In this week’s edition of The Maritime Executive Newsletter managing editor Joseph Keefe, weighs in on the changing dynamics of the Master, Pilot and Port State relationship in light of the Cosco Busan incident;
At this early stage, just one thing is perfectly clear: the Cosco Busan allision will ultimately help to redefine the role of, and the liabilities facing marine pilots in the United States today. One of the most primary questions asked of any deck cadet at any maritime academy is: What is the role of the pilot? And, the answer, of course, is (c.), “the pilot provides guidance to, but is not in charge of the vessel.” That tenet has been upheld in many venues, for many, many years. In reality, however, the typical marine pilot who guides a vessel in from the sea buoy to the dock is in complete control of that vessel on the inbound leg. He or she better be, because often the captain of a particular vessel may have never transited that restricted waterway.
This is just an excerpt of Keefe’s well written article, you can continue reading HERE.
So the gCaptain team has been exceptionally busy in the last few weeks and we have the Cosco Busan partially to thank. In addition to the server traffic and time spent researching the incident we were motivated by the events to embark on some new projects. You already now the good news, the successful launch of a new maritime podcast! Unfortunately, however, we also had a time consuming failure.
A little history…. Shortly after the ship allided with San Francisco’s Bay Bridge we pointed you to the amazing website BoatingSF.com. Run by Michael Slater, a former Adobe Engineer, the site uses AIS vessel tracking data taken from VHF radio antennas Michael has erected near the bay and uses this to plot ships to a live interactive map embedded on his site (LINK). The post that day, however, displayed recorded data showing the track of the Cosco Busan during her short voyage. The display was impressive and attracted a considerable amount of attention.
At this point of the story we had just finished reading an amazing article written for Geo: Magazine by John Astad, our friend from Vesseltrax. The subject of the article was Shore-Side Maritime Applications of Google Earth and discussed his ability to visualize 3d images of ships running the Houston Ship Channel. Even cooler was the ability to fly around a vessel as she moved about the bay… in real time! (LINK) So I contacted Michael and asked if he would send the data file to John for 3d conversion!
The stars seemed to be aligning until we discovered a problem (read about it here) that resulted in John not being able to convert the data for use in his program. Discouraged? Yes but in stepped a gCaptain reader who we can’t thank enough. He transposed the timestamps from regional AIS beacons and helped us create a ShipPlotter version (Disclaimer here and ShipPlotter results here) of the events. Not quite accurate but close enough for our next team to start work…
Jakota “is engaged in the development and sale of solutions aimed at the commercial sector and public services, as well as the field of research and science. We supply solutions for tracking, fleet management, positioning and security- and alarm systems.” Translated; they make the best 3d ship graphing websites on the planet. They also provide amazing tools for tracking fleets of ships that are visually stunning, effective and well thought out.
You ask, how did we find Jakota? We asked our friends in silicon valley to search for a company that provides AIS vessel tracking systems that first, have visually attractive solutions, second use the latest tools of web 2.0. The overwhelming response was “Check out Digital-Seas.com“.
Fast forward through the time changes, international calling codes and German accents… we finally got in touch with Lars Krueger, one of the nicest and most professional person we have met. Lars took a programmer off his job to work on our project full time… the results were stunning but the harder we work the more faulty data we found.
The bottom line… we worked hard, had fun, met some amazing people and built relationships for the future. The final result is not 100% accurate and was compressed to meat BoatingSF’s needs but still looks amazing (you should see the original!!) We also started on a new project, global AIS and vessel tracking… but that’s for another post. In the meantime, if your a marine superintendent Lars is a person you need to know. If you’re a mariner interested in tracking ships so you don’t have to spend days in sitting in the union hall… Digital-Seas is the website you will know.
Many thanks to all who helped and stay tuned for more on the amazing people and products we met while working on this project. For a preview visit these amazing sites;
EarthNC - Digital Chart Overlays for Google Earth!
Enough discussion… to see the Cosco Busan’s Track CLICK HERE
Note: The source of our problem was the USCG’s reluctance to release the official AIS data files. If you wish to see the amazing visualizations of Digital Seas… in full size… with accurate data… call your congressman and ask for the file to be released to the public.
Prior to being asked to comment the Chronicle’s lead maritime reporter contacted our friend Captain Kelly Sweeny who discussed industry wide problems with marine technology. The article states;
Sweeney said the AIS is “occasionally unreliable,” has blind spots such as when a ship is behind islands or structures, and is “antiquated” when compared with modern electronics.
Rewinding to my conversation with the reporters, the first question asked was; “Captain Sweeny believes the system used by San Francisco’s Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is antiquated, do you agree?” After requesting further clarification I was asked why the pilot’s data on his Electronic Chart Display was trusted over VTS’s radar and AIS information.
My answer was “VTS’ AIS system is susceptible to the delay inherit in the VHF transmission of AIS data” BUT, to be honest my initial gut reaction was, “no AIS is not antiquated… it was fully implemented less then 3 years ago”, I quickly corrected myself. My second answer was quoted in the article and reads;
“The maritime industry is slow to act on electronic devices,” said Capt. John Konrad, who runs a Web site called gCaptain. “By the time they get approvals on electronics, they are obsolete.”
Why the quick change of opinion? It’s because I love AIS.
This technology, properly called Automatic Identification Systems, allows me to overlay important data on my radar displays. It also allows me to contact a ship with a zero cpa (collision course) with great ease. For example, prior to AIS I would have to say “Calling the vessel in position x.xx degrees N, x.xx degrees west on a course of 267 and speed of 6knots this is the xxx on channel 16″ where now I simply look up the ship’s name and say “This is the xxx calling yyy on channel 16″. Furthermore the AIS display gives me the vessels MMSI number which opens up new and creative ways to avoid collisions. Finally, my AIS digital read-out really saved the day (and my career?) when our radars, as the Cosco Busan’s Pilot John Cota said “conked out”.
That was not my only hesitation. San Francisco Pilots are some of the most respected individuals in our profession (a dream job for myself) and I only have positive things to say about my dealings with VTS. So could they be wrong in their choice of equipment? It seemed unlikely.
In defending VTS and the Coast Guard’s systems another respected expert, Rear Adm. Craig Bone - Coast Guard district commander, commented on questions raised by myself and others. In covering today’s hearing The Chronicle reports;
Bone said he could think of no excuse for the crash. He denied reports by maritime sources claiming the electronic systems the Coast Guard uses are out of date. The pilot equipment and onboard navigational equipment are some of the most advanced, he said.
“There is no basis in my mind for this to have ever occurred,” Bone said. “Something on that ship had to go terribly wrong. It was totally preventable.”
So the question becomes; “If AIS is a loved safety improvement endorsed by maritime experts worldwide why does Captain Kelly (and myself!) consider it antiquated?”
The reason is because we can do better! In the world of cutting edge technology solutions are available now that would have given Cota and VTS a much better chance of avoiding the incident. The problem, that I suspect is an industry wide tendency, is two fold. First we are so far behind the technology curve small improvements, like AIS, seem large and exciting. Second, most licensed captains are Luddites (my self included) who want to make sure a new system is reliable before implementing it aboard ships.
I come to this conclusion because, despite my writings on the need to improve shipboard technology (most notably HERE and HERE), I initially had the same reaction as Adm. Bone but quickly changed my mind. Why? Because Capt. Kelly is correct, our systems are antiquated and when new lifesaving improvements become available we must break away from the statement that has been rehearsed by ship captains for centuries; “Only history will tell if this is a good idea”. Exciting changes are happening worldwide and improvements in communications (the number one failure in all good incident chains) are leading the way. We must change with the times and embrace technology as the benefit is a reduction of incidents and a preservation of the environment and human life.
For more information on this topic visit our Archives.
Captain John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage currently working aboard an 835′ship in the Gulf of Mexico. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.
Once the US National Transportation Safety Board has produced the transcripts of the voyage data recorder from the Cosco Busan (Formerly the Hanjin Cairo, the Hanjin name remains on the ship side) we’ll have a better idea of who said what to whom and when. Currently only the pilot’s version of events is available and it is raising a number of questions.
A malfunctioning radar appears to have been an element, though not the cause, of the incident and so far there has been no indication regarding the second radar on the ship’s bridge. Given that there was poor visibility, was the speed of the vessel excessive? Should departure have been delayed until the fog cleared.
The pilot was not familiar with the ECDIS equipment onboard, which does not appear to have malfunctioned. When the pilot asked the Captain to point out the centre of the bridge span the captain allegedly pointed to the bridge support and the pilot navigated accordingly.
With an apparently malfunctioning radar and a lack of familiarity with the primary method of navigation, did the pilot seek to confirm the vessels position with the VTS and/or the accompanying tug?
VTS informed the pilot that the ship was off course, which the Pilot disputed and shortly afterwards a lookout shouted a warning that there was a bridge support ahead and the vessel went hard right and allided with the Delta bridge support.
There also appears to have been a lack of detail in the master/pilot exchange when the latter took conduct of the vessel, as the pilot’s lawyer admits. Would the missing information have been enought to prevent the incident?
There may also have been communications problems between the American pilot and the bridge team who were Chinese. Of there were, to what extent did they reduce the pilot and the bridge team’s situational awareness?
It is not uncommon for pilots to ‘go it alone’ rather than work with a bridge team with whom communication is problematic. This increases the workload on the pilot and reduces his situational awareness. Had the pilot and the bridge team undergone bridge team/bridge resource management training?
Incidents such as this rarely have a single cause, or a single responsible individual. They are usually the result of systemic problems with Bridge Team Management, leadership, culture and navigational practices.
It will be a while before we know the full story of the Cosco Busan, but we’ll hit that bridge when we get to it.
______
Bob Couttie has written for a number of maritime industry publications, including the prestigious Lloyd’s List International daily newspaper and Lloyd’s Ship Manager magazine. His reportage on problems with ship’s officer certification examinations in the Philippines in the late 1990s influenced the adoption of computerized examinations for ship officers by the country’s Professional Regulatory Commission.
We received an email pointing us to the SFist’s skepticism regarding the Cosco Buson AIS plot and this caused us to do some investigation. The results we found are disconcerting and pertain to vessels making sharp turns. To clarify we have no idea if this problem existed on the Cosco Busan but I want to bring this up to our Professional Mariner readers as we think it’s important.
I have observed too many vessels with wrong data transmitted by their AIS. Mostly headings are not correct, but the main problem - is offset correction given by GPS. If GPS has offset correction (set by navigator on bridge) then AIS transmits wrong vessel’s position (equal to offset).
You can watch now on ECDIS some vessel in the harbour is not alongside the berth but e.g. stays in the middle of harbour instead. The greater offset - the greater error. Some of the vessels have offset from 0.02 up to 0.3 nautical mile, and if you meet such vessel in Singapore Strait - then AIS information maybe very dangerous, as you can mistake such target with others.
I like AIS information very much, but when I watch such a picture on ECDIS - I would like to suggest to all navigators not to use on their GPS any offset. Nowadays GPS is reliable information and better to plot position on sea chart manually using satellite-derived calculation instead of inserted offset into GPS unit.
Lesson Learned: check the GPS offsets on your ship and assure you are sending accurate data… or you could confuse surrounding ships.
Map mashups may be one of the coolest things on the Web, but they would be even cooler in your car. Dash Navigation is announcing today that it will make possible exactly such vehicular mashups (the Web kind, not the actual kind). Dash is developing a GPS navigation system for cars that will go on sale early next year. The device will collects data about traffic conditions from all other Dash drivers, and estimates how long alternative routes will take on any given day. Since they will be connected through a cellular data network to the Internet, all sorts of geo-tagged information can be pushed to the device and combined with the on-board maps. Everything from restaurants and open houses to concerts, gas, and golf courses could be sent to the Dash and appear there on the map. Owners will be able to manage which mashups they receive through Dash’s Website. There, they will be able to drag feeds from sites like Platial, where they can create a Google Map of dog runs in San Francisco or yoga schools in LA. Link it to Zillow, and you will be able to get data on houses as you are driving around the neighborhood. Read More…
So what does this have to do with navigating a large ship? It is my belief this type of technology is going to save lives and millions of dollars in claims. As I’ve stated previously we need better collaboration at sea. GMDSS, the radio electronics suite carried aboard ship, is a powerful tool that provides tools such as group calling via DSC and real time chat via INMARSAT C, but how many ships utilize these user unfriendly features? The sad answer; almost never.
The now antiquated GMDSS system is not soley to blame. Inmarsat-B is no more difficult to use than pulling out the phone book (or in our case the ITU directory) and calling a local number but it’s rarely used even when it can prevent a collision at sea. The reason I explain in my first Pasha Bulker commentary HERE but I’ll share the pertinent excerpt;
To clarify there are two type of prevention systems; active and passive. The former being systems that require positive effort. In this case did the crew used their satellite comms to discuss the weather patterns with meteorologists or did they simply ignore the port authority’s warnings? Did the captain use his AIS to identify the surrounding ships and call fellow captains via GMDSS to discuss the situation? Did they have access to and use real-time weather data or wait for a 2-dimensional weather fax?
I go on to discuss how the technological improvements that are saving lives today are mostly passive. EPIRBs (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons) are the simplest example of this; they are secured to an outside bulkhead with a hydrostatic unit that releases and activates the device automatically when a ship sinks. In an emergency, however, we are trained to activate the device prior to sinking but the statistics show active use of this passive device is rarely seen by Coast Guard rescuers. The reasons are simple. Human nature has instilled us with a Can Do attitude that is only fostered by the dangers of our profession. Furthermore with recent moves to criminalize the mariner and increased pressures from management that real time communication enables some captains simple wait for the moment of eminent doom before asking rescuers for help. With the Coast Guard performing multiple duties (law making, judiciary, law enforcement, rescue) and new laws being written at an accelerated pace the fact mariners make the dangerous decision to delay rescue should not be surprising.
Early this year Jim Gray, a Microsoft researcher and beloved member of the tech community was lost at sea. The specific cause of his disappearance is still unknown but we are certain his EPIRB was never activated. Wired has a plausible explination for the failure;
Like many sailors, Gray could also be slightly careless about safety equipment. He stashed his emergency radio beacon — designed to deploy automatically underwater—on a shelf in the companionway, below deck, and didn’t always remember to bring it up before leaving the dock, according to Carnes.1 If a log had opened a big enough hole in the hull, Bilger estimates, Tenacious could have sunk in as little as 30 seconds; hardly enough time to fetch the EPIRB or start inflating a dinghy with the foot pump stored under the cockpit seat. If something bad did happen out there, Jim Bellingham says, Gray’s unflappable attitude may not have served him well. “With Jim being an engineer, you can imagine him thinking, ‘I can fix this’ — and then the whole thing snowballs. He was a level-headed, steady guy who wasn’t likely to panic. Which is maybe too bad, because a less-competent person might have grabbed the radio and shouted for help.” (click here for the full article)
As a Master Mariner I would say this explanation is not only plausible but likely. I would, however, like to add one additional reason he might not have grabbed the EPIRB; emergency situations challenge your persons resources. On commercial ships every officer is required to take a course in Bridge Resource Management. BRM is a process to use all of your available resources during critical operations. It came from the airline industry which found an alarming number of accidents happened despite prior warning from the equipment or crew…. mostly by captains with military backgrounds and a “can do” attitude who did not use or fully process information from either the equipment or junior personnel. Boiled down it’s a course in teamwork and processing the large amounts of data (lookout reports, radar, radio comms, gps charting, weather information….) that pours into the bridge. The last part is critical and a likely reason Jim Gray did not activate the most important emergency device carried at sea, he was simply too busy handling the situtation.
Let’s quickly list some of the most important improvements to our industry in the last ten years;
EPIRBs
Double Hulls
Weather Routing
Inert Gas Systems for Tankers
Vessel Traffic Services
AIS
GPS
Now a list of improvements that have great potential but have failed to be embraced by the industry;
Notice the difference? The first set are passive systems. Double Hulls require no action after being built, weather routing instructions get sent to the ship, IG systems are simply turned on (awaiting hate mail from engineering), Vessel Traffic requires only call ins, AIS and GPS only display not require data. On the flip side DSC features like group calling requires hours in front of the manual, container and personnel tracking require accurate/time consuming data from the field, ECDIS requires both data input and extensive training and the internet based solutions, Homeport and cyber-based training, require active user participation.
Looking at the above list Weather Routing, the collection and deciphering of weather data to re-route a vessel’s path around storms, is by far the most difficult activity but is a success and considered passive. Why? The hard work is done by shore-based experts. It also augments rather than replacing shipboard weather planning and it arrives via an easy to use device, the fax machine. This is the reason the DASH in-car system has great potential to save lives, it’s mostly passive.
The DASH has the potential to take information from the ship via satellite, be reprocessed by third party providers, and send it back to the ship in an easy to use format. Right now we have the ability to collect AIS data from surrounding ships, we also have third party providers who take the data and plot it in on well known platforms like google earth (visit vesseltrax.com/ then download their Google Earth plug in for an example). What we are missing is a delivery system, some way to get the data out to the vessel. DASH could be the answer.
Imagine this, an Electronic Charting Display (ecdis) that plots both AIS data and a radar overlay. This already exists but let’s add weather charting (or a weather dashboard?), real time piracy reports, Coast Pilot information…. How about the ability to highlight a section of the ocean with your mouse and send a text message to ships in that area? What if NOAA had the same ability to text only the ships located near the coast after a tsunami warning? I believe this would eliminate the ban of mariners; the undesignated distress relay (false alarm).
What about the shoreside magager? Could vesseltrax be designed for the Microsoft Surface? This technology plots data on touch screen device that looks like a plasma television laying on a coffee table but is capable of storing vast amounts of data and making it interactive. Suddenly the vessel manager could walk into the operations room, look at a map of all his ships then overlay weather/security/operational alerts. In an emergency he could touch a ship on the map then press a button to skype the vessel via his bluetooth headset, then watch the vessel’s emergency traffic, forward it to other vessels in the fleet and even drag the latest crew list and station bill to the Coast Guard REC… surface would then email the data and perform the other functions behind the scenes.
Think this is just one mariner’s dream of the future? gCaptain currently has the resources to make this dream happen using existing technology. We plan to grow into a resource that will be an integral part of your bridge team and an essential tool at all levels of the industry. If you would like to hire our development team or simple discuss ideas for the future please contact us directly. Till then, stay safe. -John
John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage currently working as Chief Mate aboard a 835′ship in the Gulf of Mexico. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.
At this early stage, just one thing is perfectly clear: the Cosco Busan allision will ultimately help to redefine the role of, and the liabilities facing marine pilots in the United States today. One of the most primary questions asked of any deck cadet at any maritime academy is: What is the role of the pilot? And, the answer, of course, is (c.), “the pilot provides guidance to, but is not in charge of the vessel.” That tenet has been upheld in many venues, for many, many years. In reality, however, the typical marine pilot who guides a vessel in from the sea buoy to the dock is in complete control of that vessel on the inbound leg. He or she better be, because often the captain of a particular vessel may have never transited that restricted waterway.
Bob Couttie has written for a number of maritime industry publications, including the prestigious Lloyd’s List International daily newspaper and Lloyd’s Ship Manager magazine. His reportage on problems with ship’s officer certification examinations in the Philippines in the late 1990s influenced the adoption of computerized examinations for ship officers by the country’s Professional Regulatory Commission.
