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Where are the Inspectors?

By John G. Denham

Each day I read articles in newspapers, see TV clips and peruse blogs featuring maritime accidents. My computer’s “favorites” has a list of bad news reporters that keep me informed of the casualty ” de jour.” Why so many?

In November 1942 I arrived in Honolulu in the Territory of Hawaii. I was 16. I arrived on USAT Ernest Hinds, an over the hill cargo passenger ship. In a moment of extreme patriotism I had shipped out with the Army transport Service (ATS) while I waited to be 17 and join the navy. Unemployed and a high school drop-out I joined Ernest Hinds late one afternoon with the plan of getting seaman’s papers the next day. I woke early to find we were passing under the Golden Gate Bridge. The Chief Mate, Charley Shaw informed me not to worry, I could get papers in Hawaii.

Standing in front of a stern appearing, elderly uniformed USCG officer I answered his query “How did you get here, if you reside in San Francisco?” My response created “My God boy, you were shanghaied! Do your parents know where you are?”After a call to San Francisco ( Mom indicated no concern) and some discussion, then a phone call to USAT Hinds, I was issued a Certificate of Service certifying I was now an Ordinary Seaman and signed by the concerned Merchant Marine Inspector in Charge.

Since 1942 I have faced a number of USCG officers, but none since about 1950 had any idea of who I was, why I was there and what I had been doing; that was established by a petty officer following a guide-sheet. My licenses state, ” “having been duly examined and found competent” I was licensed to be, whatever?

To be a licensed Master I underwent hours of training, months of rehearsals, and years of qualifying experience at sea. I wrote pages of answers and was reminded that “no one gets out of here is less 10 days.” After 10 days having been duly examined and found competent I was handed a Master, unlimited License signed by a U.S. Coast Guard Captain, as officer in charge.

Federal Pilotage endorsements in Washington and California were accomplished without any demonstration of ability or skill and 100% on written responses to printed questions. Route knowledge was accomplished by listing all navigation aids etc., on formatted blank charts. Although a number of day and night trips were required, certification could easily be circumvented. Advancing to state pilotage, although experienced and capable was a political process requiring no tests or examinations and certified on a pocket sized card. Special ports pilotage was similarly accomplished. It’s understood that a better system for state pilotage is now effective and enforced, however the certification for qualification is subjective. In most cases, a pre-requisite for state pilots is a federal endorsement.

However there are bigger dichotomies in the maritime process of marine transportation. A vessel is a man made structure operated by humans, mostly guided by computer manipulated equipments. The engineering competence of the ship builders is verified by the elements and the tenacity of the crews. However most non-environmental induced failures are produced by poor ship management: collisions, allisions, groundings are mostly caused by the lack of a proper lookout, inadequate BRM, and or failure to observe the ordinary practice of seaman.

Licensing, operational practices and procedures are functions that require knowledgeable supervision. None of those can be properly accomplished without properly experienced supervisors overseeing their conduct. For some time there has been a recognized decrease in the quality and effectiveness in the process responsible to provide and maintain certified competency in maritime skills.

Accidents occur and will continue to happen as long as people and equipment are tested by nature. However a significant reduction in such mishaps can be accomplished if the faults are identified and quickly promulgated as “lesson learned,” even though some are repeated.

A process of timely investigation by knowledgeable, experienced maritime qualified experts is needed to resolve technical questions involving accidents that may influence the public safety and interfere with commerce.

The ordinary practice seaman is a term that has endured over two centuries. It is not just a catch-all clause but a professional reminder by others that view the mariners work, they expect good sense to prevail, apply due diligence and follow through in all tasks and duties and verify with certainty that Neptune’s laws are obeyed.

The ordinary practice of seaman implies a knowledge of proper seamanship and experience that is disappearing in our mariners and being by-passed by otherwise concerned managers. The instinct and inquisitiveness of a practiced mariner to know proper from not, compliance from disregard and error from slovenly practice is essential to improve. Is it time to revisit the need for a dedicated, professional cadre of “Steam Boat Inspectors” and a mandated management process that verifies our vessels are competently managed. The opposite of the ordinary practice of seaman is unskillfulness, a term from the past, that is reappearing.

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Simulator are not stimulators!
By John G. Denham

After a career at sea and a period of piloting I tried a tour in academia. I was surprised to find that maritime academies, along with other educational institutions were using classrooms furnished with middle school furnishings and tools. Are we teaching kids or future professionals I thought? Mostly the furnishings are still in use. If you treat students like kids, they will act like kids. Therefore, tools and the environment are important.

Involved in continuing education, simulators attracted me. At Marine Safety International, then the fore runner in maritime simulation the concept of simulation (make believe with electronics) was interesting, but unreal. Nature can not be simulated. For the next 10 years I visited simulators in Kings Point, New London, Piney Point, Toledo and San Diego. Each facility emulated the other and the concept of instruction was the same and teaching was partially effective. A critiques of students indicated, it’s great, but not the same.

Why doesn’t simulation prepare one for the real experience?

Looking at the COSCO BUSAN pilot house I could not recall any simulator with a similar physical arrangement. A collection of students will have a collection of pilot house arrangements in mind and therefore make believe is initiated. The installed bridge equipment in most cases is unfamiliar and therefore another make believe is instigated etc.

Simulation serves excellent purposes when used to rehearse procedures or test theories, things that are not well known, and specially ship characteristics, tactical diameters in specific conditions and human responses to critical situations. Acceleration and deceleration rates/times are not reliable due to the possible human response factor. I found that using simulation to display a critical maneuver as an illustration is excellent. A competent instructor can interject critical information as it occurs (or in advance) and implant a learning experience without the confusion of interpretation. Most want to be as good as the best. An example that I used: “I am about to show you a simulation of how old Charley Brown approaches the turn and rounds the bend at PotreroTurn to Richmond Inner Harbor.” Shown once, or more as needed with some comments on key points, delivered the lesson.

While engaged with a computer driven problem one is constantly shifting from real experience and computer generated displayed data.

For $1,000,000 American President Lines instituted a three day work shop for all ship masters and promising chief mates and invited USCG, educators and lawyers to attend. The attendees (Captains, mates, visitors and consultants) were divided into small groups and each was given a real accident problem to resolve (prevent and analyze). Some simulation was provided by video tape of simulated scenes of the situation. Realism was stimulated because it was factual.

The final critiques of each workshop indicated an awareness that the master and pilot/ watch officer relationship was essential for safety in critical situations and that masters or persons in charge should act responsibly. Simulation training as presently practiced fails in this most important facet of ship operations management; implant thinking as a process and experience by example.

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Sailor, the Nose Knows!
By John G. Denham

After spending most of my younger days at sea and standing topside watches on open bridges in all kinds of weather and places, I was tanned, weathered and a prime target for basal cell carcinoma. It took a while. I’m now 82 and I had added twenty some years of golf and tinkering in my yard in the sun without a hat. At age 75 I visited a dermatologist, got stung, scolded, given a hand full of reading material and I obtained a wide brimmed hat, but too late. [Continue Reading →]

Photo By OneEighteen

The interesting and disturbing news that the “COSCO BUSAN CREW DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGES” raises the concern that it can happen to U.S. mariners too. Asian jails are not comfortable.The fact the Captain and six crew members are available for testimony is encouraging as they may be able to fill in the blanks (Who was directing the navigation of the vessel when it allided with D tower, etc?), but the process is deplored. Regardless of nationality, innocent mariners should not be detained without proper process.

The need for facts is recognized and the availability of the COSCO BUSAN’s Captain and some crew members is necessary to obtain their statements, although the validity may be questioned. It would appear the accusers were unable to obtain legal process to depose key persons and therefore resorted to processes that are not appropriate and certainly not acceptable by international standards.

However, sometimes there is more than the printed story. Is it possible that the detention is mutually agreeable? Is it possible the Captain and his mates agree to this? ( A trip to Disney Land would sway me) Or maybe the PRC has more pressing business (Tibet), or the owners find it cheaper to let the U.S. pickup the food and berthing rather than transport them back and forth for hearings and trials?

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Photo by steven and darusha

Jeff Charlton of 911team.org in London asked a interesting maritime question on the IAEM list-serve the other day that Robin Storm thought we could answer.

Jeff’s question?

“What if the need arises to replace a master or pilot because the ship has been affected by plague, terrorism, CBRn incident? How many have the competence or training to work in level A or B PPE (personal protection equipment)?

How many crew could assist him if a vessel was out of control? What if a ship was utilized as a terrorist vector agent and required mobility rather than destruction?”

So here is the response by John Denham a former SF Bay Pilot.

First, who will be in charge. The COSCO BUSAN incident is a current example of the lack of a single responsible agent with authority to mobilize, coordinate, and direct a catastrophic event recovery operation in the San Francisco Bay area. The closest single authority to my knowledge is the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) Yours truly a member of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee. As a state ( next level of responsible government) agency , BCDC has the civic and political sub-structure ( members from all contiguous communities) to organize, coordinate and direct what ever exists to respond, but lacks any experience. 9/11 experienced a similar problem to a lesser degree as only New York city was involved. Leadership is the critical survival element.

Second: Consider a nuclear weapons attack with CB fallout-out directed on the city of San Francisco. Without details consider San Francisco and the immediate 15 mile area is devastated. In such a scenario the leadership would probably come from out of the area. Sacramento would probably respond, and in so doing would call for federal assistance; that politically implies we can handle it but need help The federal government will probably respond with support, i.e. we will take charge and fix things as we see fit. And that may be worse than the bomb.

I have an ID card identifying me as a Department of Defense employee and shipyard pilot at the Mare Island Naval Ship Yard. I have no idea what program that was and I have no idea what I was to do; I left that job in 1981. But under the Civilian Defense organization, at one time there was a plan for identifying and organizing critical persons.

Some one (authority), will eventually make a decision that vessels must be moved, for some reason. Some to depart, some to arrive. Some just to be moved from A to B. The bay waters to my knowledge will be basically unaffected by the destruction and bad effects of man’s attempt to resolve a problem with explosives. Therefore it is considered safe to move about on the water if there are no navigation restrictions e.g., bridges blocking passages .

Case 1

[Continue Reading →]

The Department of Justice has submitted “information relative to a criminal action ” in U.S. District Court in San Francisco, California; an accusation against a mariner for violating The Clean Water Act and The Migratory Bird Treaty Act. As a criminal case it will be processed not in Admiralty, but in criminal court, where there is a more relaxed and lesser general acceptance for technical qualification and terminology. The urgency in this priority matter may be a limitation in the Statutes or they are not very busy at DOJ. However it should be noted this an accusation for violating two acts, not an allision between a ship and a fixed object. Shaft alley lawyers, don your caps and peruse.

The defendant, JOHN JOSEPH COTA, did negligently (failed to act as a reasonable person might do in similar circumstances) cause (personally did) the discharge of oil in such quantities as may be harmful from a vessel, the M/V Cosco Busan, into and upon the navigable waters of the United States, without a permit. (Can one discharge oil with a permit?) Specifically, on or about November 7, 2007, Defendant Cota, while piloting the M/V Cosco Busan,(it has not been proven that at the time he was directing the navigation and movement of the vessel) caused approximately 58,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil to be discharged from the vessel into San Francisco Bay by acting in a negligent manner,(Supra) that included the following: (a) failing to pilot a collision free course (Supra; made it safely from Oakland to buoy #1); (b) failing to adequately review with the Captain and crew (all of them?) of the M/V Cosco Busan prior to departure the official navigational charts of the proposed course, (only one route out of Oakland) the location of the San Francisco Bay aids to navigation,( not reported as yet; only 18 aids not including bridge) and the operation of the vessel’s navigational equipment; (c) departing port in heavy fog ( term has no professional meaning: although reported as .1 mile) and then failing to proceed at a safe speed (too may variables and special circumstances involved) during the voyage despite limited visibility; (d) then failing to use the vessel’s radar (operational ability unresolved) while making the final approach to the Bay Bridge; (e) failing to use positional fixes during the voyage; and (f) failing to verify the vessel’s position vis-a-vis other established and recognized aids to navigation throughout the voyage. 33CFR164.11 “The owner master or person in charge shall ensure that: (a) the wheelhouse is constantly manned by persons who: (2)Fix the vessel’s position.”

All alleged in violation of Title 33, United States Code, Sections 1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321(b)(3), a Class A misdemeanor. Reviewing the above it is obvious that owners, masters and person in charge of vessels should make all employees aware of the possibility of enforcement by government of these acts, The media has correctly expressed, “they intend to make examples.” The courts, including those selected as jurors , under instruction, will expect a high professional standard of performance of licensed and documented mariners, seafarers and private boaters. It is possible with a proper defense, one may escape penalty, but the experience is devastating and costly.

This article was written by Captain John Denham, a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

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The following is the documented federal charges against Cosco Busan pilot John Cota. [Continue Reading →]

 Rules, who needs them?

by Captain John Denham

A frequent situation popping up, expectedly in many areas in Asia and popular fishing grounds is to find oneself approaching a multitude of small boats and maybe even a steamer or two. I routinely encountered a similar situation when entering from the Golden Gate on weekends into San Francisco Bay: a mass of white sails and some patches of blue water. Taiwan, Korea, Japan, France and England all have at least one such congested night mare.

As you know, the steering and sailing rules apply to you and only one other vessel at a time. It is perplexing because most of us are faced with a common problem; make the ETA. The courts have proclaimed: No vessel has the right of way through another vessel; therefore that eliminates an option. The person directing the navigation of the vessel is faced with many situations and only one solution for each problem. Therefore one must have a plan; a survival plan. The most important element in developing the plan is to determine who is the executor? My recommendation is, the Captain. To delegate, or assist, supervise or advise another is to further complicate a difficult situation. As captain I do not want to see how Jim or Harry will resolve a situation, I want it safely managed and with as little confusion as possible. Training juniors in such cases is best done by them watching and learning, and if perchance one errs, well, they may be a friendly witness.

Radar is useful in determining the path of least opposition and can also provide useful information as to the wind effect and sea conditions (watch the sea return). I would not attempt to maneuver with an opponent using radar information alone. An approaching vessel’s maneuvers may not be indicated on radar until well after his green light has turned to red. A proper ship handler will have knowledge of his vessel’s maneuvering characteristics and engine performance, i.e., at what speed does one lose steering capability? How long does it take to go from ahead RPM to astern RPM?

My plan is:

1. Captain will have the conn

2. The engine(s) are prepared to maneuver

(a) understand the operating procedures for obtaining emergency orders and how to stop propeller rotation.

3. A proper lookout is posted where he can best see, hear and report and has been instructed.

4. Communications (lookout reports, phones and radio) will be handled by another officer.

5. Illumination is available

6. BRM is informed and involved.

When towing, or in large ships one must consider the entire length (LOA) and be aware that any risk of collision (steady bearing and decreasing range) applies to the entire length of the vessel and or flotilla.

I have observed some experienced ship handlers reach for the ship’s whistle and irritatingly sound the danger signal as a warning (Lookout you dumb S.O.B.), whereas Rule 34(d) implies “failure to understand the intentions or actions of others, or is in doubt.” Nothing else. The courts have many times found: if one is in doubt, proceeding is not an option. However there is also support for: to do nothing displays unskillfulness. Therefore my practice was to sound a long blast on the whistle to attract the other’s attention and thereafter if needed, as advised by an old river pilot, “Sir, I suggest you back your engine smartly.”

Timely arrivals are “job keepers” and managers love old “On Time Joe” Also, pilots can not make up two hours in the bar channel, and, maritime lawyers love Rule 6, specially the congressional language in Senate Report 96- 979: ” it means that speed in any condition is intimately related to the immediate circumstances at hand.” And, “vessels are to proceed at a safe speed at all times.” The inference and language relates to visibility but the law as argued and accepted includes wakes. The courts have found that speed must be safe at all times under all conditions for everyone, which includes that 32 foot yawl, safely moored near Rincon Point that you passed 20 minutes ago 15knots.

Captain John Denham is a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. he is also author of The Assistant and DD 891 .

The Anatomy of Allisions

By Captain John G. Denham.

The recent accidents on the waters of San Francisco Bay has triggered the attention of maritime afficiando and many others. 7 November 2007 the COSCO BUSAN allided with the San Francisco Bay Bridge and spilled thousands of gallons of fuel oil in the bay. On 11 January 2008 the barge CASCADE allided with the bridge at Point San Quentin and in the early morning hours of Wednesday 16 January the tug TRIG LIND with a barge carrying sand navigated its way into a bridge on the Petaluma River. On 14 February an inbound container ship lost power near Fisherman’s Wharf and drifted until tugs arrived.

COSCO BUSAN was piloted by a San Francisco Bar Pilot. The oil barge CASCADE was being towed by PACIFIC WOLF and the DELTA DEANNE and was exempt from mandatory pilotage; one of the tug captains was in charge of the navigation and movement of the flotilla. In the early morning hours the 71 foot tug TRIG LIND with a 206 foot loaded barge allided with the railroad bridge and caused minor damage.

The COSCO BUSAN allision investigation is reported complete as far as the state is concerned. 1 of 2 USCG Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) reports has been published. A California state Administrative Law Judge hearing has been set for 28 April 2008.That hearing will attempt to determine the cause, find fault and make recommendation to the governing agency, the SF Bar Pilot Commission. Thereafter, state and federal agencies will determine the parties considered negligent and or responsible and will undertake appropriate action as permitted by law. Later the state of California et al, will sue the COSCO BUSAN and the bar pilot for damages etc. Monetary awards will be adjudicated. Politicians will make rules. The cause, human error, will be announced but the reasons may never be fully explained, however there are plausible explanation for all the reported alleged facts.

The CASCADE’s allision with the bridge at Point San Quentin (San Rafael-Richmond Bridge) presents a different situation. The tug PACIFIC WOLF, an 111 foot, 4100 horsepower tug and the CASCADE an OPA 90 double hull 300 foot barge are reported to be owned and operated by K-Sea Transportation. The tug DELTA DEANNE a tractor tug,108 feet in length with 4400 horsepower is owned by BayDelta Maritime. The grieved appears to be the bridge i.e., the state of California. Responsibility and fault will have to be determined. Courts have defined the duties and responsibilities of tug masters and therefore the question of who was in charge will be of primary concern.

The number of recent accidents involving petroleum product is unquestionably going to generate political rhetoric and probably some unnecessary rule making unless [Continue Reading →]

I want to welcome a new member to our team, John G. Denham, Captain USN (retired), Master Mariner (5-12 License), San Francisco Bar, and Bay and River pilot with Puget Sound endorsements. A veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, education, writing and management. From focs’le to Pentagon, from pilot house to courtroom, from classroom to senior management he will share his successes and failures in contributions to our blog. Welcome Captain Denham, nice to have you on board.

If you’re interested in reading more from Captain Denham be sure to pick up his books DD 891 and The Assistant, A Sea Story which can be found at Amazon.com or by contacting him directly.

A Word On Vessel Traffic Service

by Captain John Denham

The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to provide active monitoring and navigational advice for vessels in particularly confined and busy waterways. There are two main types of VTS, surveilled and non-surveilled. Surveilled systems consist of one or more land-based sensors (i.e. radar, and closed circuit television sites), which output their signals to a central location where operators monitor and manage vessel traffic movement. Non-surveilled systems consist of one or more reporting points at which ships are required to report their identity, course, speed, and other data to the monitoring authority. They encompass a wide range of techniques and capabilities aimed at preventing vessel collisions, rammings, and groundings in the harbor, harbor approach and inland waterway phase of navigation. They are also designed to expedite ship movements, increase transportation system efficiency, and improve all-weather operating capability.”

The above quoted purpose of VTS is considered inaccurate based on the purposes state by two of California’s most involved VTS; San Francisco and Los Angeles. Contested are the words active and manage although included in its purpose, in fact these words are not factual. Active can infer real time or instantaneous and manage can be interpreted to mean supervisory and or directive by order or command.

The rules to prevent collisions require that all vessels shall maintain a proper lookout by all available means as appropriate. The Federal Code of Regulations and the U,S. Code require if radar is installed it should be operational and operated by qualified observers. And, the ordinary practice of seaman implies that mariners should use common sense, professional skill and apply lawfully mandated procedures in a seamanly manner. Therefore, as per the ordinary practice of seaman, if VTS is available, one should accept its assistance as it fulfills the requirements of proper seamanship.

The missing ingredient for VTS fulfillment is local knowledge, skill and experience; the primary traits of pilotage. Unquestionably an experienced pilot is a great asset to help complete or commence a successful voyage. The public relies on pilots to protect them from marine catastrophes caused by wayward ships. The history of ocean transportation is replete with testimony where nations have invoked strict rules to control ill prepared ship masters from causing calamities in peaceful harbors. Mandatory pilotage is a business, a profession and a public safety measure. VTS was conceived as a tool to increase that safety measure.

All VTS are not the same although the purpose is. San Francisco and Los Angeles California are in the same state and yet the two VTS operate and are managed differently.

San Francisco

“We (USCG) execute our mission by MONITORING vessels movements, INFORMING mariners of other vessels and potential hazards, RECOMMENDING courses of action when we see a situation that the mariner may not have seen, and DIRECTING the outcome of situations when necessary to prevent disasters.”

Los Angeles-Long Beach

The goal of the Los Angeles/Long Beach VTS is to provide seamless navigational information to improve vessel transit safety. The USCG/Marine Exchange/Los Angeles and Long Beach pilot organizations have worked together to create a unique system. It is a cooperative effort of the State of California, the USCG, Marine Exchange of Southern California and the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach under the authority of the California Code, Harbor and Navigation sections.

Using one recent example: M/V Cosco Busan allision with the fender on “D” tower of the San Francisco-Okland Bay Bridge on November 7, 2007, a casual reader can determine by the mission statement alone, the San Francisco VTS was not oriented to fulfill the needed leadership and coordination role of a VTS.

San Francisco VTS is a government facility operated as a service and not a system. Its function is authoritative and not cooperative and it exists within its own environment, rules and controls. Although participating in community maters there is no functional capability to provide local knowledge, skill or experience in a seamless manner to increase harbor safety. The lack of those needed traits, local knowledge, skill and experience in preventing accidents was confirmed on 7 November 2007. However, readily available a short distance away is an abundance of such traits. The state of California supports the San Francisco Bar Pilots and provides a franchise to guarantee a proper life with regular employment and benefits. Whereas the SF VTS relies on relatively young persons lacking in local knowledge, skill and experience to safe guard the waters of the bay and region .It seems that some arrangement could be reached whereby those traits were constantly available in the VTS in San Francisco.

Captain John Denham is a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. he is also author of The Assistant and DD 891 .