until 2026! This reliance on contractors is nothing more than a Band-Aid for a bullet wound. Instead of fixing the underlying issues, the Army prefers to hemorrhage money and time, compromising readiness and, ultimately, national security.

The Army leadership’s lack of vision, failure to address risks, and inability to make effective decisions are driving this fleet—and the entire mission it supports—into the ground. In a future conflict, these deficiencies won’t just be a bureaucratic problem; they’ll be the difference between success and failure. We cannot wait for a new fleet or for the Army to get its act together. The time for action was yesterday, and the failures outlined in this report demand immediate and drastic reform. Anything less is a direct threat to the Army’s ability to perform its most critical functions in a time of war.

Read Next: It Looks Like We Are Going To Have to Swim For It – The End of the Army’s Navy

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