A screen grab from the video taken aboard the M/V Avocet

The private security firm who saw a video go viral of one of their shipboard teams defending themselves against an approaching pirate skiff has been identified, according to Bloomberg News.

The video, which emerged in early April on the community-driven video website Liveleak.com, depicts an english-speaking private security team aboard a commercial vessel firing a barrage of “warning shots” at an approaching pirate skiff.   Since its release, many have wondered the circumstances surrounding the incident, the vessel it was taken aboard, and the security firm behind the video that has so far gone unidentified.

Well today, Bloomberg News has found just who is behind the video and additional details about the attack, including an interview with the security firms President.  According to the report, the video was shot by the team leader of four man private security detail aboard the M/V Avocet while transiting “near the center” of the Arabian Sea on March 25, 2011.  Additionally, the security team shown has been identified as part of the Virginia, VA-based security firm, Trident Group, who was hired by the ship owners.

The M/V Avocet is a 53,462 dwt bulker owned by New York-based Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., described as the largest U.S.-based owner of Handymax dry bulk vessels.

Although the video was largely welcomed by viewers, critics say the video has painted private shipboard security teams and ship owners who hire them in a bad light.  The video has also left many wondering about the rules of engagement on the high seas and whether or not the heavy fire shown in the video was warranted.

But President of Trident Group, Thomas Rothrauff, defended the teams actions to Bloomberg, saying his company is “absolutely” satisfied its operating procedures were legal and “full compliance with rules for use of force were in place.”  In the report, Rothrauff even noted that at least some of the boats’ occupants were probably killed or injured although there is no way for him to know for sure.

“We’re not in the business of counting injuries,” Rothrauff added.

Rothrauff goes on to say that the particular attack shown in the video was the second attack on the vessel in 72-hours by pirates operating from a nearby mothership.  He also says that the pirates in the video were returning fire however it is hard to see in the video.

The report adds that all of Tridents Group’s operations on shot on video and the video is technically owned by the hiring company, which  in this case Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc..  No word on who is responsible for the release of the video.

The original video of the attack can been seen HERE.

Image: Nexus Consulting

In early April, a video surfaced which depicted a ship’s security team on an all-out assault against an apparent pirate attack.  For most the video was a welcomed sight, but those with ties to the industry say the video has unfortunately painted private security in a poor light.

In a recent press release, Kevin Doherty, President of Nexus Consulting, a US veteran-owned and operated private safety and security company, personally notes that, “though we are operating quite regularly conducting anti-piracy missions, the team in this video is not a Nexus team.”

Nexus further comments:

Though the validity of the video has not yet been verified (as no security firm has come forward to accept responsibility for the incident), the video is troubling on a number of levels.

Life is precious, and great care needs to be given by any security firm hired to provide defense. Threat identification, proper Use of Force (UoF) understanding and incident de-escalation need to be paramount components of every security guard’s training.

The Use of Force model is the cornerstone of any security firm. Nexus is thus calling on all security firms working in the maritime arena to review their Use of Force policies. In support of this, Nexus is proudly showcasing their cornerstone UoF policies to clarify any concerns.

Further, Nexus is calling on SAMI to conduct a through review of the incident to ensure that only the highest standards of service are being rendered through the association, and if needed, sanction the firm in the video. Security associations must ensure that firms are held accountable for their actions (and public statements) to ensure governance is not merely a paper tiger.

Image: Nexus Consulting

As an aid to ship owners, Nexus is offering ten simple questions that should help vet any potential security firm they may consider to utilize:

1. Does the security company protect any vessels from their own flag state?

2. Where is their insurance valid?

3. How do they export their weapons?

4. Has the security firm changed names recently?

5. What was their stance on armed details just a year ago?

6. What flag-states have cleared the firm for work?

7. What weapons do they utilize?

8. Do they retreat to the citadel when the bullets start to fly?

9. What P&I clubs have vetted them?

10. Finally, and most important, ask for prior CSO’s from firms they have covered and contact them.

Nexus also notes some excellent resources on the use of force thanks to the United States Coast Guard and US Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). These resources govern the Nexus use of force policy and ensure the highest standards of preservation of life on the high seas.

“Most importantly to me, I would like to personally thank the all mariners, including my brother Michael, who all regularly transiting these dangerous pirate waters,” said Doherty. “These mariners endure such threats – as noted in the video – to ensure humanitarian aid and world commerce continue to get where they’re needed – despite the great risk to themselves in doing so.”

We have no idea what the circumstances were at the time of this attack, or which ship this video was taken from, but it clearly shows a vessel security team using overwhelming firepower to successfully defend their ship from an attempted pirate attack.

Hopefully this video finds its way into Somalia…

- By Captain Rich Madden

February 15, 2012 will be a date many in the maritime security industry will remember for a long time. It was the day that the first innocent deaths were laid at the feet of an armed security team in the Indian Ocean. During a routine transit 22 nautical miles off the West coast of India, the embarked security team onboard the Italian oil tanker Enrica Lexie opened fire on a fishing boat that was apparently approaching their vessel. In the aftermath, 2 unarmed Indian fishermen were killed.

Armed security teams have become more prevalent in the Indian Ocean Basin and the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa (GOA/HOA) region due to the explosive rise of Somali piracy since 2007. With increased piracy in the Gulf of Guinea off and in Southeast Asia, it seems you might find them onboard a vessel almost anywhere.  One of the greatest concerns with putting armed security onboard a vessel is responsibility; Responsibility for weapons laws – responsibility for taking lethal action and ultimately, responsibility for deaths or injuries.

On February 15th, P&I (protection and indemnity, i.e. insurance) broker Marsh USA announced a new insurance facility to support the rapidly developing maritime security sector. Whether it was fortuitous or poor timing, it certainly shows that there is concern in boardrooms over a company’s liability with onboard security teams – particularly when they are armed.

This incident off the coast of India, tragic as it is, highlights many of the stickier subjects of maritime security. One of these is that the security team in question was Italian military, not a private contractor. When discussing the difference between embarking military personnel versus private contractors, much of the conversation must come down to the chain of command. Having military security teams onboard vessels is not new – Portuguese and French fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean have had military security onboard for years. The U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC – not to be confused with the Mediterranean Shipping Company) has embarked U.S. Navy security personnel onboard their vessels, dependent on their area of operation. In the case of MSC vessels, the security team detachment’s chain of command did not run through the master of the vessel. Instead, it operated under its own rules of engagement (ROE), while consulting with and advising the master. In at least one instance, this culminated with the scaled escalation of force against a fishing vessel, with the deck watch officer/mate on watch or master not being consulted.

In the case of the Enrica Lexie, what was the chain of command?

After defining the chain of command, the next topics that must be covered are the ROE and steps for a scaled escalation of force. The particulars of the Enrica Lexie incident are unknown, but there will seldom be an instance where a security team jumps directly to lethal force. A scaled escalation of force always starts with the lowest level of force, with additional force added until the threat is eliminated. Eliminated has an ominous overtone, but may include a suspicious vessel turning away or otherwise proving that they are not a threat. The presence of a security team alone may be enough to dissuade robbers or pirates. If not, the next step may be to indicate you are watching them – searchlights, laser “dazzlers” or activating anti-piracy water hoses along the ship’s side may have an effect. Non-lethal measures may be tried next – there are various systems available, but the many prefer the Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD). The LRADs effectiveness is not so much its ability as a non-lethal weapon, but in its versatility in weeding the truly committed perpetrator out from the fishing vessels and for its ability to be recorded by the vessel data recorder (VDR).

In the event your security team has to take lethal action, you will want to be able to prove to authorities and your company that a scaled escalation of force was used. A thorough investigation of the Enrica Lexie incident should include a review of the VDR data to demonstrate the actions taken.

While military security teams are an asset onboard a vessel in a high threat area, it would appear that on the Enrica Lexie, they were also a liability. Part of the difficulty with military security teams is the chain of command, but may also continue to the level of training and experience of its members. Simply put, private contractors are there to protect the company’s asset, with no other bosses or agendas with which to deal. Many companies offering vessel security services have joined organizations such as SAMI or IAMSP that provide vetting and guidance. It would be highly recommended that any company, vessel or master hiring a vessel security company do the proper research on those companies and regulations thereof.

No one wants to find out, as the pirates are coming over the rail, that the security company you hired wasn’t all it was cracked up to be.

To develop the course, the University of Greenwich teamed up its School of Engineering and Natural Resources Institute (NRI), Marine Insurance and Maritime Crime Consultants, and the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), and draws on the institute’s strengths in maritime management, policy and history as well as the university’s wider expertise in engineering, technology, energy, environmental science and the Law of the Sea.

“The whole planet depends on safe, secure shipping,” said Professor Chris Bellamy, Director of the Greenwich Maritime Institute.  “Almost every day we hear about issues such as pirates in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Guinea and the Malacca Strait; port security, not to mention the melting Arctic, rising sea levels, maritime oil and gas, wind and tidal issues. The maritime industry needs educated people with the informed vision to deal with these threats and opportunities. This course can help to provide the professional development which is so vitally needed.”

The program looks to attract interest from people currently working or seeking employment in senior roles in the armed services, the private maritime and shipping sector, private security firms, government bodies and law enforcement agencies.

The University of Greenwich says that the first courses will start this fall at the university’s campus in the Old Royal Naval College located within the Maritime Greenwich World Heritage site.  Obtaining the degree will take one year for full-time students and two years for part-time.

“The maritime security industry has come a long way in stressing its professional credentials,” said SAMI Founder, Peter Cook. “The creation of this Masters degree is yet another stage in this development and we would encourage all those considering a career in the highest echelons of this rapidly growing industry to join this course.”

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Ricardo J. Reyes (RELEASED)

- By Cesar Morales

On Jan 29th Rear Admiral (Select) Robert V. Hoppa, Director, National Maritime Intelligence Center, announced the renaming of the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) to the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO).  More important, and troubling, than the name change, is the consolidation of responsibilities…

The new NMIO will assume the responsibilities of the National Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office (NMCO), which is currently charged with maritime information exchange within the unclassified sphere – NMCO was formerly known as the Office for Global Maritime Situational Awareness (OGMSA).

This consolidation of efforts, both illogical and unwise, is a significant step backwards for national MDA.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is built on information sharing, not on intelligence exchange or integration. If asked, most mariners will tell what they need is ‘information,’ not ‘intelligence’- noting the distinct differences between the two. Where as ‘intelligence’, by definition, is available to a select few, information moves freely, without restriction, among those that need and want it. As a former Chief of Naval Operations once stated, unclassified information exchange, and effective MDA, allows “the right people, to have the right information, at the right time….”.

Clearly, the efficient movement of maritime domain information should be the goal of national MDA.  In an affront to unclassified information exchange however, NMIO will work to coordinate all interagency MDA and information sharing – formerly the responsibility of the OGMSA/NMCO – behind the secure walls of in the Office of Naval Intelligence building in Suitland, MD.  The OGMSA/NMCO, despite its failure as an interagency experiment (primarily due to budgetary limitations and the absence of interagency commitment), claimed several successes in enhancing national MDA by identifying interagency MDA capability gaps through the Interagency Solutions Analysis (IASA) and advancing the Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS)program.

The Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS) is a freely-shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network.

These successes were a direct result of OGMSA/NMCO’s focus on information exchange in the unclassified environment – thus enabling OGSMA/NMCO to build relationships and networks within the vast spectrum of maritime stakeholders ranging from interagency and commercial entities to international partners.  Relationships and networks enable information exchange and are therefore proven necessities for effective MDA.

It remains to be seen how an intelligence organization (NMIO) will be able to facilitate the exchange of information between the numerous and varied members of the mariner community when only a fraction of these stakeholders have the ability to operate in a secure environment. Anyone who has operated with, or within, the walls of Suitland, knows that getting information to move outside those walls is a monumental, if not impossible task.

It begs the question- how will an intelligence organization expand and enhance the networks critical to national MDA, if most of those networks are outside the IC community?

Ultimately, this move to create and rename a new MDA office is representative of the absence of alignment by the senior interagency leaders tasked with enhancing and coordination of national MDA efforts. From the restructuring of the OGMSA to be the NMCO, to the creation of the NMIO and subsequent dismantling of the NMCO, these national MDA coordination efforts have been characterized by good intentions rather than by focused efforts. However, these MDA endeavors have proven that although many obstacles exist to effective information exchange, information exchange is the essential foundation for enhancing both MDA and national security.

Sadly, placing this new NMIO MDA office behind the walls of Suitland results in not just another potential obstacle to information exchange, but a significant step backwards for national MDA.

Follow the discussion on the FORUM.

Cesar Morales is an independent Maritime Analyst, graduate of the US Naval Academy, and a former Surface Warfare Officer.  He is a recognized subject matter expert in interagency Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities.  

Image courtesy Maersk Line

An Algerian newspaper reports a local al-Qaeda cell planned to launch boats loaded with explosives at US and European ships with aid of suicide bombers.

Algerian security forces have thwarted a terrorist suicide attack by the “al-Qaeda organization in the Maghreb” targeting European and American ships in the Mediterranean, Algeria-based daily e-Chorouk reported.

According to the report, three people were arrested over suspected involvement in the plot, H. Rabeh, T. Belal, and M. Tarek — who all hail from the city of Annaba in northeastern Algeria.   They admitted that they were operating under the authority of Maghreb-based al-Qaeda PR chief, Qassemi Salah al-Din, also known as Mohamed Abu Salah.

The terror cell they were members of purchased a boat and equipped it with navigational equipment. They planned on loading the boat with explosives and launching it towards American and European vessels, according to the suicide bombers’ preferences.

The newspaper reported that the three were arrested after they aroused suspicions by visiting the same internet cafes on a daily basis where they would surf global Jihad websites.  Eventually, security forces specializing in cyber-crimes traced them.

The plot was also set to “undermine the national economy and reverberate in the global media” by offering media outlets real-time information.

GHOST. Photo: Juliet Marine Systems

The number of threats posing significant risks to maritime security these days seems to be never ending, always changing, and rapidly growing.  Pirates, rogue governments, terrorism; all seem to be organizing an accelerating – and rather freighting – rate.  So what can we do?  Have the world navies place destroyers in every vital waterway, every ocean or body of water in the world? It would be nice, depending on who you talk to, but unrealistic.  The issue has led a number of private companies come up with their own solutions.  Some have been good, a lot have been bad, and many have been downright ridiculous.

Now enter GHOST.  Developed by the privately held Juliet Marine Systems, a technology systems company based in Portsmouth, NH, the company believes they have the solution for many of the increasing threats to maritime security.

A view of the cockpit of GHOST. Photo: Juliet Marine Systems

Described as an attack helicopter on water, GHOST is a high-speed attack craft specifically designed to protect vital waterways like the Straits of Hormuz and counter threats such as piracy.  With swarm attacks and close-to-shore operation in mind, the GHOST was designed with speed, maneuverability, endurance and the ability to carry a hefty payload.

JMS says that, deployed, GHOST would have the capability to conduct long duration patrols and missions, adding that two squadrons of GHOSTs operating from Bahrain or Djibouti could effectively provide protection to destroyers or cruisers operating within the region.

“No country would be able to keep Iran from closing the Straits of Hormuz without conflict with Iran’s small high-speed boats,” said JMS President and CEO, Gregory Sancoff.  “These swarm attacks are the Navy’s equivalent of the IED. GHOST is the counter-IED solution to this hit and run attack weapon.”

As for the GHOST’s firepower, JMS says the possibilities are endless and the company is currently seeking a weapons integrator.  The vessel is designed to conceal all weaponry in enclosed bays allowing for an improved radar cross section, reducing GHOST’s radar signature significantly.

So is GHOST practical in the field and a promising solution for maritime security in the Straits of Hormuz or Gulf of Aden? We’ll just have to wait and see.  But, one is for sure… the thing looks pretty cool.

GHOST during sea trials. Photo: Juliet Marine Systems

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report found that the overall awareness and preparedness of EU member states for maritime specific cyber-attacks is currently low to non-existent; an alarming find considering 90% of the EU’s external trade and more than 40% of the internal trade take place via maritime routes.

While ENISA admits that ensuring adequate maritime cyber security and protection of ICT (information and communications technology) systems is a major challenge that is in no way limited to the maritime sector, more can be done.

First, ENISA recommends EU Member States undertake targeted maritime sector awareness campaigns (see gCaptain Advertising) and cyber security training for shipping companies, port authorities and so on.  On the other hand, policy makers need to prioritize cyber security aspects as they would (or do) with physical security and safety aspects facing the maritime industry.

Given the reports findings, ENISA strongly recommends a holistic, risk-based approach that includes assessment of maritime-specific cyber risks, as well as identification of all critical assets within this sector.

“This report positions maritime cyber security as a logical and crucial next step in the global protection efforts of ICT infrastructure,” said Executive Director of ENISA, Professor Udo Helmbrecht.

It will be interesting to see how the industry reacts to the findings and how, or if, the recommendations will be implemented.

The full report can be downloaded HERE

Jeffrey Milstein, image by Barbara Veiga

On August 2nd, 1939 Albert Einstein wrote a letter to then President Roosevelt stating, “A single bomb…carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”  This threat remains as real today as it was in 1939.  The majority of the public and even Congress fear the threat of a major attack will come hidden inside one of the thousands of boxes that arrive via container ships into our ports every day.

In response to this fear, we create many different container security initiatives and trade partnerships against terrorism in order to limit our exposure and screen as much as possible before the vessel even arrives on our shores.  Unlike a container ship, where there are many hoops to jump through to hide something nefarious in a box, the engine room of an oil tanker is a much easier place to hide the nefarious box as it would be much less scrutinized and much harder to keep track of.  That being said, tankers are obviously part of many inspected and scrutinized programs.  One might suggest however, that tankers provide more of a threat than container ships as they are part of a tramp shipping market (tramp trade is a market which does not have a fixed schedule, itinerary or published ports of call) where routes and schedules can’t be analyzed by think tanks.  More often than not, cargo may not even be sold on a tramp ship or discharge orders given until weeks after a vessel leaves the load port.

Even more unpredictable than a tankers route would be a commercial fishing vessel’s route, which may rely upon the “good feeling” for which location a fishing boat captain might take.  While the methodology of fishing routes is likely easier to figure out than the schedule of a tanker, one thing is for sure: Fishing vessels have the ability to go uninspected and unhindered in their daily operations which make them the perfect threat vector to the fragile state of the maritime industry.

In addition to the fragile state of the maritime industry, a recent study completed at Oxford University reports:

“Fish, sharks, whales and other marine species are in imminent danger of an unprecedented and catastrophic extinction event at the hands of humankind, and are disappearing at a far faster rate than anyone had predicted.  Overfishing has cut some fish populations by more than 90 percent”.

The threat vector, the history on port security, terrorism, piracy and how it all relates to the U.S. maritime industry and the reasons why such threats are not being addressed were spelled out in Part 1, “Terrorism, Pirates, and blowing the whistle on Commercial Fishing Before it Causes the Next Big Attack”.  In part 2, the goal is to explain what happens if this threat continues not to be ignored, as well as how we can start to solve this by being proactive, rather than reactive after a devastating attack to the nation.

What happens if the threat continues is not addressed?

After the terrorist attack of 9/11, the airline industry went into a financial tailspin.  By 2005, four of the nation’s five largest carriers — Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways — filed for bankruptcy protection.  The nation’s 10 largest airlines combined lost an estimated $29 billion between 2001 and the first six months of 2011, and the cost and convenience of airline travel for all were grossly impacted forever.  While 9/11 had nothing directly to do with our ports, it actually impacted the maritime industry more than any other event in the history of maritime including the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 and subsequent OPA 90 regulations.  After 9/11 the U.S. demanded the International Maritime Organization (IMO) set forth regulations for securing vessels and facilities, which ultimately gave birth to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code.  This was developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, now known as the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulations.  Its full provisions came into effect on July 1, 2004 after what was an unbelievably fast and comprehensive implementation process for an industry that rarely saw the likes of vulnerability assessments, development of security plans that included passenger, vehicle and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identification procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment, fencing and increase in guards.

US Flag off back of boat in NY Harbor, photo by Jeffrey Milstein

The driving force behind all of this change was not an attack on the Maritime Transportation System (MTS), but actually a “perceived threat”.  Now imagine if an attack actually took place in the maritime domain within the U.S. interior that directly affected the citizens of our nation, not just economically but with considerable loss of life as it happened when the planes crashed into the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  How would the industry and government react to the future handling of operations and how maritime security is conducted if an actual Transportation Security Incident (TSI) were to happen within the one of our 361 U.S. ports?  More importantly, how would the citizens of our country react?  Aviation is a necessity for travel and it was heavily impacted by a fear of people to fly securely even though  it was often their only choice. The effect on the public’s faith in the cruise industry, which is not a necessity for vacation and transit, would be devastating if there were an attack in maritime that translated to a realistic perceived threat against the cruise industry.  Ultimately the industry would rebound, however it would likely suffer from a significant reduction in attendance for quite some time.

One could only speculate how cost-prohibitive security measures would become and how much of an impact a nationwide sustained heightened Maritime Security Level (MARSEC) 2 or 3 condition would have on our economy and to the global markets.  In 2008, USCG Admiral Thad Allen told us that the U.S. maritime transportation system adds $700 billion to the U.S. economy annually, calling it “the lifeblood of our economy.” He later cited as an example that when a labor dispute shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in 2003, the American economy suffered losses estimated at $1 billion per day. With a terrorist attack you would have to add the possible costs in infrastructure damage and relative expenses for a recovery in order to reconstitute trade and commerce to that $1 billion per day loss to truly see how devastating an attack would be.

If we continue on the same path, and a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) is caused with significant loss of life or economic impact directly resulted from a fishing vessel, both the fishing industry and the maritime industry will be grossly impacted.  Fishing vessels would no longer have access to docks in and around ports, security zones would be established affecting fishing vessels ability to continue to operate.  It is even possible all commercial fisheries within the U.S. EEZ would be temporarily halted.  At first, it sounds unlikely, however look at the temporary and permanent impacts to drilling after BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster, and to vessel crew shore leave after 9/11, and to single hull vessels after the Exxon Valdez spill, etc.  While this would be great for our oceans to get some time to regenerate and repopulate, the economic stability in our country would suffer a critical blow because of job losses and massive inflation of food costs.

The unfortunate state of Congress and the federal government today is that rules and regulations for security are often not endorsed or pushed through until a significant amount of people die first.

This means in order for the majority of our bills, regulations, and guidelines to be written and threats to be taken seriously by our legislators, they have to be written in the blood of those who died because of an incident.

Strangling the Maritime industry

After the events of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, OPA 90 increased the commitment that industry had to make to be prepared for an oil spill response.  By increasing the industry’s accountability, many important steps were made in establishing a more environmentally sensitive maritime environment.  Three major items that came out of this incident were the implementation of the USCG document “Certificate of Financial Responsibility” (COFR), requirement for Vessel / Facility Response plans, and the establishment and identification of Qualified Individual’s (QI).

It took many years for the proper requirements and safety measures to fall into place after the Exxon Valdez spill and for them to not be considered a nuisance or cost prohibitive measure by the maritime industry.  At this point, those same measures that the industry pushed back on that provided a cleaner and safer environment are now a standard part of doing business and have been streamlined with everyday activities.  This being said, the USCG, with the implementation of MTSA, made a large step in the same direction with security measures as OPA 90 did with safety measures, but many still feel push-back in relation to costs for implementation and upgrades in security.  It is extremely rare for organizations to invest money into securing themselves against something that they may themselves see as a perceived threat if there are no regulations requiring them to do so.  One of the main contributing factors for this is the constant fear of what will come next and how that will affect ship owners and facilities in a market that is already suffering some of the lowest shipping rates in the past few decades.

If an attack were to happen now, causing more stringent regulations, it might just be almost impossible for many companies to bounce back from given the state of the industry today.  Considering the state of the Euro, countries like Greece, which have a significant stake in the maritime world, would not be in any position to start reorganizing or investing into new equipment or requirements.   Because charter rates are so low in some sections of the industry, we are seeing things we never saw before like traders chartering Very large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and anchoring them offshore for a year fully laden with cargo rather than entering into new tankage agreements at facilities.  We have even seen what some considered “graveyards of ships” anchored in Indonesian ports waiting for cargos.

The industry needs an environment for ship owners to want to go over and above and be willing to try innovative methods for security rather than living in the current state of fear waiting for the next set of restrictive regulations or event to be written that will cost excessive amounts of money to comply with.  Ship owners, facility operators and the crew who effectively have their boots on the ground everyday more often than not, know how to better secure their interests than the legislators writing these bills and using them to attach ear marks that are in most cases laughable.

How we can start to solve this?

As a port agents, we see gaps every day that potentially leave the door open for a myriad of plausible scenarios for a terrorist planning attacks on our country.  But what we don’t see is the regulations and laws to close many of the gaps that actually already exist.  No one wants to reinvent the wheel, they just want to put their name on something that doesn’t cost billions, doesn’t impact voters and doesn’t take long to achieve.  There’s no such thing as proactive, just reactive, even when the requested result is not possible.  For example, the “9/11 commission recommendations act of 2007” requiring 100 percent screening will likely not be achieved unless a box blows up and then somehow or another it will be achieved, even if it slows the maritime transportation system to a screeching halt.  MTSA as described earlier was in response to 9/11 and we achieved 100 percent total transformation of all U.S. ports in six months from the date of implementation.  That’s historic, but that was in reaction to the events of 9/11, 100 percent screening wasn’t.  The concept of 100 percent screening came from the 9/11 commission report which was completed three years after the attack and it didn’t become a priority until it hit the congressional floor 3 years later.

In the case of commercial and recreational fishing, it is an industry that is already exposed and already has laws and regulations governing them, yet overfishing, poaching, and unenforced regulated fishing continue to be an open threat vector and continue to bring us closer to an extinction event.  Commercial fishing vessels are given quotas and specific instructions to what they can fish, how they can fish, when they can fish, and with whom they can fish.  Are we inspecting these vessels when they arrive on the dock to confirm they are doing what we license them to do?  Do we track their routes, and do we ensure everything is on par? To take it a step further and possibly a bit overboard, do we know if they are going offshore and meeting with foreign vessels or going to foreign ports or being hijacked or being used to run guns and weapons, drugs, or other nefarious purposes?  The answer to all of these questions is a resounding NO. But, what we do have is laws in place allowing us to inspect, search and penalize these same vessels for breaking the rules.

We already have a system in place to take the fear of threat out of an entire industry; we have a system in place to fine and penalize those breaking the rules, which would subsidize the force needed to enforce the regulations.  There are people breaking the laws, we know this because our oceans are emptying at catastrophic rates.  These vessels should be a part of the system, they should be required to carry AIS regardless of their size and be monitored by a fisheries enforcement agency.  They should have to report their arrivals through a system similar to the electronic notification of arrivals (ENOA) to the USCG National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC); they should have to be boarded by a DHS agency upon arrival.  They should have to pay an inspection fee and be penalized if they are breaking the laws that were created to protect bio-diversity and the oceans that cover the majority of our planet.

The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), which provides a clear picture that we do not know how to defend against the small vessel security threat, is currently posted on the internet for potential terrorists to see in a 57-page document on DHS’s website.  This strategy “harmonizes related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within DHS, and lays the groundwork for DHS cooperation across the broad small vessel stakeholder base”.

The problem with this strategy is there is no clear concise way to deal with or resolve this issue.  We must stop trying to address all small vessels as the same and start identifying ways to take pieces out of the equation little by little in order to whittle down this massive undertaking.

There is a significant difference between the threat posed by a standard recreational vessel and a commercial fishing vessel.  Commercial fishing vessels are crewed with several experienced people who are prepared to handle rough weather, be offshore for long periods of time, and are willing to take chances.  While some recreational boaters may be much more experienced than commercial crew, the reality is that most recreational boaters go out for the day, the weekend, or a specific time period as a vacation and they can be tracked and patterns can easily be identified as to what might be a threat or not.  However, commercial fishing vessels and even private chartered party boats and day trip vessels are not as easy to track.  The ease at which a person can join one of these private vessels to fish for the day is startling.  While the vessel crew is required to have a Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) with background checks by the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), there is no requirement for ID checks, record keeping or vetting of guests who board.  This allows for a great starting point for would-be terrorists to collect intel on our nation’s ports.  Intel can easily be collected on the vector of fishing vessels but also on the shipping patterns in a given port as well.  Many of these daytrip fishing vessels pass through ports, choke points and regions where someone could pretend to fish for the day or for a few weeks and get into regions where they otherwise could not see the flow of traffic from the water instead of behind a fence and scrutiny from the land.

Stay tuned for the third and final chapter to this series: “Who is responsible for enforcement of our fisheries, who should be responsible and how we can save our oceans from extinction while proactively protecting our nation from terrorism”