



## Joint Maritime Information Center




# JMIC INFONOTE 15JUL\_05 – USV ATTACK INVOLVING A LIBERIA-FLAGGED TANKER VESSEL, CHIOS LION, 97NM NW OF AL-HUDAYDAH, YEMEN.

## INCIDENT REPORT

1. There was a reported USV attack on a Liberia-Flagged Tanker Vessel, CHIOS LION (IMO: 9398280), while transiting the Southern Red Sea, approximately 97NM NW of Al-Hudaydah, Yemen on 15 JUL 24 at 1209 (UTC). Reference UKMTO Incident Warning 100. (See **Picture 1** for incident location).

Picture 1: Incident Location





2. The JMIC has confirmed that CHIOS LION was attacked by a USV, impacting on port side, resulting in minor damage. The vessel was underway with AIS off when targeted 97NM NW from the coast of Yemen. While originally headed south, following the attack the vessel turned around and back north out of the threat area to further assess damage and investigate potential oil spillage. The Master of the CHIOS LION reported all crew on board safe.

3. JMIC has investigated and assesses this vessel was targeted due to other vessels within its company structure making port calls in Israel [*in alignment with Houthi's statement on 4 May 2024 to target all vessels from a company and/or group that had any vessel calling into Israel.*]

## JMIC GUIDANCE

4. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from 16N to 047E remain a threat area based on the Houthis ability to attack vessels with various capabilities. The current threat assessment identifies:

- a. Vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
- b. Any vessel within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the company has been identified making port calls to Israel

5. **Vessels** intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:

- a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area
- b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intra-ship UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting
  - i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise safety & security of the vessel



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- ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
  - d. Do not loiter when transiting this threat area and proceed with caution
  - e. If contacted by any unrecognized organisation:
    - i. Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
  - f. If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
    - i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
    - ii. Describe incident in follow up reports to UKMTO
  - g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
    - i. UAV sightings
    - ii. Communications challenges
  - h. In case of any unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
    - i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
    - ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
    - iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
    - iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)
- 6. **Maritime Industry** is recommended to:
  - a. Conduct threat & risk assessment of all **associated** vessels and especially those that may have previous US, UK or Israel ownership or associations [*to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure*]
  - b. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
  - c. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
  - d. Review digital footprint
  - e. The JMIC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators
    - i. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
    - ii. Any response should be carefully considered



- iii. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi's Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company's CSO
- f. Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual
  - i. JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy

**Additional Resources on Incident:**

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

**Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:**

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea:

<https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers:

7. [https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file\\_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2](https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2)