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Carl Nolte of the San Francisco Chronicle writes:

According to a report released Thursday by the state pilot commission…

“There was unequivocally pilot error,” said Gary Gleason, an attorney for the state Board of Pilot Commissioners, which is appointed by the governor to regulate ship pilots in San Francisco, Suisun and San Pablo bays.

John Cota was in control of the 901- foot-long container ship Cosco Busan when it smashed into one of the towers of the Bay Bridge on Nov. 7. The crash caused a 220-foot long gash in the side of the ship and punctured the ship’s fuel tanks. More than 50,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil spilled out, fouling 26 miles of shoreline and killing more than 2,000 birds.

Gleason presented the report to the seven members of the commission and closed with a recording of Cota’s voice, made on the Cosco Busan just after the accident.

“Oh, yeah, it’s so foggy. I shouldn’t have gone,” the pilot said. “I’m not going to do well on this one.” As Cota spoke, the mournful sound of the ship’s fog signal was heard in the background.

Continue Reading…

You can find the full pilot commission report HERE.

John Clandillon-Baker of pilotmag has been featured along with his fellow London pilot (retired) Geoff Taylor in an article written by Libby Purves of The Times. This quote seemed to ring particularly true;

The human aspect of the job fascinated me. “I know what I’m getting into, from the first rung of the ladder and the angle of the captain’s head,” says Geoff. “I’m a psychologist, have to be. You get a sense of the ship – is it well run, is it happy, is it tense, how has it been for that month at sea? Is the master assertive or co-operative?” “Or bonkers,” says a Thames pilot. “A bad ship, you feel the rust on the ladder, you look up at the scruffy individual at the top who looks as if he’d like to stick a knife in you . . .” “You smell it,” says another.

The article can be found HERE and be sure to check back for a link to the BBC radio show of the same title.

In this week’s edition of The Maritime Executive Newsletter managing editor Joseph Keefe, weighs in on the changing dynamics of the Master, Pilot and Port State relationship in light of the Cosco Busan incident;

At this early stage, just one thing is perfectly clear: the Cosco Busan allision will ultimately help to redefine the role of, and the liabilities facing marine pilots in the United States today. One of the most primary questions asked of any deck cadet at any maritime academy is: What is the role of the pilot? And, the answer, of course, is (c.), “the pilot provides guidance to, but is not in charge of the vessel.” That tenet has been upheld in many venues, for many, many years. In reality, however, the typical marine pilot who guides a vessel in from the sea buoy to the dock is in complete control of that vessel on the inbound leg. He or she better be, because often the captain of a particular vessel may have never transited that restricted waterway.

This is just an excerpt of Keefe’s well written article, you can continue reading HERE.

National news sources are publishing a story about the VTS warning to the Cosco Busan’s pilot Jim Cota. In a story titled “Ship Got No Alert From Coast Guard” the New York Times writes:

The Coast Guard did not warn helmsmen of a cargo ship that spilled 58,000 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay that the ship was poised to hit the Bay Bridge, investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said. One board member, Debbie Hersman, said the Vessel Traffic Service of the Coast Guard asked the pilot of the ship, the Cosco Busan, about its course before the accident. “They all recognized and were concerned about the vessel’s position,” Ms. Hersman said. But the traffic workers told investigators they decided to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver.

Now I promised you I wouldn’t correct minor mistakes made by the media so I’ll just offer a gCaptain tshirt to the person who catches the first error made by Carolyn Marshall in the linked article. I will, however, continue to report on major mistakes and I believe the misleading title is just that. Saying “Ship Got No Alert From Coast Guard” contradicts the article’s context which clearly states that VTS warned the pilot of an observed error in the vessel’s course. The San Francisco Chronicle goes in more depth writing;

“As we approached the bridge, I received a radio call from Vessel Traffic Service saying I was on a (southwesterly course that was wrong) and asking what my intentions were,” he said.

He said his instruments showed he was heading roughly northwest, a significant difference from what the Coast Guard was seeing on its instruments. Such a difference could indicate that something was wrong with the ship’s electronic navigating equipment.

Cota said the ship’s radar systems failed him, but the NTSB said Thursday that the ship had two completely independent radar systems, suggesting that it was unlikely that both would stop functioning at the same time. Continue Reading…

So what happened and was VTS’ concern for distracting the pilot valid? It is important to note VTS serves in an advisory role and, despite their physical location on shore, plays an important role in Bridge Resource Management ( BRM ). In a previous post we wrote:

(Bridge Resource Management) is a class all officers must take in both teamwork and processing the large amounts of data (lookout reports, radar, radio comms, gps charting, weather information….) that pours into the bridge.

With the error observed, ship notified and a response received VTS remained silent to give the pilot time to process the information and regain situational awareness. I’m just not sure why the media thinks the decision to “to limit communication so as not to distract the pilot from a difficult maneuver” is newsworthy.

The San Francisco Chronicle has published the Pilot’s Report on the Cosco Busan Incident. Here are the parts of interest to mariners;

Meadows said problems also cropped up in “bridge management,” the communication between the pilot, who had years of experience on the bay, and the ship’s officers, who had never navigated the bay in the Cosco Busan. All were supposed to work together and exchange information on how to successfully navigate the harbor.
“While some information was exchanged, perhaps it could be said it wasn’t a full transfer of information. It was enough for the pilot to work with the master and get the ship ready for sea,” Meadows said.

We have previously reported on bridge management also know as Bridge Team Management or BRM.

gCaptain’s BRM related articles;

• Cosco Busan - Bridge Resource Management
• Environmental Catastrophe Possible Averted - M/V Pasha Bulker
  
• Pasha Bulker Incident Report - Nearly Unbelievable
• What Went Wrong Aboard the MV Pasha Bulker? (Telstar Logistics)

The article continues;

The Cosco Busan’s radar “conked out” twice - first before departure and again as the ship was near the lighthouse on Yerba Buena Island.

Cota was forced to rely on an electronic chart display, showing the track of the vessel and its speed, plus charts of San Francisco Bay. Meadows said the pilot told him he was “not familiar” with the electronic system on the Cosco Busan. “They are all different,” Meadows said.

Cota asked Mao Cai Sun, the captain of the Cosco Busan, to point on the display to the center of the bridge span between the Delta and Echo towers on the western side of the Bay Bridge.

“The master pointed that out,” Meadows said. “In fact, several times during the trip. That’s what the pilot was heading for.”

…

“The pilot had to go along with what the master indicated on the electronic chart display was the center of the span,” Meadows said. “That turned out to be the tower instead.”

We have received email asking; Should the vessel have left without a working radar? and Did the second radar work? …unfortunately those are questions we can’t answer. You will have to wait until the NTSB investigation report is complete.

Read the full SF Chronicle article HERE.

Related Maritime Blog Posts;

Pilot Terror by Bob Couttie