The findings of the IRC report are concurred in, essentially as presented ,and, based on the evidenciary material utilized. As a step, it removes the SFBP from any further action unless, as mentioned in a comment, “they are accountable for placing Cota in the role he played.” It must be shown they knew his condition. The Federal indictment includes some accusations that are not discussed in the IRC, by choice, My review of “reported”' data indicates Cota did demonstrate some proper conduct e.g., checking with dredge on status,but thereafter the data indicates a lack of proper conduct.Regretfully in almost a year nothing has changed; it can happen again. Ships, people, systems conditions are the same, as far as the public is concerned. No NTSB report, the USCG is in silent mode and the media only reports what they are told, and that is not much. Why did this happen remains unknown. JGD.

The findings of the IRC report are concurred in, essentially as presented ,and, based on the evidenciary material utilized. As a step, it removes the SFBP from any further action unless, as mentioned in a comment, “they are accountable for placing Cota in the role he played.” It must be shown they knew his condition. The Federal indictment includes some accusations that are not discussed in the IRC, by choice, My review of “reported”' data indicates Cota did demonstrate some proper conduct e.g., checking with dredge on status,but thereafter the data indicates a lack of proper conduct.Regretfully in almost a year nothing has changed; it can happen again. Ships, people, systems conditions are the same, as far as the public is concerned. No NTSB report, the USCG is in silent mode and the media only reports what they are told, and that is not much. Why did this happen remains unknown. JGD.

I agree, Cota's main error was in not recognizing the mess around him. The other errors can be summed up in the report statement:

“Captain Cota was unaware that Captain Sun and his crew had only joined the vessel on Oct 24 (two weeks previously) when there was a change in the vessel's ownership.”.

The most I have personally seen in a two week period was an 80% change of the marine dept and this was followed by the closest near-miss I have ever witnessed.

It is hard enough for one individual to work with a new bridge team aboard an unfamiliar ship. It is criminal to have every member of the bridge team try to do this and the company official who made the decision should be on trial. In my opinion Captain Cota and Sun suffered from the less objectionable charge of cowardice for not walking off the vessel…. but how many captains have you seen walk away from an operation they knew was unsafe? It's a common problem in the industry as fear of loosing one's job seems to trump fear of an incident…. surprising to me considering the myriad of employment opportunities available to mariners today.

I do, however, find it hard to dismiss the fact Cota completely forgot he had a tug alongside. This seems inexcusable.

“http://www.pilotcommission.org/home.shtml”

A good link was also published as a gCaptain forum entry

“http://gcaptain.com/maritime/forum/comments.php?DiscussionID=544″

COSCO BUSAN Incident Review Committee Report
“The Board of Pilot Commissioners today received a report of the investigation by its Incident Review Committee “IRC) of the accident on November 7, 2007 in which the M/V COSCO BUSAN, under the navigational control of Captain John Cota, a Board-licensed pilot, struck one of the towers of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, damaging the ship and releasing over 50,000 gallons of fuel oil into the waters of San Francisco Bay.”