Image courtesy Maersk Line

An Algerian newspaper reports a local al-Qaeda cell planned to launch boats loaded with explosives at US and European ships with aid of suicide bombers.

Algerian security forces have thwarted a terrorist suicide attack by the “al-Qaeda organization in the Maghreb” targeting European and American ships in the Mediterranean, Algeria-based daily e-Chorouk reported.

According to the report, three people were arrested over suspected involvement in the plot, H. Rabeh, T. Belal, and M. Tarek — who all hail from the city of Annaba in northeastern Algeria.   They admitted that they were operating under the authority of Maghreb-based al-Qaeda PR chief, Qassemi Salah al-Din, also known as Mohamed Abu Salah.

The terror cell they were members of purchased a boat and equipped it with navigational equipment. They planned on loading the boat with explosives and launching it towards American and European vessels, according to the suicide bombers’ preferences.

The newspaper reported that the three were arrested after they aroused suspicions by visiting the same internet cafes on a daily basis where they would surf global Jihad websites.  Eventually, security forces specializing in cyber-crimes traced them.

The plot was also set to “undermine the national economy and reverberate in the global media” by offering media outlets real-time information.

By Jeffrey J. Milstein, Moran Office of Maritime and Port Security (MOMPS) 

There are many different types of possible terrorists, but the simplest definition for the successful ”terrorist” is: one supported by an organization capable of significant funding, providing training and with the foresight to plot scenarios dedicated to causing mass casualties and impact.  That being said, if someone is dedicated enough to give their life for a cause, they want one hundred percent confirmation of a target or as close to that as possible.  Every terrorist wants to be the next Bin Laden and not to be some fool who showed up at the wrong spot and blew himself up.  Because of this, a terrorist may spend as many as five to ten years planning for an attack.  However, if they arrive on site for a dry run before the big day and find the attack might not be successful, then it’s back to square one and on to planning for the next identified weak target.

Recreational vessels operate in close proximity to a docked containership, photo by Jeffrey Milstein

People often forget that what makes a threat is not just the idea; it’s the possibility of a proven vector of threat (i.e. method, path or tool that utilizes the threat to perpetrate an attack).  Anyone can come up with the good idea, just look at the thriller section in Netflix and you will see that.  What makes a threat vector realistic is the idea itself and the probability of success.  If the probability of success is high and can be proven, the idea holds water and we have a problem.  For example, anyone screaming “Nuclear attack!” needs to take into consideration that nuclear weapons are not so easy to obtain and smuggle, and they’re even harder to make, maintain and ensure they work.  Furthermore, there needs to be validity as to where purported weapons of mass destruction have come from.  For example, even though a Nuke would cause ninety billion dollars in destruction the probability of this type of attack is so low that it creates a vector value below the benchmark needed to consider it a daily threat.  However, something that could be made much easier like a dirty bomb, which could still cause considerable destruction, is more of a realistic threat once divided by the probability.

So, with this said, why aren’t most gaps or weaknesses identified as a threat vector?

The real answer is there isn’t enough time in the day to tackle the unbelievable quantity of gaps and weakness we face in our ports, and then check them against the chances of probability or possibility.  The truly dedicated, overworked men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) are the most underfunded branch of the U.S. Military and can’t do the job on their own.  In a perfect world, the best way to test probability of a possible threat is via covert operations as Richard Marcinko did in 1984 with the establishment of the Naval Security Coordination Team OP-06D, or more commonly known as “Red Cell”.  Lack of funding however, and an embarrassing lack of understanding from our legislators and regulators of how the maritime industry operates means these types of operations are rarely conducted, and when they are, they’re usually in a vacuum.  Because of this, Congress opts to try and tackle the low-hanging fruit and the topics that will generate the most publicity.  More often than not, they do not consist of things that we need the most protection from, just those things that might not kill a bill before Congress or in some cases need to be attached to something to make it more “interesting” in order to help to get support and be passed.

A perfect example of this is the “Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 or more commonly known as the “Safe Port Act,” which was an act of Congress in which an online gambling measure was added at the last moment.  You may be asking yourself, what does internet gambling have to do with port security for the entire nation? -It doesn’t. It was added because the bill could not get enough support and was going to be killed on the floor until this measure was added.

Fortunately the bill passed, however it’s  an embarrassing example that a bill that includes things like the creation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), establishment of interagency operational centers for port security, the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), Container Security Initiative (CSI), requirements for foreign port assessments, the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (CT-PAT) and possibly the most important the creation of a new agency within the DHS called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) wasn’t important enough for Congress until someone decided that they wanted to stop internet gambling.

In a time of great economic uncertainty, it may be controversial to point out that a profitable industry is affecting their own sustainability by blatantly overfishing our oceans while at the same time exposing us to great risk, but everyone has a right to know.  The fishing industries, both recreational and commercial, not only pose one of the greatest threats to the maritime industry, but they provide the single most realistic proven threat vector to our nation and citizens.  Before we get too far into this, let’s start with a brief history on port security, terrorism, piracy and how it relates to the U.S. maritime industry.

The first possible example of a maritime attack that impacted the US was on September 13, 1814 when the British fleet staged an attack on the Port of Baltimore (they identified this as the most strategic attack point in the country).  However, they were stopped at Fort McHenry by a much smaller weaker force that used the Port as a defensive position and created their own security protocols to protect it, thus providing the first real example of Port Security in our nation’s history.  Unfortunately, this is indicative of how we will address future maritime security issues: reactively, not proactively.

Next came the following:

• 

  Achille Lauro: Attack on a Cruise ship on October 7th, 1985 that resulted in the death of an American Passenger Leon Klinghoffer who was pushed in his wheel chair off the side to his death by hijackers.  The impact of this incident marked the beginning of Port Security regulations and requirements on the cruise industry and the first set of regulations of its kind to affect the maritime industry in general.

• USS COLE: Attack on a US Navy Vessel on October 12th, 2000 in the Port of Yemen.  A fishing vessel laden with explosives rammed the US Naval vessel in the Port of Aden killing 17 and injuring 39 US sailors.
• 9/11: Caused the total closure of the Port of NY/NJ as well as full scale waterborne evacuations and port recovery operations in order to bring the port back on line and resume the flow of commerce in the U.S.
• Oil Tanker Limburg: small boat attack on a VLCC on October 6th, 2002.  It should be noted that this attack did not take place on a U.S. vessel or in a U.S. port, but that it was intended to disrupt the global oil trade and flow of commerce in the U.S.  While the impact state side was minimal it caused considerable consternation among tanker operators.  Although the bombing killed only one member of the Limburg’s crew, it caused insurance rates among shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the next month after the attack.
• Mumbai attack: November 26, 2008.   Terrorist hijacked and murdered crew on the Indian flagged fishing vessel “MV Kuber” from a Mother vessel “MV Al-Husseni” a fishing vessel in order to enter India by sea and perpetrate a three day long attack at over 10 highly populated, land-based locations in the Indian city of Mumbai, terrorizing the country and killing over 170 people.  Again, this was not an attack on the U.S., but it is clearly a blueprint for possible attacks on U.S. soil.
• Piracy off the coast of Somalia:  A total lack of government and stability in the region compounded by toxic dumping and foreign overfishing off the coast of Somalia were the main contributing factors that pushed many Somalis to take part in piracy.  Piracy in the Gulf of Aden began as fishermen sought to force out commercial fishing vessels that were illegally decimating the eco-system in Somali waters. The Gulf of Aden was at one point one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world.  Boats mainly from Europe and Asia illegally reaped over $350 million worth of fish per year from the region, depriving the local fishermen of the career that supported and fed their families and destroying the marine life that thrived since the beginning of time.  As fishing in this area was not monitored or controlled, fishermen utilized invasive and illegal methods which included such things as drift nets and undersized tight nets, which were designed to catch everything in their path including very young fish, thereby ensuring no hope for a future marine ecosystem.  Without regulation and enforcement, fish populations were totally decimated, painting a picture that easily shows how this could start in other impoverished coastal countries with limited governments.  Any place where too many individuals fish the same waters, the ecosystem collapses, and in this particular case Somalis who could have once made their living fishing turn to piracy as an alternative.

In most cases piracy doesn’t relate to terrorism, but as terrorist see the value of piracy and how it can raise funds towards extremism, piracy becomes a viable market for them to either invest in or exploit.  Piracy is no longer just plain robbery.  It has become an elaborate network of operations designed to extract enormous quantities of ransom. “Ransom amounts have increased to an average of $5.4 million per ship from just $150,000 five years ago” as stated by Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma at an international symposium in New Port, Rhode Island.  The admiral went on to explain that there is a distinct nexus between piracy and terrorism.  Al-Qaeda linked militants Al-Shabaab and pirate gangs are increasing their cooperation as they become more in need of funding.  Up until now, pirates have used the ships they hijack to collect ransoms.  If terrorists continue to find their way in to this industry we may see ships used as weapons or as threats to countries by opening manifolds and dumping product into ports, waterways or marine rich coastal environments.

There is a reason why you probably haven’t heard about this before and why many politicians have no interest in resolving the issue. Recreational fishing supports a million jobs, pays $45 billion in wages and has an overall economic impact of $125 billion in the United States annually.  NOAA reports state that the international trade in coastal and marine commercial fisheries contributes 70 billion annually to our nation’s economy.  One million jobs are associated with the U.S. commercial fishing industry yielding over 32 billion in income.  An example is that over two billion pounds of Alaskan Pollock alone are caught in the U.S. EEZ yearly, that’s just one species of thousands of different species that are caught on a daily basis.

Recreational fishing is seldom thought of as a major industry, but clearly it accounts for good paying jobs and contributes millions to the economy, not to mention 40 million fisherman buying fishing gear, gasoline, licenses, hotel rooms and boat equipment.  This also has quite an impact on the nation’s economy.

To understand the magnitude of the challenge of determining and resolving the threat vectors we need to look at the physical environment.  The United States has more than 95,000 miles of maritime coastline; 361 ports, including eight of the world’s 50 largest by volume; and 10,000 miles of navigable waterways on which approximately 15 million small craft operate routinely.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports there are 13 million registered US recreational vessels, 110,000 fishing vessels and over 100,000 other commercial small vessels.  The rest are many more which are unregistered.

As you can imagine, it is impossible to keep an eye on this group of small vessels.  DHS estimates there are approximately 68,000 foreign vessel arrivals a year, all of which are monitored through a system called AIS (Automated Identification System) which is similar to the FAA’s air traffic control.

Recreational vessels are not required to carry AIS and the majority of commercial fishing vessels just happen to fall below the size requirement for AIS.  As a result, there is currently no way to add them to the system.  We are currently having a difficult time handling inspections on the 68,000 vessels a year that require inspection, how can we even consider understanding how to manage over 13 million vessels that may come and go every weekend?

Foreign recreational vessels calling on the US are covered by the “Pleasure Boat Reporting System” (PBRS) which is based on boater self-reporting.  During fiscal year 2006, only 70,000 boater foreign arrivals were recorded in this US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) controlled system.  CBP states that “Conservative estimates suggest that these reporting figures represent only a fraction of the actual international boater traffic, especially given the ease with which boaters operate in these waters.”

So what is the threat vector from these small vessels? 

Well, it’s easy; Terrorists could exploit the maritime domain via small boats in many different ways. The most serious and likely threat is the already common Waterborne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED) attack, used in the USS Cole and Limburg attacks.  Second, vessels could transport terrorists onto American shores at locations where they will not be inspected or checked.  Third, small vessels could be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.  Fourth, small vessels could be used for a strategic attack to gain access to our shores for small arms attacks in populated regions as is what happened in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

What is the impact of a maritime terrorist attack? 

The ability to use the maritime domain for mass casualty is very clear; just look at any of the major ports in the US and how they are situated in comparison to the local community and major assets in their particular region.  In New Jersey alone, there is what is considered to be the most dangerous two mile stretch in America from Newark Airport to Port Elizabeth.  New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the country and on this particular two miles of land there are hundreds of potential terrorist targets including chemical plants, chlorine gas plants, rail yards, rail lines, refineries, an international airport, and the third largest port in the country.   An attack in these two miles could bring lethal harm to more than 12 million people within in a 14-mile radius, not to mention shut down the entire transportation system.  These areas are open to attack and small recreational vessels are allowed within, and are able to dock at, locations within this two mile stretch.  In addition, people are permitted to fish off of public piers somehow mixed within the commercial infrastructure of this area.  So it’s not an oddity or even seen as suspicious to see small boats and random persons in and around this area.  To make matters worse, just a few miles away from the “most dangerous two miles” there are public boat ramps right in the middle of the channel within 100’ to 500 feet’- of some of the largest petroleum facilities and vessels on the eastern seaboard.

Stay tuned for part 2 “Overfishing ourselves out of the Maritime industry and defense of the Homeland” where the dots are connected and you understand why they have to be written in blood to work.

Port side view showing the damage sustained by the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) on October 12, 2000. Photo: DoD

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba—A Saudi considered among the most senior figures in al Qaeda emerged Wednesday from nine years of secret confinement to face charges of orchestrating the deadly attack on the USS Cole in the start of a new round of Guantanamo Bay war-crimes tribunals.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri didn’t enter a plea as he was arraigned and the court dealt with a number of procedural issues. The detainee, who was subjected to the harsh interrogation techniques that his lawyers say amounted to torture, appeared engaged and occasionally smiled as he responded to questions from the judge.

The charges against Mr. Nashiri, 46 years old, include murder in violation of the law of war in the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, an attack that killed 17 crew members. Authorities said he took orders directly from Osama bin Laden and also set up the October 2002 bombing of the French supertanker MV Limburg, which killed one crewman, as well as a failed attack on another American warship, the USS The Sullivans in January 2000.

He was allowed to remain unshackled, declined an offer to exchange his white prison uniform for civilian clothes in future court appearances and said he wants to keep all the members of his appointed legal team.

“At this moment these lawyers are doing the right job,” he told the judge.

It was a low-key start to a highly anticipated proceeding, the start of a capital case against a prisoner who was held in a series of clandestine CIA prisons where he was subjected to the simulated drowning technique known as waterboarding as well as mock executions and other forms of harsh interrogation.

President Barack Obama took office pledging to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center, but was rebuffed by Congress, which has refused to authorize moving prisoners from the American base in Cuba, and forced him to resume the war-crimes prosecutions started under his predecessor.

Three Guantanamo cases have been resolved through plea bargains under Mr. Obama but Mr. Nashiri is the first initiated under this administration and it is considered a prelude to the prosecution of the five Guantanamo prisoners who are accused of orchestrating the Sept. 11 attacks.

The trial of Mr. Nashiri will take place under a military-commission system that has been revised by Congress and the Obama administration but is still subject to criticism from defense lawyers and human-rights groups, who have complained about repeated changes in procedures and rules that favor the prosecution.

Legal experts have also questioned whether Mr. Nashiri should be charged with a war crime for the Cole bombing, which occurred before the Sept. 11 attacks and the U.S. declaration of war on al Qaeda.

Critics such as retired Air Force Col. Morris Davis, who resigned as chief prosecutor for the trials in October 2007 after alleging political interference by superiors, said the case against Mr. Nashiri and other prisoners should be moved to U.S. federal court to avoid having the convictions perceived as illegitimate.

“There is ample evidence to prove his case in federal court, where there is a long history of trying terrorism cases and certainly not this presumption of a kangaroo court,” Mr. Davis said.

Mr. Nashiri was captured in 2002 in Dubai and was held by the CIA in a series of secret prisons before being sent to Guantanamo in September 2006.

A report by the CIA Inspector General revealed that Mr. Nashiri was one of the prisoners subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including two instances of waterboarding. He also was threatened with a gun and a power drill because interrogators believed he was withholding information about possible attacks against the U.S.

He is now held in Camp Seven, a top-secret section of Guantanamo where 15 “high-value” detainees are held, including the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is expected to be arraigned next year in what is also likely to be a death-penalty case.

The judge also informed Mr. Nashiri that he could choose to skip future court hearings, as some prisoners have done, but he declined. “I think I will attend all the sessions,” he said.

The judge also set a tentative trial date for November 2012 but that date is likely to be postponed for months if not years, delayed in part by efforts by his lawyers to challenge any statements he made as being the product of torture.

“By torturing Mr. al-Nashiri and subjecting him to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the United States has forfeited its right to try him and certainly to kill him,” his defense team wrote in one legal motion. “Through the infliction of physical and psychological abuse the government has essentially already killed a man it seized almost 10 years ago.”

(c) 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

Submersible ROV's, such as this one by VideoRay, have been used by the Department of Homeland Security to combat these types of threats. Image by Christian Skauge

By Andrew F. Krepinevich

Nearly 60 years ago the classic television documentary series “Victory at Sea” first recounted the U.S. Navy’s exploits during World War II. Several episodes highlighted the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines that were waging guerrilla war at sea. Their objective: destroy allied cargo ships providing an economic lifeline from America to Britain.

The German submarines pursued a form of warfare known as commerce raiding, attacking the enemy’s economic assets at sea. The U.S., British and Canadian navies won the Battle of the Atlantic, thanks to their use of convoys and exploitation of advances in antisubmarine warfare technology and tactics—but only after suffering horrendous losses in blood and treasure.

At war’s end, the United States emerged as far and away the world’s predominant naval power. Since then the U.S. commitment to providing unfettered access to the world’s seas to all nations has enabled an era of economic globalization and growth.

Memories of a time when access to the seas was not guaranteed have faded. Yet much has changed in the past 60 years. Two developments in particular suggest a growing need for the United States and other peaceful nations to begin thinking anew about how to defend their maritime commerce, albeit under very different circumstances.

The first development is the emergence of an undersea economy. Two years after World War II, in 1947, the first offshore discovery of oil out of sight of land occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. Today nearly 30% of U.S. oil production and 15% of gas production is produced from wells on the Outer Continental Shelf. Globally, some 30% of the world’s oil output comes from offshore production.

An enormous amount of capital investment has gone into creating this undersea energy infrastructure. This includes the oil platforms that drill, extract and temporarily store oil and gas, as well as the oil and gas wellheads, pipelines and pumps required to transfer the product from its undersea location to shore.

This vast infrastructure was built with the assumption that while it would have to weather natural disasters, it would not be a target in war. In military parlance, much of the infrastructure comprises “soft” targets that would not require much in the way of explosives to cause significant, and perhaps catastrophic, damage. Fortunately many of these targets have not been easy to reach—until now.

This brings us to the second development: the diffusion of military technology and weaponry that can threaten the undersea economy with a new form of commerce raiding.

In recent years, Latin-American narco-cartels have begun moving their cargo by submarine. While not even remotely in a class with the U.S. Navy’s submarines, these simple boats are nevertheless capable of operating undersea in littoral waters while moving tons of cocaine. They have a range of up to 2,000 miles and cost but a few million dollars to build. These submarines can submerge to depths of a few dozen feet, which is sufficient to make detection difficult, allowing them to approach offshore oil platforms with little or no warning.

Even more disturbing is the proliferation of unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, which were once almost exclusively operated by Western militaries. With the growth of the undersea economy, civilian development and production took off in the 1980s. UUVs are now widely used for a variety of commercial and scientific purposes.

These UUVs are perhaps best known for their role in locating sunken ships. Unlike the small submarines operated by narco-cartels, UUVs can descend to the ocean floor. If adapted for military purposes, they could carry mines and other explosives, as well as cameras and electronic sensors. They are also becoming cheaper, with a wide variety of systems available for sale in the private sector.

Then there are naval mines, now manufactured in more than 30 countries. Some producers, like Russia, are developing mines with better sensors, target-recognition systems, stealthy coatings, and self-propulsion systems to enable them to move about. But mines don’t need to be sophisticated to be effective, especially against the thousands of soft targets populating the continental shelf.

While narco-cartels are interested in making money, not war, this is not the case with radical nonstate entities or their state sponsors. Some groups, including al Qaeda, seek to achieve victory not by defeating their enemies on the battlefield but by inflicting unacceptable pain or damage, either against defenseless civilians or economic infrastructure. Toward this end, radical Islamists have undertaken attacks, employing far less sophisticated means and with minimal success, on an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002 and Saudi oil production facilities in February 2006. Should the U.S. find itself in a confrontation with Iran, it might employ proxies to achieve similar ends.

For a relatively small effort on their part, in short, America’s enemies could potentially impose enormous costs on its undersea economy, including loss of energy resources, damaged infrastructure and environmental degradation.

This nascent threat to America’s undersea energy assets demands attention before it arrives on the nation’s doorstep. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Defense Department, should explore the cost and feasibility of options for defending the undersea energy economy, so they can move quickly to build a defensive shield if the need arises. The intelligence community should monitor the threat by focusing on the proliferation of undersea means of attack, especially as it pertains to radical nonstate entities. On the diplomatic front, efforts should be made to engage in this effort friendly states that have significant undersea energy assets of their own, such as Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom.

Given the stakes involved, just as the U.S. and its allies developed the forces, capabilities and methods needed to defend their economic assets at sea during the Battle of the Atlantic, a similar effort is needed now with respect to America’s undersea economic interests. The alternative is to hope for the best—and hope is not a strategy.

Mr. Krepinevich is president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

(c) 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

By Michael Howard Saul, Wall Street Journal

America paused Sunday to remember what was lost and how it has changed forever a decade after four hijacked jetliners felled New York City’s twin towers, split open the Pentagon and bore into the ground in a quiet Pennsylvania meadow.

The anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks provided a moment to take stock of 10 years of war and worry, while at the same time paying tribute to honorable deeds performed not only in the earliest moments of the attack, but in the years since as well.

In New York, thousands of guests visited for the first time a monument that pierces Manhattan’s bedrock where the World Trade Center towers formerly stood. President Barack Obama read from Psalm 46, chosen, a spokesman said, for its message of perseverance. “God is our refuge and strength,” Mr. Obama said. “He breaks the bough and cuts the spear in two.”

Former President George W. Bush read from a letter written by President Abraham Lincoln to a mother who had lost five sons in the Civil War. “I feel how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine,” he said. “I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the republic they died to save.”

The horror of the attack a decade ago resonated anew on Sunday, when military jets were scrambled to escort a passenger aircraft from Los Angeles to New York after the crew reported a passenger disturbance. Officials said it wasn’t a terrorism incident. On Thursday, law-enforcement authorities said they received specific intelligence that al Qaeda militants in Pakistan might be attempting car or truck bombings in New York City and Washington, D.C., a plot aimed to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the attacks.

In the 2001 attacks, 19 terrorists hijacked four jetliners, crashing two of them into the World Trade Center towers and one into the Pentagon. The fourth jet, which was apparently headed for another target in Washington, D.C., instead crashed into a Pennsylvania field after passengers fought back against the hijackers and foiled the plot. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, then sheltering in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the attacks, which killed nearly 3,000.

Shortly after the 2001 attacks, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and then subsequently launched a war in Iraq, two conflicts that continue today. The U.S. has faced sharp criticism for some aspects of the war on terror, including the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the practice of holding enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The most recent milestone in the war was the killing of bin Laden in a nighttime raid by special forces within Pakistan.

On Sunday, formal events commemorating the 2001 attacks were also conducted at the Pentagon and near Shanksville, Pa., where United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field. Many smaller observances were held across the country as well, from a stair climb in Seattle to the dedication of a 9/11 memorial in Sarasota, Fla.

At the Pentagon—where terrorists in 2001 crashed one of the four hijacked jets into a symbol of American military might—Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke of the “dreams shattered” by the attacks, but also spoke of how, in the decade since, the country’s sense of patriotism has been amplified. “They could kill our citizens, they could not kill our citizenship,” he said.

In Shanksville, which Mr. Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama visited later in the day, the president helped lay a wreath to honor the victims of Flight 93. The wreath stood in front of the newly dedicated memorial, an undulating wall of white marble engraved with the names of the passengers and flight crew aboard the plane.

The Obamas then visited the boulder that marks the actual crash site, standing quietly for a few moments in the field of wildflowers. An enthusiastic crowd greeted them with cheers and shouts of “USA, USA” as the first couple made their way to the crowd.

Back in Washington Sunday evening, Mr. Obama paid tribute to the fortitude shown in the aftermath of the attacks. “More than monuments, that will be the legacy of 9/11—a legacy of firefighters who walked into fire and soldiers who signed up to serve, of workers who raised new towers, and citizens who faced down their private fear, and most of all, of children who realized the dreams of their parents,” he said at “A Concert for Hope” at the Kennedy Center.

Outside the U.S., there were also ceremonies commemorating the attacks. Prince Charles and Prime Minister David Cameron joined relatives of British victims at a service next to the U.S. Embassy in Grosvenor Square, London. Nearby, some protesters shouted “USA terrorists.”

Elsewhere, there was a 9/11-related event at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard joined the U.S. ambassador to Australia at a ceremony in Canberra. At an outdoor mass in Ancona, Italy, Pope Benedict XVI urged the world to resist “temptation toward hatred.” In Pakistan, there was a demonstration against the U.S.

In New York, the 10th anniversary marked the official opening of the National September 11 Memorial, twin reflecting pools resting within the footprints of the twin towers. The memorial features bronze panels on which the names of the dead are inscribed.

On the tree-covered memorial plaza, open to the families of the victims for the first time, relatives clutched each other, cried or moved their fingers over the names of dead loved ones. Some used pencils and crayons to make rubbings of the names.

Anthony Calasanti, whose son, Christopher, died in the attacks, choked back tears as he described spotting his son’s name on the memorial. “I did find some comfort from seeing his name,” Mr. Calasanti said.

The Obamas, accompanied by Mr. Bush and his wife, Laura, entered the site together. The four solemnly looked at the memorial’s waterfalls and stepped forward to reach toward the names of the deceased.

The family members—some carrying photos of loved ones, others holding the American flag—gathered shoulder-to-shoulder amid a heavy police presence to commemorate the deadliest foreign strike on U.S. soil. Nearby and still under construction, 1 World Trade Center, formerly known as the Freedom Tower, was draped with a flag.

At the heart of the city’s ceremony was the reading of the names of the victims of the attacks, including those who were killed at the Pentagon and in Shanksville as well as the six who died in a 1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center.

There were six moments of silence: twice to mark the precise times each plane slammed into the towers, twice to mark when the towers fell, and two marking when the planes crashed in Virginia and Pennsylvania.

Messrs. Obama and Bush were among the eight current or former elected officials to deliver readings at the ceremony, which began at 8:35 a.m. with the sound of bagpipes and drums.

“We can never unsee what happened here,” New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg said in remarks to the crowd. However, he said, “We can also see that children who lost their parents have grown into young adults, grandchildren have been born, and good works and public service have taken root to honor those we loved and lost.”

In recent weeks, Mr. Bloomberg has been the target of criticism concerning the program and invitation list at the memorial site. With limited space available there, the mayor didn’t invite first-responders to attend, sparking some complaints. The mayor also rejected calls to allow religious leaders to speak, another point of contention.

Sunday’s ceremony included a performance by the singer Paul Simon, wearing a baseball cap and a suit and tie while singing “Sounds of Silence” and accompanying himself on guitar. In the crowd, some people sang along, wiping away tears.

Andrew Grossman, Erica Orden, Laura Meckler, James R. Hagerty, Julian E. Barnes and Tamer El-Ghobashy contributed to this article.

As we all know, or at least were told according to some conspiracists, the body of Osama Bin Laden was taken aboard the USS Carl Vinson and dumped into the North Arabian Sea less than 24 hours after a team of Navy SEALS stormed Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, killing the Al Qaeda leader.  But that’s about all we know.  No details of the location were ever released.

However Bill Warren, using hi-tech equipment and several boats which he says will cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, claims he has what it takes to find the body of one of the most wanted men in history.

‘We do this because we are patriotic Americans and feel that President Obama failed to provide the proof,’ he told TMZ.

What do you think, is it possible for Warren to locate the body of Bin Laden in the vast Arabian Sea? Or is this just a publicity stunt?

A photo illustration of the guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112). U.S. Navy Photo Illustration by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jay Chu (Released)

By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dominique M. Lasco

BATH, Maine (NNS) — The Navy christened its newest guided-missile destroyer, Pre-commissioning Unit (PCU) Michael Murphy (DDG 112), during a morning ceremony at General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine May 7.

The new destroyer honors Medal of Honor recipient Lt. (SEAL) Michael P. Murphy and was christened on what would have been his 35th birthday.

“It is my sincere belief that this ship will build on the momentum gained by our special operations forces in the fight against extremism and sail the seas in a world made more peaceful by sustained American vigilance, power and dignity,” said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead. “This ship will carry Michael’s legacy and values to Sailors several decades from now and to a new generation of Americans. For that I am proud to wear this uniform.”

Maureen Murphy, sponsor of the ship named for her late son, had the honor of breaking a bottle of champagne across the ship’s bow, formally christening the ship in accordance with Navy tradition.

“I am so proud and it is truly an honor,” said Murphy.” For people to come out and remember Mike and to celebrate this ship; it means a lot and it means that they still remember the sacrifice he made for this country.”

On June 28, 2005, Murphy was leading a four-man team tasked with finding a key Taliban leader in the mountainous terrain near Asadabad, Afghanistan, when they came under fire from a much larger enemy force with superior tactical position. Mortally wounded while exposing himself to enemy fire, Murphy knowingly left his position of cover to get a clear signal in order to communicate with his headquarters. While being shot at repeatedly, Murphy calmly provided his unit’s location and requested immediate support for his element. He returned to his cover position to continue the fight until finally succumbing to his wounds.

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Adm. Eric T. Olson, Deputy Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command Rear Adm. Garry Bonelli and family members of the Navy SEALs who lost their lives alongside Murphy were also in attendance.

Designated DDG 112, Michael Murphy, the 62nd Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, will be able to conduct a variety of operations, from peacetime presence and crisis management to sea control and power projection. Michael Murphy will be capable of fighting air, surface and subsurface battles simultaneously and will contain a myriad of offensive and defensive weapons designed to support maritime warfare in keeping with CNO’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”

Cmdr. Thomas E. Shultz, a native of El Cajon, Calif., is the prospective commanding officer of the ship and will lead the crew of 279 officers and enlisted personnel. The 9,200-ton Michael Murphy is being built by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works. The ship is 509 feet in length, has a waterline beam of 59 feet, and a navigational draft of 31 feet. Four gas turbine engines will power the ship to speeds in excess of 30 knots.

For more information on Michael Murphy, visit USS Michael Murphy on facebook and LT Michael P. Murphy USN page on the Medal of Honor site.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Timothy A. Hazel/Released)

By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON (NNS) — Osama bin Laden received a Muslim ceremony as he was buried at sea, a senior defense official said in Washington, D.C., May 2.

The religious rites were performed aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in the North Arabian Sea and occurred within 24 hours of the terrorist leader’s death, said the official.

“Preparations for at-sea [burial] began at 1:10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time and were completed at 2 a.m.,” said the official.

The burial followed traditional Muslim burial customs, and bin Laden’s body was washed and placed in a white sheet, said the official.

“The body was placed in a weighted bag. A military officer read prepared religious remarks, which were translated into Arabic by a native speaker,” the official added.

Afterward, bin Laden’s body was placed onto a flat board, which was then elevated upward on one side and the body slid off into the sea.

The deceased terrorist was buried at sea because no country would accept bin Laden’s remains, a senior defense official said.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Department officials are sure it was the body of bin Laden. CIA specialists compared photos of the body with known photos of bin Laden and said with 95-percent certainty it was the terrorist leader, a senior intelligence official said.

In addition, bin Laden’s wife identified the al-Qaida leader by name while the strike team was still in the compound, said the intelligence official.

CIA and other specialists in the intelligence community “performed the initial DNA analysis matching a virtually 100-percent DNA match of the body against the DNA of several of bin Laden’s family members,” the official added.

The UAE said Friday that the Japanese tanker M. Star was indeed the target of a terrorist strike after she suffered damage while transiting the Strait of Hormuz on July 28th.  The AP has the alarming details:

The report — which came days after an al-Qaida-linked group claimed responsibility for attacking the vessel — raised fears about the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping lane for many petroleum exporting countries.

It was the latest in what has been a series of conflicting accounts of what happened to the M. Star supertanker, which was damaged as it entered the Strait of Hormuz, a transit point for about 40 percent of oil shipped by tankers worldwide.

Al-Qaida has carried out attacks on oil infrastructure on land in nearby Saudi Arabia, as well as a 2002 suicide bombing of the Limburg off the coast of Yemen and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden.

But if the UAE report is confirmed, the July 28 incident would be the first militant attack in the strait, a narrow chokepoint between Oman and Iran. For years, fears have been high that the waterway could be the site of conflict between the United States and Iran, but the reported attack underscored concerns that militant groups could target civilian vessels to foment economic instability.  Keep Reading…

M Star was sailing from Qatar to Japan and reportedly carrying two million barrels of crude when an explosion went off shortly after midnight.  One member of the crew was injured in the attack.

by Fred Fry

The English translation to the DANICA WHITE hijacking is now available. As previously mentioned, the ship’s crew is partly to blame for the incident, as they failed to maintain a proper watch:

If there had been proper lookout from DANICA WHITE, the pirate boats could have been spotted app. 30 minutes before they reached DANICA WHITE. However, due to the slow speed of the ship, DANICA WHITE could not have sailed away from the pirates, but the crew would have been able to raise the alarm in time and shown the pirates that they had been spotted. (6.5) – DMA (page 5)

Here is a list of who was on the ship. The ship had an absurdly low crew of five:

That’s it. Two Captains, two Ordinary Seamen (OS) (an entry-level position which requires little more than a heartbeat) and a cook to feed them. No experienced crew. No Able-bodied Seaman (AB) for the Ordinary Seamen to learn from. No Bosun to oversee them, no time for the Captain or Mate to supervise them, other than when they were on the bridge, no additional watchstanding officer to keep working time on the bridge to eight hours a day per officer, leaving four hours of overtime available for other activities and no engineers to maintain the machinery or to figure out any problems if the ship’s engine or generator decide to stop working on it’s own.

Here is how the work was organized on the ship:

Normally, DANICA WHITE had a crew of 6 men, the master, the mate, three OSs and one cook.

The sea watch on board was arranged in such a way that the master and the mate had a 6 – 6 hours schedule as the navigators on duty. Two out of the three OSs also had similar 6 – 6 hours schedule as lookout man/helmsman. OS 3 was a day man and did not take the sea watch. The OS on duty worked with the day man within normal working hours (08 – 17).

In port, the OSs kept an entrance log at the gangway. (Page 16)

Basically, this ship did not have enough crew to maintain a proper lookout. In my experience, Ordinary Seaman just don’t count. Sure they contribute, but that is not exactly their purpose, especially when it comes to contributing to a bridge lookout.

An Ordinary Seaman (OS) is an unlicensed member of the deck department of a merchant ship. The position is an apprenticeship to become an Able Seaman, and has been for centuries. In modern times, an OS is required to work on a ship for a specific amount of time, gaining what is referred to as “sea time.” Once a sufficient amount of sea time is acquired, the OS can apply to take a series of courses, and then a series of examinations to become certified as an able seaman.

An OS is generally not required to stand watch, but must pass examinations on watchstanding skills such as performing lookout duty and being a helmsman. Thus an OS will often be found on a ship’s bridge after working hours taking a turn at the ship’s wheel or being familiarized with bridge equipment.

During the apprenticeship, an OS performs a variety of duties concerned with the operation and upkeep of deck department areas and equipment. These duties vary with the type of ship, the type of voyage, the number of crewmembers, the weather, the supervisor, and any number of other variables. However, in most cases, one can expect an ordinary seaman to clean, to perform maintenance, to work with deck equipment, and to undergo on-the-job-training under the supervision of senior deck department members. – Wikipedia

It is nice to have them onboard to do the menial tasks, so that the able-bodied seaman can take care of other things, or give them an extra set of hands to take care of larger tasks. So, this ship really had a crew of two. (The equivalent position in the engine room is ‘Wiper’. Can you guess the type of work that he does?) To prove my point that you can’t count on ordinaries to safely mann the ship, take a look at what happened on this ship:

On 12/5 at 1810, the following has been entered into DANICA WHITE’s logbook:

“OS XXX leaves the watch – does not wish to keep a lookout – believes that he is entitled to sit down.”

On 13/5 at 1000, the following has been entered: “no lookout”.

On 21/5, shortly after DANICA WHITE left Sharjah, one of the OSs was signed off due to illness. After this, only two OSs were left on board.

Subsequently, the master decided to stop the OSs’ sea watch. According to him, this decision was taken on basis of the fact that he did not want further discussions with the two OSs, who did not want to carry out the sea watch in addition to the cleaning and keeping up the maintenance of the deck. (Pages 16-17)

So as far as the Captain and Mate were concerned, it was better to have nobody on the bridge than have any of the three OS up there. This is how the Master ended up on watch alone when the ship was taken by the pirates, although one could probably take the position that he was still alone up there, even with the ordinaries standing watch:

Before Sharjah, the two OSs participated in the sea watch as lookouts or helmsmen according to fixed schedule where the OS 1 had the watch from 00-06 and from 12-18 with the mate and OS 2 from 06-12 and from 18-24 with the master. OS 3 was the day man. They took turns every month.

At one point, the day man replaced OS 2 (OS 4), because the master did not get along with OS 2.

The OS on duty, worked with the day man within normal working hours (08-17). Therefore, it was only outside normal working hours that the ordinary seamen ran the bridge watch. The ordinary seamen received a contractual wage increase for the time spent on watch.

After leaving Sharjah, the master cancelled the OSs’ sea watch, because they did not wish to run the sea watch and do work on deck and because the Master did not want any more arguments with them. Also the mate did not think there was a need for an OS on the lookout. (Page 10)

So, according to the above point, even if the OS were still standing watch, the Captain probably still would have been caught alone as the OS on watch would have been doing work elsewhere during the day. This is not an uncommon practice. I am used to watches having two ABs assigned to each watch where during the day with one working on deck with the Bosun. (I did sail on one ship that had only three AB’s and a Bosun.)

The pirates did not believe that there were only 5 men on board. (Page 11)

I too find it hard to believe. It would be nice to see a copy of the minimum safe manning certificate issued to this ship, but the authorities thought better not to include it in the report. This is about all that the report mentions concerning this issue:

6.3 The Watch

According to DANICA WHITE’s Minimum Safe Manning, the crew must consist of at least one Master, one chief officer and two ordinary seamen.

Furthermore, the ship normally has one OS and one cook on board.

With three ordinary seamen on board, it is possible, in relation to the resting hours regulations, to let two of the ordinary seamen be on a 6-6 hour sea watch as navigators, and let the third OS operate as day man for the cleaning and run-down work on deck.

During the actual sailing, there were only two OSs on board because the third had been signed off due to illness shortly before departure.

With two ordinary seamen on board, it was still possible, in relation to the resting hours regulations, to let one OS take the lookout watch in the dark hours and also to clean the ship.

During DANICA WHITE’s passage off the coast of Somalia, a sail of 8 – 9 days and nights should have established an increased lookout, as recommended in MSC/Circ.623, and as stated in the ship’s procedure for piracy under the wording “Stay alert”. This could have been done with two OSs on board, however the time to do any other work would have been very limited, if the resting time regulations were to be observed. (Pages 21-22 )

During this sailing, only the navigator on duty was on the bridge because the Master had decided that the OSs were not to take the sea watch. The navigator on duty was therefore the only one on the lookout, also in the dark and no increased lookout had been established, even though the sailing took place in an area where there is a risk of pirate attack. Lastly, the Master was alone on the bridge during the pirate attack, occupied with other things than the sailing of the ship and the lookout.

Under these circumstances, the watch on DANICA WHITE was insufficient. (Pages 21-22)

But the report makes no mention of whether the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate contributed to this problem by not requiring more than four crewmembers, of which one was the Captain who was forced to stand watch, one watchstanding officer and two entry-level seaman. With only four seafarers required to be onboard, the maximum available for any one watch would have been 2.

Here is what the Danish Maritime Authority has to say about Minimum Safe Manning:

Manning

All passenger ships, cargo ships of 20 gross tonnage or more, and cargo ships of less than 20 gross tonnage engaged in international trade, must have a Minimum Safe Manning Document. In Denmark each Minimum Safe Manning Document is issued to the individual ship. A shipping company may also apply for a preliminary decision on minimum safe manning before registering in the Danish International Ship Register (DIS). Contact the Danish Maritime Authority’s Centre for Seafarers and Fishermen for further information on e-mail: – DMA

Shipping companies will often go shopping around to get the minimum safe manning certificate they want. (So while I might be picking on the Danes, they are not the only ones who issue questionable MSM certificates. You would think though that they would know better.) I would love to know how this ship’s Minimum Safe Manning certificate did not include any requirement for experienced unlicensed bridge crew or any engineering staff. It’s not like this ship was operating in coastal Europe; it was traveling to Africa and to North and South America. Even if the Captain also had an engineering license, there is no time for him to spend in the engine room with all of his time dedicated to standing watch. (There is no evidence he did have any engineering certification. The issue is that the ship was not required to carry any engineering personnel.)

Here is a summary of how to determine the minimum safe manning for a vessel.

Now you might think, ‘sure this is only the minimum crew requirements, the ship operator will surely place additional crew onboard, as was the case here’. My answer to that is how often do you do more than the minimum? Do you ever pay more than the sticker price for an item? This ship was sailing with the minimum as the cook is not included in the MSM certificate. The ship operator could have replaced the cook with frozen dinners and a microwave if it wanted to, but opted not to.

So while the report mentions that the ship should have had an increased lookout, it completely ignores the fact that there was nobody on board to increase the lookout with! At best, the Captain could have put the OSs back on watch where they should have been in the first place. While the initial news reports faulted the crew, after reading the translated report I suspect that the blame should be extended to the Danish Maritime Administration for issuance of a MSM certificate that resulted in the ship being insufficiently manned as they state in their own report. In my opinion, this ship was not only improperly manned for sea, but also for entering and leaving port as well. There is no indication on whether or not any of the OS had been certified as helmsmen. Even if they were, this means that the ship was ‘steered’ by a person with minimum training. Then on deck, this leaves the mate to supervise docking operations on both the bow and stern, unless the Captain supervised the bow from the bridge. Of course, the engine room would be unmanned at the time it is most likely to develop problems and result in an accident. Now picture a ship like this coming into San Francisco. That is easy, since this ship did call the US. The only good thing I can say is that if you were an OS on this ship, you had the opportunity to get lots of hands-on experience in every job the deck department has to offer!

You can find the English translation of the DANICA WHITE piracy report here.

Maritime Accident Casebook also comments on the case with “The Danica White and The Pirates – All That Was Missing Was A Welcome Mat“

As I mention above, Denmark is not the only Administration that is guilty of issuing bare-bones Minimum Safe Manning certificates. The first US-Flag ship I sailed on had only 18 crew, and that was including the two cadets. (This was not enough crew for docking the vessel without the assistance of the unlicensed engineers on deck.) They are just the example of the day. There has been some internal discussion between the various maritime blogs concerning the issue of watchstanding Captains. Surely this will be brought up as one example of why this is a bad idea, along with others. More to follow sometime in the near future.

Originally posted on my blog Fred Fry International, HERE.