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Back in November we worked with a number of organizations to bring you the path of the Cosco Busan on the day of its allision with San Francisco’s Bay Bridge (article link). Today, in response to Paul Drouin’s article “Pilotage Paradox - A Look Into The Cosco Busan Allision“, our friend Professor Kurt Schwehr  has compiled the radar images of the incident on his blog. Take a look:  LINK

You can find our full coverage of the incident on our tag page: Cosco Busan Articles.

Our friend Richard Rodriguez of the BitterEnd Blog had an excellent post titled VTS - Working with large vessels, that gives Puget Sound boaters tips on communicating with the numerous large ships transiting to and from port.

The post had me thinking about my frequent dealings with Vessel Traffic Services worldwide like the time we entered the Singapore Straights and our Captain ordered, despite loud protests, the deck crew to finish chipping paint on the Flying Bridge. The result… the mate on watch missed a few critical calls from the local vessel controllers and they basically shut down the port for 20 minutes to give us plenty of sea room…. and a $25,000 fine!

Once my mind was past reminding me of few sea stories to tell at the next CAMM meeting I started to realize that I had no idea what the VTS stations I have been calling look like. So here they are:

United States:

The Volpe Center recently implemented a vessel communications and tracking network for the Saint Lawrence Seaway. The network, based on the automatic identification system, promises improved safety, security, and efficiency throughout the Seaway. Above, the new system in use at the Eisenhower Lock vessel traffic control center in New York. (Photo courtesy of Mr. Kam Chin)

New York, NY - Seaman Operations Specialist Jason Dailey, sector operator at the Vessel Traffic Center at Coast Guard Activities New York, Staten Island, N.Y. monitors vessel traffic in the New York Harbor. USCG photo by PA2 Mike Hvozda. [Continue Reading →]

 

 Vessel Traffic Services Overview: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download

Yesterday my comments were published on the front page of The San Francisco Chronicle in an article titled; “Hearing today at Presidio - tough queries for spill captain.”

Prior to being asked to comment the Chronicle’s lead maritime reporter contacted our friend Captain Kelly Sweeny who discussed industry wide problems with marine technology. The article states;

Sweeney said the AIS is “occasionally unreliable,” has blind spots such as when a ship is behind islands or structures, and is “antiquated” when compared with modern electronics.

Rewinding to my conversation with the reporters, the first question asked was; “Captain Sweeny believes the system used by San Francisco’s Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is antiquated, do you agree?” After requesting further clarification I was asked why the pilot’s data on his Electronic Chart Display was trusted over VTS’s radar and AIS information.

My answer was “VTS’ AIS system is susceptible to the delay inherit in the VHF transmission of AIS data” BUT, to be honest my initial gut reaction was, “no AIS is not antiquated… it was fully implemented less then 3 years ago”, I quickly corrected myself. My second answer was quoted in the article and reads;

“The maritime industry is slow to act on electronic devices,” said Capt. John Konrad, who runs a Web site called gCaptain. “By the time they get approvals on electronics, they are obsolete.”

Why the quick change of opinion? It’s because I love AIS.

This technology, properly called Automatic Identification Systems, allows me to overlay important data on my radar displays. It also allows me to contact a ship with a zero cpa (collision course) with great ease. For example, prior to AIS I would have to say “Calling the vessel in position x.xx degrees N, x.xx degrees west on a course of 267 and speed of 6knots this is the xxx on channel 16″ where now I simply look up the ship’s name and say “This is the xxx calling yyy on channel 16″. Furthermore the AIS display gives me the vessels MMSI number which opens up new and creative ways to avoid collisions. Finally, my AIS digital read-out really saved the day (and my career?) when our radars, as the Cosco Busan’s Pilot John Cota said “conked out”.

That was not my only hesitation. San Francisco Pilots are some of the most respected individuals in our profession (a dream job for myself) and I only have positive things to say about my dealings with VTS. So could they be wrong in their choice of equipment? It seemed unlikely.

In defending VTS and the Coast Guard’s systems another respected expert, Rear Adm. Craig Bone - Coast Guard district commander, commented on questions raised by myself and others. In covering today’s hearing The Chronicle reports;

Bone said he could think of no excuse for the crash. He denied reports by maritime sources claiming the electronic systems the Coast Guard uses are out of date. The pilot equipment and onboard navigational equipment are some of the most advanced, he said.

“There is no basis in my mind for this to have ever occurred,” Bone said. “Something on that ship had to go terribly wrong. It was totally preventable.”

So the question becomes; “If AIS is a loved safety improvement endorsed by maritime experts worldwide why does Captain Kelly (and myself!) consider it antiquated?”

The reason is because we can do better! In the world of cutting edge technology solutions are available now that would have given Cota and VTS a much better chance of avoiding the incident. The problem, that I suspect is an industry wide tendency, is two fold. First we are so far behind the technology curve small improvements, like AIS, seem large and exciting. Second, most licensed captains are Luddites (my self included) who want to make sure a new system is reliable before implementing it aboard ships.

I come to this conclusion because, despite my writings on the need to improve shipboard technology (most notably HERE and HERE), I initially had the same reaction as Adm. Bone but quickly changed my mind. Why? Because Capt. Kelly is correct, our systems are antiquated and when new lifesaving improvements become available we must break away from the statement that has been rehearsed by ship captains for centuries; “Only history will tell if this is a good idea”. Exciting changes are happening worldwide and improvements in communications (the number one failure in all good incident chains) are leading the way. We must change with the times and embrace technology as the benefit is a reduction of incidents and a preservation of the environment and human life.

For more information on this topic visit our Archives.

Still agreeing with Admiral Bone? Take a look at technology used by Tampa Pilots or Maine Pilots, upcoming portable ECDIS units, the VTS tracking system in Valdez, well documented problems with AIS Ask yourself “Can I send an area specific sitor message via GMDSS” or “Why can my son video chat with a pen pal in China while I’m having trouble raising a vessel 1000 yards away… and closing?”

Captain John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage currently working aboard an 835′ship in the Gulf of Mexico. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.

Cosco Busan - Questions,Questions,Questions

By Bob Couttie

Once the US National Transportation Safety Board has produced the transcripts of the voyage data recorder from the Cosco Busan (Formerly the Hanjin Cairo, the Hanjin name remains on the ship side) we’ll have a better idea of who said what to whom and when. Currently only the pilot’s version of events is available and it is raising a number of questions.

A malfunctioning radar appears to have been an element, though not the cause, of the incident and so far there has been no indication regarding the second radar on the ship’s bridge. Given that there was poor visibility, was the speed of the vessel excessive? Should departure have been delayed until the fog cleared.

The pilot was not familiar with the ECDIS equipment onboard, which does not appear to have malfunctioned. When the pilot asked the Captain to point out the centre of the bridge span the captain allegedly pointed to the bridge support and the pilot navigated accordingly.

With an apparently malfunctioning radar and a lack of familiarity with the primary method of navigation, did the pilot seek to confirm the vessels position with the VTS and/or the accompanying tug?

VTS informed the pilot that the ship was off course, which the Pilot disputed and shortly afterwards a lookout shouted a warning that there was a bridge support ahead and the vessel went hard right and allided with the Delta bridge support.

There also appears to have been a lack of detail in the master/pilot exchange when the latter took conduct of the vessel, as the pilot’s lawyer admits. Would the missing information have been enought to prevent the incident?

There may also have been communications problems between the American pilot and the bridge team who were Chinese. Of there were, to what extent did they reduce the pilot and the bridge team’s situational awareness?

It is not uncommon for pilots to ‘go it alone’ rather than work with a bridge team with whom communication is problematic. This increases the workload on the pilot and reduces his situational awareness. Had the pilot and the bridge team undergone bridge team/bridge resource management training?

Incidents such as this rarely have a single cause, or a single responsible individual. They are usually the result of systemic problems with Bridge Team Management, leadership, culture and navigational practices.

It will be a while before we know the full story of the Cosco Busan, but we’ll hit that bridge when we get to it.

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Bob Couttie has written for a number of maritime industry publications, including the prestigious Lloyd’s List International daily newspaper and Lloyd’s Ship Manager magazine. His reportage on problems with ship’s officer certification examinations in the Philippines in the late 1990s influenced the adoption of computerized examinations for ship officers by the country’s Professional Regulatory Commission.

Bob currently writes and produces podcasts for The Maritime Accident Casebook

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Would you like your article published by gCaptain? Submit it now.

The San Francisco Chronicle has published the Pilot’s Report on the Cosco Busan Incident. Here are the parts of interest to mariners;

Meadows said problems also cropped up in “bridge management,” the communication between the pilot, who had years of experience on the bay, and the ship’s officers, who had never navigated the bay in the Cosco Busan. All were supposed to work together and exchange information on how to successfully navigate the harbor.
“While some information was exchanged, perhaps it could be said it wasn’t a full transfer of information. It was enough for the pilot to work with the master and get the ship ready for sea,” Meadows said.

We have previously reported on bridge management also know as Bridge Team Management or BRM.

gCaptain’s BRM related articles;

• Cosco Busan - Bridge Resource Management
• Environmental Catastrophe Possible Averted - M/V Pasha Bulker
  
• Pasha Bulker Incident Report - Nearly Unbelievable
• What Went Wrong Aboard the MV Pasha Bulker? (Telstar Logistics)

The article continues;

The Cosco Busan’s radar “conked out” twice - first before departure and again as the ship was near the lighthouse on Yerba Buena Island.

Cota was forced to rely on an electronic chart display, showing the track of the vessel and its speed, plus charts of San Francisco Bay. Meadows said the pilot told him he was “not familiar” with the electronic system on the Cosco Busan. “They are all different,” Meadows said.

Cota asked Mao Cai Sun, the captain of the Cosco Busan, to point on the display to the center of the bridge span between the Delta and Echo towers on the western side of the Bay Bridge.

“The master pointed that out,” Meadows said. “In fact, several times during the trip. That’s what the pilot was heading for.”

…

“The pilot had to go along with what the master indicated on the electronic chart display was the center of the span,” Meadows said. “That turned out to be the tower instead.”

We have received email asking; Should the vessel have left without a working radar? and Did the second radar work? …unfortunately those are questions we can’t answer. You will have to wait until the NTSB investigation report is complete.

Read the full SF Chronicle article HERE.

Related Maritime Blog Posts;

Pilot Terror by Bob Couttie