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San Francisco Pilot’s Report Published

November 13th, 2007 · Comments - by John -

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Maritime Headhunters

The San Francisco Chronicle has published the Pilot’s Report on the Cosco Busan Incident. Here are the parts of interest to mariners;

Meadows said problems also cropped up in “bridge management,” the communication between the pilot, who had years of experience on the bay, and the ship’s officers, who had never navigated the bay in the Cosco Busan. All were supposed to work together and exchange information on how to successfully navigate the harbor.
“While some information was exchanged, perhaps it could be said it wasn’t a full transfer of information. It was enough for the pilot to work with the master and get the ship ready for sea,” Meadows said.

We have previously reported on bridge management also know as Bridge Team Management or BRM.

gCaptain’s BRM related articles;

The article continues;

The Cosco Busan’s radar “conked out” twice - first before departure and again as the ship was near the lighthouse on Yerba Buena Island.

Cota was forced to rely on an electronic chart display, showing the track of the vessel and its speed, plus charts of San Francisco Bay. Meadows said the pilot told him he was “not familiar” with the electronic system on the Cosco Busan. “They are all different,” Meadows said.

Cota asked Mao Cai Sun, the captain of the Cosco Busan, to point on the display to the center of the bridge span between the Delta and Echo towers on the western side of the Bay Bridge.

“The master pointed that out,” Meadows said. “In fact, several times during the trip. That’s what the pilot was heading for.”

“The pilot had to go along with what the master indicated on the electronic chart display was the center of the span,” Meadows said. “That turned out to be the tower instead.”

We have received email asking; Should the vessel have left without a working radar? and Did the second radar work? …unfortunately those are questions we can’t answer. You will have to wait until the NTSB investigation report is complete.

Read the full SF Chronicle article HERE.

Related Maritime Blog Posts;

Pilot Terror by Bob Couttie

Related Articles:



About The Author

Captain John Konrad is co-founder of Unofficial Networks and Editor In Chief of this blog. He is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage and, since graduating from SUNY Maritime College, has sailed a variety of ships from ports around the world. He currently lives in Morro Bay, California with his wife and two children.
Full Profile: John
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Categories: Communication · Container Ship · MARPOL Incidents · San Francisco

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Viewing 7 Comments

    • ^
    • v
    I am under the impression that the pilot comes aboard the ship with his own laptop loaded with charts. The laptop has an interface to the "Pilot Port" of the ship's AIS system giving him connectivity to the ships GPS and the other navigation systems. This connectivity gives the pilot the same AIS derived picture that VTS sees. Can someone affirm or deny my assertion regarding SF pilots. If I am correct, the pilot can navigate from his own laptop making it unnecessary for him to (mis)interpret the ships chart display?
    • ^
    • v
    David, I do know that type of system exists and I've seen it in use by Tampa Bay Pilots.. I do not know what specifically the SF pilots bring aboard as I have not sailed the bay with a State pilot in at least 5 years.

    Things might change though. I have to think the Tampa Skyway Bridge disaster had something to do with the implementation of new systems

    http://gcaptain.com/maritime/blog/may-9-1980-ta...
    • ^
    • v
    The SF pilots don't as a rul utilize the laptop systems and the AIS plug. I am a bit puzzled about th nws rports and the lost radar. All ssls ar requird to have two working radars. So vbn if one quit, there should have been a scond available.

    Unfortunately our pilotage system does not reinforce safety to the point that a pilot can comfortably refuse to sail a ship, or require it to go to anchor when equipment fails. Perhaps this incident will get us to that point.
    • ^
    • v
    John, I thought I'd post some of our previous discussion.

    It seems fairly apparent to me and other captains the cause of this situation was the failure of the Chinese bridge team to communicate effectively and know their equipment.

    I think the biggest failure here was the company changing out an ENTIRE set of officers at once. This is NOT standard practice for American ships. My company never changes out more than one senior officer per port unless there are IMPORTANT extenuating circumstances. Changing out the Chief Mate and Master at the same time is just dangerous because there is no continuity. Changing out the Master, Ch mate, 2nd mate and 3rd mate in the same week is SUICIDAL and it’s no wonder none of them had a clew how to tune the radar or ECDIS.

    Sorry john I’m going to quote your email, “A ship's quirks, equipment and the interpersonal relationships among the crew are different on every ship and can't be learned in a short period of time.”

    This is why some companies make a captain sail as chief mate on a ship before giving him command. How else could he learn the Furuno Radar needs an extra 1/4 turn of sea state adjustment to be tuned or that helmsmen XO CHIN tends to oversteer or that the second mate always forgets to put danger bearings in the radar?

    My assessment:
    The shipping company was criminal for changing out the entire crew at once
    The captain was an idiot for accepting such a job
    The pilot screwed up by not refusing to sail with a brand new crew in poor weather conditions
    • ^
    • v
    I agree with your assessment Capt Bill except that I believe the existing Pilot Rules and Rules of the Road would prevail over economic or social pressure in this situation. I really hope I am not naive. I understand Cota's predictament but it is not exuse. He should have dogged that ship to the dock & waited for fog to lift or hired a escort thru the first second the radar glitch AND language barrier was apparent.

    Sorry Capt Cota, Im trying to find a reason to defend you...
    • ^
    • v
    Towboater, no I agree the Rules supersede all which means the capt's to blame. My argument is the blame goes as follows:
    Cosco: For changing out an entire crew at once
    Capt: For taking a suicidal job assignment
    Cota: for leaving in bad weather with these newbies on the bridge
    • ^
    • v
    Bill, thx, I understand. But...I feel that regardless whether it was a "green crew" or a crew that literally lived thier total lives aboard that Ship, once the radar issues arose AND a language barrier was realized, Capt Coto had every right under several existing rules to drop anchor until the situation was under control.

    Ive found this site and several others looking for a reason to defend Capt Coto...a fellow Professional Mariner... and I cant find one.

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