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The data visualization above represents the worlds 10 largest container shipping companies by TEU capacity. We created this chart using IBM’s Many Eye’s project which we enjoy using since it gives us a clear, easy to understand and interactive picture of numeric data. Plus it looks pretty cool.

Want to know which company has the largest number of ships or the highest percentage of the overall market? If so then click on the picture above for the interactive version.

For those who prefer more traditional data:

(Source: 2006 BRS Report)

Fairplay brings us the most ridiculous item of the day;

Vessels transiting US harbours could come under tight navigational controls in the wake of the Cosco Busan bridge strike and resulting spill in San Francisco Bay. Sources close to the investigation tell Fairplay that federal officials may suggest that vessels transiting US channels may be compelled to follow navigational instructions issued by the US Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Service. In the case of the Cosco Busan accident, it has been alleged that VTS duty officers tried to warn the vessel off its impact course with the Bay Bridge, but their advice is just that and not mandatory for vessel operators. Fairplay asked USCG Commandant Thad Allen about the suggestion and he said that, if required to, the Coast Guard is up to the challenge of positively controlling commercial vessel traffic. But he noted that most major US harbors presently don’t have VTS systems and that such a change would require a major financial commitment “and a departure from the current culture regarding vessel navigation responsibility”. The suggested system would be along the lines of air traffic control procedures which Allen says were developed centuries after the traditional rules for vessel captains and pilots.

The problem with maritime incidents is the fix rarely address the true cause and often creates problems that contribute to future incidents. As an example here’s an email from a gCaptain reader who wishes to remain anonymous;

“The new ISPS reporting requirements are sinking us in paperwork. Just yesterday I was on bridge watch in moderate traffic, typing a report out on my laptop. For 15 minutes our captain observed my action from the chart room then came out and said:

5 Years ago if I saw you typing a report on that F$@@’n laptop I would have fired you on the spot. Today, with all these ISM/ISPS requirements, if I come up here and find your not on your laptop typing out reports, I’ll fire you on the spot!

I was paying attention to the traffic but we both knew it didn’t have my full attention… and these reports were suppose to be making us safer!! I don’t feel safer and I don’t feel the paperwork will keep terrorists away from my ship”

Unsafe indeed.

Vessel Traffic in US ports is exceptionally well run and experienced in vessel safety and operations. They do not make the proposal ridiculous, Admiral Allen does. Why? Current technology is simply not capable of delivering real time tracking. Also, final say remains the responsibility of a ship’s captain because he is the one who knows the ship’s capabilities, it’s crew and he is stationed on the bridge. He is also the last one to abandon if the ship finds danger… and he knows it.

If the Coast Guard wants final say then they need to be aboard the vessel and if that happens they will be hard pressed to fill the position with anyone more qualified than the competent and experienced San Francisco Pilots.

UPDATE:

Bob Couttie of Maritime Accident Casebook comments on this post;

VTS-assisted accidents, by action or inaction, aren’t rare, or at least not rare enough. John Clandillon-Baker, editor of The Pilot, journal of the UK Maritime Pilots Association sent us an email reminder about the Sea Express/Alaska Rainbow collision in February, 2007. VTS issues also featured in the grounding of the P&O Nedlloyd Magellan in 2001, and the source or worst oil spill so far in Singapore waters, the collision between the Evoikos and Orapin Global in October 1997. One can arguably include the Exxon Valdez.

USCG Commandant Thad Allen’s assurance to Fairplay that his command is up to the challenge has a Rice-Davies sort of quality to it, he would say that, wouldn’t he.

MAC’s own informal think-tank of veteran master mariners, who aren’t tanked up when they think, finds the proposal less objectionable, the authority of the master will remain in force much as it does now, in their view.

This is only a clip of Bob’s article so be sure to read his full post: “Cosco Busan - Who Needs Pilots?“

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John Konrad is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage. Since graduating from SUNY Maritime College he has sailed 4 of the world’s oceans and reports from his ship via satellite.

Cosco Busan - Questions,Questions,Questions

By Bob Couttie

Once the US National Transportation Safety Board has produced the transcripts of the voyage data recorder from the Cosco Busan (Formerly the Hanjin Cairo, the Hanjin name remains on the ship side) we’ll have a better idea of who said what to whom and when. Currently only the pilot’s version of events is available and it is raising a number of questions.

A malfunctioning radar appears to have been an element, though not the cause, of the incident and so far there has been no indication regarding the second radar on the ship’s bridge. Given that there was poor visibility, was the speed of the vessel excessive? Should departure have been delayed until the fog cleared.

The pilot was not familiar with the ECDIS equipment onboard, which does not appear to have malfunctioned. When the pilot asked the Captain to point out the centre of the bridge span the captain allegedly pointed to the bridge support and the pilot navigated accordingly.

With an apparently malfunctioning radar and a lack of familiarity with the primary method of navigation, did the pilot seek to confirm the vessels position with the VTS and/or the accompanying tug?

VTS informed the pilot that the ship was off course, which the Pilot disputed and shortly afterwards a lookout shouted a warning that there was a bridge support ahead and the vessel went hard right and allided with the Delta bridge support.

There also appears to have been a lack of detail in the master/pilot exchange when the latter took conduct of the vessel, as the pilot’s lawyer admits. Would the missing information have been enought to prevent the incident?

There may also have been communications problems between the American pilot and the bridge team who were Chinese. Of there were, to what extent did they reduce the pilot and the bridge team’s situational awareness?

It is not uncommon for pilots to ‘go it alone’ rather than work with a bridge team with whom communication is problematic. This increases the workload on the pilot and reduces his situational awareness. Had the pilot and the bridge team undergone bridge team/bridge resource management training?

Incidents such as this rarely have a single cause, or a single responsible individual. They are usually the result of systemic problems with Bridge Team Management, leadership, culture and navigational practices.

It will be a while before we know the full story of the Cosco Busan, but we’ll hit that bridge when we get to it.

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Bob Couttie has written for a number of maritime industry publications, including the prestigious Lloyd’s List International daily newspaper and Lloyd’s Ship Manager magazine. His reportage on problems with ship’s officer certification examinations in the Philippines in the late 1990s influenced the adoption of computerized examinations for ship officers by the country’s Professional Regulatory Commission.

Bob currently writes and produces podcasts for The Maritime Accident Casebook

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Would you like your article published by gCaptain? Submit it now.

For those curious how the editors at gCaptain research maritime incidents like the Cosco Busan’s allision with San Francisco’s Bay Bridge, here are some of the websites that provide excellent reference material.

Maritime Industry Custom Search Engine

Our first stop in researching any maritime related topic is our own Maritime Industry CSE. It’s a powerful resource since it provides search results with the aid of google’s powerful search database and algarithims. Actually the only difference between it and google.com is the fact that our tool narrows the results down and only displays sites that pertain to large ships.

*Tip: Try the “incidents” refinement to narrow down the results even further.

The Maritime Incident Casebook

If you are looking for trusted information on incidents as they happen then MAC should be your first stop. Be sure to visit their podcast section as well as their links page which contains a list of the best maritime resources for incident prevention.

Searates.com Container Shipping References

For those looking for data that specifically pertains to Container Ships, head over to Searates’ Container Ship Reference Book. Not only is it full of Web 2.0 eye candy, it also has some great hard data.

*Tip: Its shipping lines section has links to both Cosco and Hanjin. By visiting Cosco’s site you will quickly learn they have removed their official “Cosco Busan” statement from Nov 11th.

gCaptain’s Maritime News Mash-up

For breaking news your first stop should be our Maritime News Discoverer but a close second is our Maritime News Mash-up which is automatically updated with the industry’s most trusted news sources.

*Tip - Also take a look at our gCaptain News and Maritime Blog Mash-ups

The Council of American Master Mariners

For those looking for expert opinion from Ship Captain’s we hope you contact us… but your next stop should be CAMM. Contact them directly for contacts from the Maritime Expert Database.

Maritime Executive Magazine

Traditional media is know for making small errors when reporting maritime incidents. To obviate this problem subscribe to MAREX’s FREE weekly newsletter. It is published every Thursday and is written by professional journalists with maritime backgrounds. For past articles click HERE.

*Tip: If you are more interested in weekly blog postings check out Fred Fry’s Maritime Monday

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If you have a reference site of interest please submit it to our Maritime News Discoverer under the category “Links“

The San Francisco Chronicle has published the Pilot’s Report on the Cosco Busan Incident. Here are the parts of interest to mariners;

Meadows said problems also cropped up in “bridge management,” the communication between the pilot, who had years of experience on the bay, and the ship’s officers, who had never navigated the bay in the Cosco Busan. All were supposed to work together and exchange information on how to successfully navigate the harbor.
“While some information was exchanged, perhaps it could be said it wasn’t a full transfer of information. It was enough for the pilot to work with the master and get the ship ready for sea,” Meadows said.

We have previously reported on bridge management also know as Bridge Team Management or BRM.

gCaptain’s BRM related articles;

• Cosco Busan - Bridge Resource Management
• Environmental Catastrophe Possible Averted - M/V Pasha Bulker
  
• Pasha Bulker Incident Report - Nearly Unbelievable
• What Went Wrong Aboard the MV Pasha Bulker? (Telstar Logistics)

The article continues;

The Cosco Busan’s radar “conked out” twice - first before departure and again as the ship was near the lighthouse on Yerba Buena Island.

Cota was forced to rely on an electronic chart display, showing the track of the vessel and its speed, plus charts of San Francisco Bay. Meadows said the pilot told him he was “not familiar” with the electronic system on the Cosco Busan. “They are all different,” Meadows said.

Cota asked Mao Cai Sun, the captain of the Cosco Busan, to point on the display to the center of the bridge span between the Delta and Echo towers on the western side of the Bay Bridge.

“The master pointed that out,” Meadows said. “In fact, several times during the trip. That’s what the pilot was heading for.”

…

“The pilot had to go along with what the master indicated on the electronic chart display was the center of the span,” Meadows said. “That turned out to be the tower instead.”

We have received email asking; Should the vessel have left without a working radar? and Did the second radar work? …unfortunately those are questions we can’t answer. You will have to wait until the NTSB investigation report is complete.

Read the full SF Chronicle article HERE.

Related Maritime Blog Posts;

Pilot Terror by Bob Couttie