http://schwehr.org/blog/archives/2008-09.html#e…

I don't quite understand what you mean when you say, “Under keel clearance does have a maneuvering effect in current and changing water depths, but not relevant in this case. Using only NTSB data at time 08 27 37 Cosco Busan has no feasible alternative course change to the right.”

My point was, as the CB came to port (and then, of course, too much so), the tidal current would push on the ship with greater force (and hence send it off the intended course faster) with low UKC than if UKC had been greater. All of this contributing to the loss of situational awareness of the bridge team – i.e.”where are we now?”

By law, custom, tradition and attitude many pilots that have not experienced the courts continue to perform as “one man shows.” However one must recognize the difference between a river pilot and a bar/harbor pilot: e.g navigating the San Francisco Bar Channel and the ports on San Francisco Bay and the pilots that navigate to Sacramento and Stockton, California. Hearings, inquiries and investigation seldom develop the “root cause” of accidents because they have limited experience, knowledge and mostly are guided by bureaucratic constraints and therefore if fault is found, send the culprit to ship handling training. Why, because there is no other appropriate remedy available.

The statement that transiting the Oakland Bar Channel is a “relatively simple matter” is misleading in that the bar channel is nearly perpendicular to the currents and the published predictions are frequently inaccurate. Therefore, in limited visibility the person directing the navigation must rely on radar navigation to determine set and drift. Also, as one transits the bar channel the effect of the current changes. Experience in this case dictates: in fog, concentrate on radar navigation.

Regardless, no one knows what actually occurred except the Captain of COSCO BUSAN and pilot Cota i,e: why so many rudder orders? What passage plan was discussed? Was the track plotted on the chart 588 accepted by the pilot and Master? The NTSB hearing produced exceptional testimony and information however, no analysis or report has been produced, but professional mariners and second guessers have theories.

Under keel clearance does have a maneuvering effect in current and changing water depths, but not relevant in this case. Using only NTSB data at time 08 27 37 Cosco Busan has no feasible alternative course change to the right.

Most importantly, is the mostly common practice of pilots and ships not using BRM as a safety feature in voyages and navigation practice. The non-functional practice of BRM is concurred in. Although taught, stressed and published it is not universally followed; and now the cause is known!

Lastly as I recall, Brisbane Australia has a relatively calm and secured bay for pilot operations that allow discussion. Not so on at the sea boarding stations at some west coast pilot stations, however there is no rule that demand full speed till otherwise required.

Essentially, if the BRM is to be accepted and function then the professional pilots must be implementers. JGD