Our friend Richard Rodriguez of the BitterEnd Blog had an excellent post titled VTS – Working with large vessels, that gives Puget Sound boaters tips on communicating with the numerous large ships transiting to and from port.

The post had me thinking about my frequent dealings with Vessel Traffic Services worldwide like the time we entered the Singapore Straights and our Captain ordered, despite loud protests, the deck crew to finish chipping paint on the Flying Bridge. The result… the mate on watch missed a few critical calls from the local vessel controllers and they basically shut down the port for 20 minutes to give us plenty of sea room…. and a $25,000 fine!

Once my mind was past reminding me of few sea stories to tell at the next CAMM meeting I started to realize that I had no idea what the VTS stations I have been calling look like. So here they are:

United States:

The Volpe Center recently implemented a vessel communications and tracking network for the Saint Lawrence Seaway. The network, based on the automatic identification system, promises improved safety, security, and efficiency throughout the Seaway. Above, the new system in use at the Eisenhower Lock vessel traffic control center in New York. (Photo courtesy of Mr. Kam Chin)

New York, NY – Seaman Operations Specialist Jason Dailey, sector operator at the Vessel Traffic Center at Coast Guard Activities New York, Staten Island, N.Y. monitors vessel traffic in the New York Harbor. USCG photo by PA2 Mike Hvozda.

BM2 Erin de la Cruz, a controller at Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) Houston, monitors the tracks of numerous ships and barges as they make their way along one of largest concentrations of heavy industry and maritime traffic in the world.

At LOOP‘s Marine Terminal, vessel traffic controllers maintain a 24-hour watch over all vessel traffic in the LOOP controlled safety zone. Similar to air traffic controllers, they monitor radar and maintain continual radio communication with tankers.

NorControl VOC 5060 system as installed and operating at the
Marine Exchange’s Vessel Traffic Center, which runs VTS for
Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard

Europe:

Monitoring vessel traffic in the South West Lane. The three screens to the right of the picture provide the operator with live radar coverage of vessel traffic throughout the Dover Strait

The Vessel Traffic Service Centre in Bremen

London

Horten Norway

Asia:

The Chief Executive, Mr Donald Tsang, visiting the Hong Kong Marine Department to better understand their work in vessel traffic control, marine rescue and co-ordination, as well as ship registry and safety inspections.

VTS Hong Kong

Singapore

Vessel Traffic Service Links;

• World VTS Guide
• International VTS consultants
• VTS – Wikipedia
• VTS Videos

Click here to view the embedded video.

NOTE: Touch down occurs at about 2:00

by Captain John Denham

The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to provide active monitoring and navigational advice for vessels in particularly confined and busy waterways. There are two main types of VTS, surveilled and non-surveilled. Surveilled systems consist of one or more land-based sensors (i.e. radar, and closed circuit television sites), which output their signals to a central location where operators monitor and manage vessel traffic movement. Non-surveilled systems consist of one or more reporting points at which ships are required to report their identity, course, speed, and other data to the monitoring authority. They encompass a wide range of techniques and capabilities aimed at preventing vessel collisions, rammings, and groundings in the harbor, harbor approach and inland waterway phase of navigation. They are also designed to expedite ship movements, increase transportation system efficiency, and improve all-weather operating capability.”

The above quoted purpose of VTS is considered inaccurate based on the purposes state by two of California’s most involved VTS; San Francisco and Los Angeles. Contested are the words active and manage although included in its purpose, in fact these words are not factual. Active can infer real time or instantaneous and manage can be interpreted to mean supervisory and or directive by order or command.

The rules to prevent collisions require that all vessels shall maintain a proper lookout by all available means as appropriate. The Federal Code of Regulations and the U,S. Code require if radar is installed it should be operational and operated by qualified observers. And, the ordinary practice of seaman implies that mariners should use common sense, professional skill and apply lawfully mandated procedures in a seamanly manner. Therefore, as per the ordinary practice of seaman, if VTS is available, one should accept its assistance as it fulfills the requirements of proper seamanship.

The missing ingredient for VTS fulfillment is local knowledge, skill and experience; the primary traits of pilotage. Unquestionably an experienced pilot is a great asset to help complete or commence a successful voyage. The public relies on pilots to protect them from marine catastrophes caused by wayward ships. The history of ocean transportation is replete with testimony where nations have invoked strict rules to control ill prepared ship masters from causing calamities in peaceful harbors. Mandatory pilotage is a business, a profession and a public safety measure. VTS was conceived as a tool to increase that safety measure.

All VTS are not the same although the purpose is. San Francisco and Los Angeles California are in the same state and yet the two VTS operate and are managed differently.

San Francisco

“We (USCG) execute our mission by MONITORING vessels movements, INFORMING mariners of other vessels and potential hazards, RECOMMENDING courses of action when we see a situation that the mariner may not have seen, and DIRECTING the outcome of situations when necessary to prevent disasters.”

Los Angeles-Long Beach

The goal of the Los Angeles/Long Beach VTS is to provide seamless navigational information to improve vessel transit safety. The USCG/Marine Exchange/Los Angeles and Long Beach pilot organizations have worked together to create a unique system. It is a cooperative effort of the State of California, the USCG, Marine Exchange of Southern California and the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach under the authority of the California Code, Harbor and Navigation sections.

Using one recent example: M/V Cosco Busan allision with the fender on “D” tower of the San Francisco-Okland Bay Bridge on November 7, 2007, a casual reader can determine by the mission statement alone, the San Francisco VTS was not oriented to fulfill the needed leadership and coordination role of a VTS.

San Francisco VTS is a government facility operated as a service and not a system. Its function is authoritative and not cooperative and it exists within its own environment, rules and controls. Although participating in community maters there is no functional capability to provide local knowledge, skill or experience in a seamless manner to increase harbor safety. The lack of those needed traits, local knowledge, skill and experience in preventing accidents was confirmed on 7 November 2007. However, readily available a short distance away is an abundance of such traits. The state of California supports the San Francisco Bar Pilots and provides a franchise to guarantee a proper life with regular employment and benefits. Whereas the SF VTS relies on relatively young persons lacking in local knowledge, skill and experience to safe guard the waters of the bay and region .It seems that some arrangement could be reached whereby those traits were constantly available in the VTS in San Francisco.

Captain John Denham is a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. he is also author of The Assistant and DD 891 .

NetworkWorld.com is reporting that the US Air Forces is looking to artificial intelligence for controlling aricraft. Automated ATC – now there’s a concept. Here’s an excerpt: “DARPA says the artificial intelligence software will learn by assembling knowledge from different sources-including generating knowledge by reasoning. According to a Military & Aerospace item, such software has to combine limited observations with subject expertise, general knowledge, reasoning, and by asking what-if questions.”

As a private pilot, I just can’t wait, let alone accept that HAL will eventually sequence me in the pattern.

As a licensed mariner, I can just imagine VTS moving to such an automated system. While it’s possible for federal pencil pushers to justify such a cost saving system; it’s that kind of logic that will lead to the end of the world as we know it.

Imagine the Coast Guard doing away with all Aids to Navigation and issuing a chart plotter to each mariner, both professional and recreational. Sure, it would save money, but the results would be catastrophic.

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This post was written by Richard Rodriguez, Rescue Tug Captain, and US Coast Guard approved instructor for License Training. You can read more of his articles at the BitterEnd of the net.

Fairplay brings us the most ridiculous item of the day;

Vessels transiting US harbours could come under tight navigational controls in the wake of the Cosco Busan bridge strike and resulting spill in San Francisco Bay. Sources close to the investigation tell Fairplay that federal officials may suggest that vessels transiting US channels may be compelled to follow navigational instructions issued by the US Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Service. In the case of the Cosco Busan accident, it has been alleged that VTS duty officers tried to warn the vessel off its impact course with the Bay Bridge, but their advice is just that and not mandatory for vessel operators. Fairplay asked USCG Commandant Thad Allen about the suggestion and he said that, if required to, the Coast Guard is up to the challenge of positively controlling commercial vessel traffic. But he noted that most major US harbors presently don’t have VTS systems and that such a change would require a major financial commitment “and a departure from the current culture regarding vessel navigation responsibility”. The suggested system would be along the lines of air traffic control procedures which Allen says were developed centuries after the traditional rules for vessel captains and pilots.

The problem with maritime incidents is the fix rarely address the true cause and often creates problems that contribute to future incidents. As an example here’s an email from a gCaptain reader who wishes to remain anonymous;

“The new ISPS reporting requirements are sinking us in paperwork. Just yesterday I was on bridge watch in moderate traffic, typing a report out on my laptop. For 15 minutes our captain observed my action from the chart room then came out and said:

5 Years ago if I saw you typing a report on that F$@@’n laptop I would have fired you on the spot. Today, with all these ISM/ISPS requirements, if I come up here and find your not on your laptop typing out reports, I’ll fire you on the spot!

I was paying attention to the traffic but we both knew it didn’t have my full attention… and these reports were suppose to be making us safer!! I don’t feel safer and I don’t feel the paperwork will keep terrorists away from my ship”

Unsafe indeed.

Vessel Traffic in US ports is exceptionally well run and experienced in vessel safety and operations. They do not make the proposal ridiculous, Admiral Allen does. Why? Current technology is simply not capable of delivering real time tracking. Also, final say remains the responsibility of a ship’s captain because he is the one who knows the ship’s capabilities, it’s crew and he is stationed on the bridge. He is also the last one to abandon if the ship finds danger… and he knows it.

If the Coast Guard wants final say then they need to be aboard the vessel and if that happens they will be hard pressed to fill the position with anyone more qualified than the competent and experienced San Francisco Pilots.

UPDATE:

Bob Couttie of Maritime Accident Casebook comments on this post;

VTS-assisted accidents, by action or inaction, aren’t rare, or at least not rare enough. John Clandillon-Baker, editor of The Pilot, journal of the UK Maritime Pilots Association sent us an email reminder about the Sea Express/Alaska Rainbow collision in February, 2007. VTS issues also featured in the grounding of the P&O Nedlloyd Magellan in 2001, and the source or worst oil spill so far in Singapore waters, the collision between the Evoikos and Orapin Global in October 1997. One can arguably include the Exxon Valdez.

USCG Commandant Thad Allen’s assurance to Fairplay that his command is up to the challenge has a Rice-Davies sort of quality to it, he would say that, wouldn’t he.

MAC’s own informal think-tank of veteran master mariners, who aren’t tanked up when they think, finds the proposal less objectionable, the authority of the master will remain in force much as it does now, in their view.

This is only a clip of Bob’s article so be sure to read his full post: “Cosco Busan – Who Needs Pilots?“

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John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.

I am pleased to report a significant amount of positive feedback from mariners when discussing new MARAD (Maritime Administration) initiatives. In addition to being on the forefront of new LNG programs they are aggressively pursuing new ways of providing job opportunities for U.S. Mariners and, the *word on the street* is they are even working with the IRS to protect our interests with regards to the Sailor Tax Deduction Debacle.

One of the programs that gets too little attention is the Marine Highway Initiative. What is the program nicknamed “American’s Marine Highway” all about. Maritime Administrator, Sean T. Connaughton tells us;

Our marine highways are a cost effective, yet under utilized, method for the movement of passengers, containers, and bulk cargoes that is especially fuel efficient, safe, and reliable.

Accelerated use of the waterborne transportation mode holds forth a special promise for tomorrow in; reducing traffic congestion, enhancing freight flow, expanding freight capacity, and providing a new pathway for hazardous materials.

Maybe it’s because MARAD touts advantageous like “new pathway for hazardous materials” over headline grabbing sound bites that key into popular culture (how about “America’s Green Highway – Moving Cargo While Reducing Greenhouse Gas”) but the program contains major benefits for industry, consumers and the environment.

Despite a long line of marketing errors they might finally be on the right track with the attractive logo seen below and a new video that makes you ask; Why haven’t we been doing this all along?

Youtube commentary;

While sailing on San Francisco Bay we had a close encounter with a container ship. The container ship honked at the other sailboat. We had space to turn…but when we tried the container ship blocked our wind. That captain was a hell of a driver! He threaded between our two little sailboats.

I don’t think I need to comment on these boaters but I will say if you’re a boater and sail in an area of heavy ship traffic head over to the Bitterend End blog an soak up some collision avoidance knowledge. You can start here: VTS – Working with large vessels

Prior to being asked to comment the Chronicle’s lead maritime reporter contacted our friend Captain Kelly Sweeny who discussed industry wide problems with marine technology. The article states;

Sweeney said the AIS is “occasionally unreliable,” has blind spots such as when a ship is behind islands or structures, and is “antiquated” when compared with modern electronics.

Rewinding to my conversation with the reporters, the first question asked was; “Captain Sweeny believes the system used by San Francisco’s Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is antiquated, do you agree?” After requesting further clarification I was asked why the pilot’s data on his Electronic Chart Display was trusted over VTS’s radar and AIS information.

My answer was “VTS’ AIS system is susceptible to the delay inherit in the VHF transmission of AIS data” BUT, to be honest my initial gut reaction was, “no AIS is not antiquated… it was fully implemented less then 3 years ago”, I quickly corrected myself. My second answer was quoted in the article and reads;

“The maritime industry is slow to act on electronic devices,” said Capt. John Konrad, who runs a Web site called gCaptain. “By the time they get approvals on electronics, they are obsolete.”

Why the quick change of opinion? It’s because I love AIS.

This technology, properly called Automatic Identification Systems, allows me to overlay important data on my radar displays. It also allows me to contact a ship with a zero cpa (collision course) with great ease. For example, prior to AIS I would have to say “Calling the vessel in position x.xx degrees N, x.xx degrees west on a course of 267 and speed of 6knots this is the xxx on channel 16″ where now I simply look up the ship’s name and say “This is the xxx calling yyy on channel 16″. Furthermore the AIS display gives me the vessels MMSI number which opens up new and creative ways to avoid collisions. Finally, my AIS digital read-out really saved the day (and my career?) when our radars, as the Cosco Busan’s Pilot John Cota said “conked out”.

That was not my only hesitation. San Francisco Pilots are some of the most respected individuals in our profession (a dream job for myself) and I only have positive things to say about my dealings with VTS. So could they be wrong in their choice of equipment? It seemed unlikely.

In defending VTS and the Coast Guard’s systems another respected expert, Rear Adm. Craig Bone – Coast Guard district commander, commented on questions raised by myself and others. In covering today’s hearing The Chronicle reports;

Bone said he could think of no excuse for the crash. He denied reports by maritime sources claiming the electronic systems the Coast Guard uses are out of date. The pilot equipment and onboard navigational equipment are some of the most advanced, he said.

“There is no basis in my mind for this to have ever occurred,” Bone said. “Something on that ship had to go terribly wrong. It was totally preventable.”

So the question becomes; “If AIS is a loved safety improvement endorsed by maritime experts worldwide why does Captain Kelly (and myself!) consider it antiquated?”

The reason is because we can do better! In the world of cutting edge technology solutions are available now that would have given Cota and VTS a much better chance of avoiding the incident. The problem, that I suspect is an industry wide tendency, is two fold. First we are so far behind the technology curve small improvements, like AIS, seem large and exciting. Second, most licensed captains are Luddites (my self included) who want to make sure a new system is reliable before implementing it aboard ships.

I come to this conclusion because, despite my writings on the need to improve shipboard technology (most notably HERE and HERE), I initially had the same reaction as Adm. Bone but quickly changed my mind. Why? Because Capt. Kelly is correct, our systems are antiquated and when new lifesaving improvements become available we must break away from the statement that has been rehearsed by ship captains for centuries; “Only history will tell if this is a good idea”. Exciting changes are happening worldwide and improvements in communications (the number one failure in all good incident chains) are leading the way. We must change with the times and embrace technology as the benefit is a reduction of incidents and a preservation of the environment and human life.

For more information on this topic visit our Archives.

Still agreeing with Admiral Bone? Take a look at technology used by Tampa Pilots or Maine Pilots, upcoming portable ECDIS units, the VTS tracking system in Valdez, well documented problems with AIS Ask yourself “Can I send an area specific sitor message via GMDSS” or “Why can my son video chat with a pen pal in China while I’m having trouble raising a vessel 1000 yards away… and closing?”

Captain John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage currently working aboard an 835′ship in the Gulf of Mexico. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.

 Once the US National Transportation Safety Board has produced the transcripts of the voyage data recorder from the Cosco Busan (Formerly the Hanjin Cairo, the Hanjin name remains on the ship side) we’ll have a better idea of who said what to whom and when. Currently only the pilot’s version of events is available and it is raising a number of questions.

A malfunctioning radar appears to have been an element, though not the cause, of the incident and so far there has been no indication regarding the second radar on the ship’s bridge. Given that there was poor visibility, was the speed of the vessel excessive? Should departure have been delayed until the fog cleared.

The pilot was not familiar with the ECDIS equipment onboard, which does not appear to have malfunctioned. When the pilot asked the Captain to point out the centre of the bridge span the captain allegedly pointed to the bridge support and the pilot navigated accordingly.

With an apparently malfunctioning radar and a lack of familiarity with the primary method of navigation, did the pilot seek to confirm the vessels position with the VTS and/or the accompanying tug?

VTS informed the pilot that the ship was off course, which the Pilot disputed and shortly afterwards a lookout shouted a warning that there was a bridge support ahead and the vessel went hard right and allided with the Delta bridge support.

There also appears to have been a lack of detail in the master/pilot exchange when the latter took conduct of the vessel, as the pilot’s lawyer admits. Would the missing information have been enought to prevent the incident?

There may also have been communications problems between the American pilot and the bridge team who were Chinese. Of there were, to what extent did they reduce the pilot and the bridge team’s situational awareness?

It is not uncommon for pilots to ‘go it alone’ rather than work with a bridge team with whom communication is problematic. This increases the workload on the pilot and reduces his situational awareness. Had the pilot and the bridge team undergone bridge team/bridge resource management training?

Incidents such as this rarely have a single cause, or a single responsible individual. They are usually the result of systemic problems with Bridge Team Management, leadership, culture and navigational practices.

It will be a while before we know the full story of the Cosco Busan, but we’ll hit that bridge when we get to it.

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Bob Couttie has written for a number of maritime industry publications, including the prestigious Lloyd’s List International daily newspaper and Lloyd’s Ship Manager magazine. His reportage on problems with ship’s officer certification examinations in the Philippines in the late 1990s influenced the adoption of computerized examinations for ship officers by the country’s Professional Regulatory Commission.

Bob currently writes and produces podcasts for The Maritime Accident Casebook

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The Coast Guard did not warn helmsmen of a cargo ship that spilled 58,000 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay that the ship was poised to hit the Bay Bridge, investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said. One board member, Debbie Hersman, said the Vessel Traffic Service of the Coast Guard asked the pilot of the ship, the Cosco Busan, about its course before the accident. “They all recognized and were concerned about the vessel’s position,” Ms. Hersman said. But the traffic workers told investigators they decided to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver.

Now I promised you I wouldn’t correct minor mistakes made by the media so I’ll just offer a gCaptain tshirt to the person who catches the first error made by Carolyn Marshall in the linked article. I will, however, continue to report on major mistakes and I believe the misleading title is just that. Saying “Ship Got No Alert From Coast Guard” contradicts the article’s context which clearly states that VTS warned the pilot of an observed error in the vessel’s course. The San Francisco Chronicle goes in more depth writing;

“As we approached the bridge, I received a radio call from Vessel Traffic Service saying I was on a (southwesterly course that was wrong) and asking what my intentions were,” he said.

He said his instruments showed he was heading roughly northwest, a significant difference from what the Coast Guard was seeing on its instruments. Such a difference could indicate that something was wrong with the ship’s electronic navigating equipment.

Cota said the ship’s radar systems failed him, but the NTSB said Thursday that the ship had two completely independent radar systems, suggesting that it was unlikely that both would stop functioning at the same time. Continue Reading…

So what happened and was VTS’ concern for distracting the pilot valid? It is important to note VTS serves in an advisory role and, despite their physical location on shore, plays an important role in Bridge Resource Management ( BRM ). In a previous post we wrote:

(Bridge Resource Management) is a class all officers must take in both teamwork and processing the large amounts of data (lookout reports, radar, radio comms, gps charting, weather information….) that pours into the bridge.

With the error observed, ship notified and a response received VTS remained silent to give the pilot time to process the information and regain situational awareness. I’m just not sure why the media thinks the decision to “to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver” is newsworthy.