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Perusing ” A failure in XXX Resource Management” I must accept the authors concern. Although encompassing, the point is understood: the maritime industry has problems. It is mostly people and a close second is political and management oversight. Regardless of license, experience and qualification every mariner has the right and personal obligation to warn of impending danger. The author, in personal style, expressed concerns and opinions. For that impressive step, appreciation is warranted and any factual argument by those not agreeing should be espoused and considered; i.e., open a pilot house window and let in some fresh air.

COSCO BUSAN. Captain Sun and Pilot Cota have created an awareness that bad thing can happen and that determining responsibility and fault(s) is evidently not simple. The suspects are government, officials, owners, managers, operators, public committees, associations and the primary target, ship board persons. How many errors were committed may not be known, but the probability that only Captain Sun and Pilot Cota are alone responsibile is suspect.

Since America was only a gathering of colonies, commerce has been the sustaining life blood of economic and political survival. To impede commerce with redundant and useless laws, a political solution, is to deny growth and deter competition. There is a need for the maritime community, local, regional, national and international to clean-up their respective acts. Pilotage, in general as a service, not just a business is in a universal state of confusion as to qualification, competency and what is acceptable seamanship. Money alone is not the panacea, personal dedication and skillfullness come to mind.

As an accepted process licensed pilots, in most cases are found competent by virtue of their tested local knowledge. Licensed officers are also examined and based on a percentage score, licensed. That process has been historically accepted , however reliability and proficiency in the myriad of tasks required to be performed is not. A master, acting as co-pilot may not be equally qualified or competent as the person directing the navigation of the vessel, and therefore errors in judgment may be overlooked. The public is unaware and yet public safety is of concern. How many similar errors are repeated before the law of averages kicks in?

The history of pilotage is replete with cases where mandated local licensed pilots were not considered competent to moor and undock vessels; a specialized skill. Not to say they were not, but owners and managers were concerned and cautious; and they pay the bills.

The comparison of the pilots role versus the masters alludes to the increased burden for masters while the duties of pilots has changed little. Both are presently compensated at their worth, but in any grouping there is an average. Each has undergone various forms of training and then turned lose to practice, essentially without evaluation. Although copious dollars are spent on training individuals, the bridge teams may not be. An untrained team lacking discipline is a gang. Although not specifically pronounced the role of owners, managers and operators must include responsibility for any failure to verify that employees are qualified and competent and perform in the manner required by rule. A vessel found undermanned, crewed with unqualified persons or lacking operational proficiency is unseaworthy and local authority, as a matter of public policy, should be responsible to detain it. - John Denham

More on accidents and why.

By John G. Denham

A pilotage pardox presently exists because of the lack of explanations as to the “root cause” of accidents; basically, a failure to comply with existing rules. There are more rules than there are ships. Piloting is a function of navigation, but it requires an understanding of who is directing the navigation of the vessel i.e., an employed pilot not a ship’s officer, or a ship’s officer licensed to pilot. (33CFR Part 164.11). Standards for duties and responsibility for persons in charge of a vessel (persons piloting) have been legally established in Atlee v N.W. Packet Co., (1874) ,88 U.S. 389, 22l.ed. 619.

By law, custom, tradition and attitude many pilots that have not experienced the U.S. courts continue to perform as “one man shows.” However one must recognize the difference between a river pilot and a bar/harbor pilot: e.g navigating the San Francisco Bar Channel and the ports on San Francisco Bay and the pilots that navigate to Sacramento and Stockton, California. In the later case, a river pilot is “directing the navigation” This is not to say that the route to and from sea is a “piece of cake”, it is not.

The view that transiting the Oakland Bar Channel is a “relatively simple matter” is misleading in that the bar channel is nearly perpendicular to the currents and the published predictions are frequently inaccurate. Therefore, in limited visibility a person directing the navigation must rely on radar navigation to determine set and drift as it occurs because as one transits the bar channel the effect of the current changes. Experience in this case dictates: in fog, one concentrate on radar navigation.

Hearings, inquiries and investigation seldom develop the “root cause” of accidents because they have limited experience, knowledge and are mostly guided by bureaucratic constraints and therefore if fault is found, they send the culprit to ship handling training. Why, because there is no other appropriate remedy available.

No one knows what actually occurred except the Captain of COSCO BUSAN and pilot Cota i,e: why so many rudder orders? What passage plan was discussed? Was the track plotted on the chart 588 accepted by the pilot and Master? The NTSB hearing produced exceptional testimony and information however, no analysis or report has been produced, but professional mariners and second guessers have theories. Under keel clearance does have a maneuvering effect in current and changing water depths, but probably not relevant in this case. Using only NTSB data at time 08 27 37 Cosco Busan there appears no feasible alternative course change to the right.

Most importantly, is the mostly common practice of pilots and ships not using BRM as a safety feature in voyages and navigation practice. Although taught, stressed and published BRM is not universally followed. There are reasons, some valid, but all are resolvable. .

Many ports have a relatively calm and secured bay for pilot operations that allow discussion. Not so at the ocean boarding stations at some west coast pilot stations, however there is no rule that one should proceed at full speed until ready.

Essentially, if the BRM is to be accepted and function as per its purpose, then the owners, managers and professional pilots must mandate implementation. The simple solution ” if the BRM is not functional the vessel is not seaworthy” JGD

Safety at Sea=PAP

By John G. Denham

In my naval experience I hated inspections more than storms. Most of the inspectors were knowledgeable, competent but tended to harp on what they knew and nit-picked technical items the average sailor barely understood. There were two exceptions: the Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) and the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). The ship was either determined ready and capable or it was not. I played several roles in those processes and gleaned an important lesson: a ship operates best when Policy, Attitude and Procedures are in sync.

Every ship at sea operates within some form of policy, be it the companies or the Master’s. The policy normally dictates the attitude in which procedures are executed. Success starts with a realistic policy. A policy that demands 100% effort all the time has little chance of success, whereas a reserve margin for emergencies provides probable achievement. If one can not pick-up the beat, the race may be lost.

The maritime situation today is rapidly changing; sailors are technicians, ships are mechanical, electronic packages of modern technology, the old buckets are disappearing, replaced by behemoths with a hand full of people in charge. Modernization and maximum-efficient processes are the order for survival.

Competency is not accomplished overnight or is a high test score an indication of skill. Competency, knowledge, skill, and experience are hard to acquire and are increasing in demand. There are groups, organizations and societies of highly qualified and experienced ex-mariners, licensed masters, captains, mates and engineers that have left the sea and sought employment in related trades and associated professions. Some have formed companies that provide special services to shipping companies e.g., pollution prevention, personnel and vessel manning, license and certification preparation, insurance, cargo operations, ship handling, navigation and seamanship etc. [Continue Reading →]

Big Motor Problems

By John G. Denham

I am impressed with the significant improvements that large diesel engine manufacturers are making in reducing offensive emissions, improving operational efficiency and cutting costs. When the “Firecracker Engineers” put their mind to it, it happens. Government is putting a lot of pressure on engine exhausts; the bigger the engine the more political pressure. Owners want more speed and efficiency and less cost. I have not observed any government involvement except to increase standards. The diesel engine manufacturing guys have addressed faster, more powerful, cleaner, efficient and less costly engines admirably, but there is another problem that effects operations: minimum speed.

The minimum speed limitation is an operational safety factor when maneuvering in confined, congested and special maneuvering areas. Rule 6 of the International and Inland Rules:

“Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed…” A gold mine for maritime lawyers.

The Pacific Maritime Magazine May 2008 issue’s feature article “Large Marine Diesel Engines” exemplified:

“APL recently ordered eight MAN B&W 14K98ME-C7 two stroke low-speed crosshead engines …will generate 115,000 bhp at 105 RPM …to be installed in eight new 10,000 teu container ships.”

As advertised the operating range of similar behemoths maybe as low 45 RPM and as high as 120 RPM. With direct drive and an efficient propeller the probable minimum speed may be 5.0 knots. Persons piloting such vessels may need to stop and start the engines any number of times due to circumstances; the engines are usually started with compressed air. Therefore knowing the quantity of consecutive start and stops is essential as an operating factor. There are two navigation considerations that must be resolved while en route: the safe speed of advance and the hydrodynamic effect of the vessel’s movement; the greater the speed the greater the effect. So far, ship handlers have developed procedures to reduce the speed of advance but as the engines become more powerful the solutions will be less effective.

While transiting a narrow channel there are three sub-factors involved that need to be considered to safely proceed: the bow wave, suction effect and the wake; all relate to speed and displacement. The details and an excellent explanation are provided in Caryle J. Plummer’s “SHIP HANDLING IN NARROW CHANNELS; Cornell Maritime Press.

Large direct drive diesel ships may have as many as 10 or 12 consecutive starts if the propeller is free rotating, but less if backing (need more air). Of greatest concern is an emergency full astern from full speed ahead; the air pressure may not be adequate to counter the propeller rotations.

Therefore, the ship owner must not only consider the environmental impact and economical advantage, but the cost of additional tugs and support services when entering congested and confined water. JGD.

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He writes for Pacific Maritime Magazine and is the author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Cadet Edward Pollard on the TSES

Recent news article claim steps in obtaining agreements in placing maritime school students aboard merchant ships for accomplishing sea time requirements. A step that appears to solve a problem. Getting places to stash the boys and girls seems like a good idea, but what does it actually achieve and at what cost?

License requirements requires sea time that allegedly acquaints one with the performance of seaman type works and shipboard practices. A candidate for a license should be a competent mariner (Deck or Engine qualified). The latest version of the Merchant Marine Officer’s Handbook, 5th edition, implies a newly licensed officer should “hit the deck running.” A perusal of the American Merchant Seaman’s Manual, 6th edition, list twenty three or more chapters of basic material a competent mariner should be “knowledgeable ” or at least aware of.

Taking the sample examination questions from the USCG Proceedings, Spring 2008, both deck and engine I was hard pressed to locate answers or information that would provide acceptable answers. The same applied to the two previous issues. Therefore, either the examinations are based on data that is not readily available or there is a gross deficiency in training manuals; in any case what does one study at sea, examination prep- sheets?

Of greatest concern is the lack of awareness by bureaucrats that putting kids to sea does not make them seaman. How many ship’s officers are qualified teachers , practiced instructors, good parents? The wrong experience can set a pattern that can be perpetuated for years. Cramming for an examination does not produce competency.

It is time to examine the school of the ship and resolve the requirements for education, knowledge, skill and leadership and invest our maritime training funds in those that will properly crew, operate and command the sophisticated giants of the seas in the future. Not all will be effective and efficient masters or chief engineers, but everyone licensed or documented should be competent. The expeditious path of “pumping out” licensed people to fill vacant slots is accomplishing only one purpose, increasing accidents. -JGD

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Sailor, the Nose Knows!
By John G. Denham

After spending most of my younger days at sea and standing topside watches on open bridges in all kinds of weather and places, I was tanned, weathered and a prime target for basal cell carcinoma. It took a while. I’m now 82 and I had added twenty some years of golf and tinkering in my yard in the sun without a hat. At age 75 I visited a dermatologist, got stung, scolded, given a hand full of reading material and I obtained a wide brimmed hat, but too late. [Continue Reading →]

Photo By OneEighteen

The interesting and disturbing news that the “COSCO BUSAN CREW DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGES” raises the concern that it can happen to U.S. mariners too. Asian jails are not comfortable.The fact the Captain and six crew members are available for testimony is encouraging as they may be able to fill in the blanks (Who was directing the navigation of the vessel when it allided with D tower, etc?), but the process is deplored. Regardless of nationality, innocent mariners should not be detained without proper process.

The need for facts is recognized and the availability of the COSCO BUSAN’s Captain and some crew members is necessary to obtain their statements, although the validity may be questioned. It would appear the accusers were unable to obtain legal process to depose key persons and therefore resorted to processes that are not appropriate and certainly not acceptable by international standards.

However, sometimes there is more than the printed story. Is it possible that the detention is mutually agreeable? Is it possible the Captain and his mates agree to this? ( A trip to Disney Land would sway me) Or maybe the PRC has more pressing business (Tibet), or the owners find it cheaper to let the U.S. pickup the food and berthing rather than transport them back and forth for hearings and trials?

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

Photo by steven and darusha

Jeff Charlton of 911team.org in London asked a interesting maritime question on the IAEM list-serve the other day that Robin Storm thought we could answer.

Jeff’s question?

“What if the need arises to replace a master or pilot because the ship has been affected by plague, terrorism, CBRn incident? How many have the competence or training to work in level A or B PPE (personal protection equipment)?

How many crew could assist him if a vessel was out of control? What if a ship was utilized as a terrorist vector agent and required mobility rather than destruction?”

So here is the response by John Denham a former SF Bay Pilot.

First, who will be in charge. The COSCO BUSAN incident is a current example of the lack of a single responsible agent with authority to mobilize, coordinate, and direct a catastrophic event recovery operation in the San Francisco Bay area. The closest single authority to my knowledge is the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) Yours truly a member of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee. As a state ( next level of responsible government) agency , BCDC has the civic and political sub-structure ( members from all contiguous communities) to organize, coordinate and direct what ever exists to respond, but lacks any experience. 9/11 experienced a similar problem to a lesser degree as only New York city was involved. Leadership is the critical survival element.

Second: Consider a nuclear weapons attack with CB fallout-out directed on the city of San Francisco. Without details consider San Francisco and the immediate 15 mile area is devastated. In such a scenario the leadership would probably come from out of the area. Sacramento would probably respond, and in so doing would call for federal assistance; that politically implies we can handle it but need help The federal government will probably respond with support, i.e. we will take charge and fix things as we see fit. And that may be worse than the bomb.

I have an ID card identifying me as a Department of Defense employee and shipyard pilot at the Mare Island Naval Ship Yard. I have no idea what program that was and I have no idea what I was to do; I left that job in 1981. But under the Civilian Defense organization, at one time there was a plan for identifying and organizing critical persons.

Some one (authority), will eventually make a decision that vessels must be moved, for some reason. Some to depart, some to arrive. Some just to be moved from A to B. The bay waters to my knowledge will be basically unaffected by the destruction and bad effects of man’s attempt to resolve a problem with explosives. Therefore it is considered safe to move about on the water if there are no navigation restrictions e.g., bridges blocking passages .

Case 1

[Continue Reading →]

The Contra Costa Times article “Critics Fear More Barge Disasters” of February 19, 2008 and the KGO TV Channel 7 report on tug boat licensing presented eye opening views on the crewing and operations of harbor tugs. Although in excellent detail the views expressed and the comments made by active tug operators presented a deeper problem than just the shortage of qualified people. It illuminated the government intervention into unfamiliar fields using academic research techniques. Such data gathering processes are excellent in determining sales, production and pedestrian patterns but when dealing with people’s, livelihoods and professional experience and knowledge, they are inappropriate.Of concern, in this case, is the process used to publish intentions to make new or change rules. Obviously, by the limited number of reported written responses (14) to a possible population of several thousand the sampling was insignificant.

Therefore to continue further is ineffective. A better and more effective sampling technique is warranted. The USCG criteria “to make a good case” is certainly not convincing or professional.

There is no doubt that the tug people, like so many other transportation occupations need to improve their safety, education and training. An example of an acceptable level of effort put forth is the airline industry; however, the public pays. In my experience, I have found tug people, inland and off shore, to be concerned about the petty bureaucratic confusion of government officials, but angry about managerial mis-management. The law relating to tugs and tug operation as capsulated in ” Parks on the law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage” is mind boggling but almost essential reading for the guy in the pilot house. Most tug operators are given tasks and provided two options: either do the job, or some one else will. Few will support them in confrontations with management involving risk, safety and lawful precedence, mostly it is: up to the tug skipper to decide. A tug operator has little choice in task, crew, time or condition although the laws hold them accountable.

It is appropriate, under the circumstances cited above, that the USCG reconsider their position based on the little response previously acquired and conduct a series of on-scene visits to the major tug boat areas and determine what is actually needed and how to accomplish it. A small professional. representative experienced team could effectively accomplish a meaningful result in a few months. The result may not be perfect, but the effort should be.

It is not what one achieves, but the effort that prove its worth.

JGD

Captain John Denham is a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. he is also author of The Assistant and DD 891 .