Our friend Richard Rodriguez of the BitterEnd Blog had an excellent post titled VTS – Working with large vessels, that gives Puget Sound boaters tips on communicating with the numerous large ships transiting to and from port. [Continue Reading →]

 

 Vessel Traffic Services Overview: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download

Fairplay brings us the most ridiculous item of the day;

Vessels transiting US harbours could come under tight navigational controls in the wake of the Cosco Busan bridge strike and resulting spill in San Francisco Bay. Sources close to the investigation tell Fairplay that federal officials may suggest that vessels transiting US channels may be compelled to follow navigational instructions issued by the US Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Service. In the case of the Cosco Busan accident, it has been alleged that VTS duty officers tried to warn the vessel off its impact course with the Bay Bridge, but their advice is just that and not mandatory for vessel operators. Fairplay asked USCG Commandant Thad Allen about the suggestion and he said that, if required to, the Coast Guard is up to the challenge of positively controlling commercial vessel traffic. But he noted that most major US harbors presently don’t have VTS systems and that such a change would require a major financial commitment “and a departure from the current culture regarding vessel navigation responsibility”. The suggested system would be along the lines of air traffic control procedures which Allen says were developed centuries after the traditional rules for vessel captains and pilots.

The problem with maritime incidents is the fix rarely address the true cause and often creates problems that contribute to future incidents. As an example here’s an email from a gCaptain reader who wishes to remain anonymous;

“The new ISPS reporting requirements are sinking us in paperwork. Just yesterday I was on bridge watch in moderate traffic, typing a report out on my laptop. For 15 minutes our captain observed my action from the chart room then came out and said:

5 Years ago if I saw you typing a report on that F$@@’n laptop I would have fired you on the spot. Today, with all these ISM/ISPS requirements, if I come up here and find your not on your laptop typing out reports, I’ll fire you on the spot!

I was paying attention to the traffic but we both knew it didn’t have my full attention… and these reports were suppose to be making us safer!! I don’t feel safer and I don’t feel the paperwork will keep terrorists away from my ship”

Unsafe indeed.

Vessel Traffic in US ports is exceptionally well run and experienced in vessel safety and operations. They do not make the proposal ridiculous, Admiral Allen does. Why? Current technology is simply not capable of delivering real time tracking. Also, final say remains the responsibility of a ship’s captain because he is the one who knows the ship’s capabilities, it’s crew and he is stationed on the bridge. He is also the last one to abandon if the ship finds danger… and he knows it.

If the Coast Guard wants final say then they need to be aboard the vessel and if that happens they will be hard pressed to fill the position with anyone more qualified than the competent and experienced San Francisco Pilots.

UPDATE:

Bob Couttie of Maritime Accident Casebook comments on this post;

VTS-assisted accidents, by action or inaction, aren’t rare, or at least not rare enough. John Clandillon-Baker, editor of The Pilot, journal of the UK Maritime Pilots Association sent us an email reminder about the Sea Express/Alaska Rainbow collision in February, 2007. VTS issues also featured in the grounding of the P&O Nedlloyd Magellan in 2001, and the source or worst oil spill so far in Singapore waters, the collision between the Evoikos and Orapin Global in October 1997. One can arguably include the Exxon Valdez.

USCG Commandant Thad Allen’s assurance to Fairplay that his command is up to the challenge has a Rice-Davies sort of quality to it, he would say that, wouldn’t he.

MAC’s own informal think-tank of veteran master mariners, who aren’t tanked up when they think, finds the proposal less objectionable, the authority of the master will remain in force much as it does now, in their view.

This is only a clip of Bob’s article so be sure to read his full post: “Cosco Busan – Who Needs Pilots?“

__________________________________________________

John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.

National news sources are publishing a story about the VTS warning to the Cosco Busan’s pilot Jim Cota. In a story titled “Ship Got No Alert From Coast Guard” the New York Times writes:

The Coast Guard did not warn helmsmen of a cargo ship that spilled 58,000 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay that the ship was poised to hit the Bay Bridge, investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said. One board member, Debbie Hersman, said the Vessel Traffic Service of the Coast Guard asked the pilot of the ship, the Cosco Busan, about its course before the accident. “They all recognized and were concerned about the vessel’s position,” Ms. Hersman said. But the traffic workers told investigators they decided to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver.

Now I promised you I wouldn’t correct minor mistakes made by the media so I’ll just offer a gCaptain tshirt to the person who catches the first error made by Carolyn Marshall in the linked article. I will, however, continue to report on major mistakes and I believe the misleading title is just that. Saying “Ship Got No Alert From Coast Guard” contradicts the article’s context which clearly states that VTS warned the pilot of an observed error in the vessel’s course. The San Francisco Chronicle goes in more depth writing;

“As we approached the bridge, I received a radio call from Vessel Traffic Service saying I was on a (southwesterly course that was wrong) and asking what my intentions were,” he said.

He said his instruments showed he was heading roughly northwest, a significant difference from what the Coast Guard was seeing on its instruments. Such a difference could indicate that something was wrong with the ship’s electronic navigating equipment.

Cota said the ship’s radar systems failed him, but the NTSB said Thursday that the ship had two completely independent radar systems, suggesting that it was unlikely that both would stop functioning at the same time. Continue Reading…

So what happened and was VTS’ concern for distracting the pilot valid? It is important to note VTS serves in an advisory role and, despite their physical location on shore, plays an important role in Bridge Resource Management ( BRM ). In a previous post we wrote:

(Bridge Resource Management) is a class all officers must take in both teamwork and processing the large amounts of data (lookout reports, radar, radio comms, gps charting, weather information….) that pours into the bridge.

With the error observed, ship notified and a response received VTS remained silent to give the pilot time to process the information and regain situational awareness. I’m just not sure why the media thinks the decision to “to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver” is newsworthy.