Costa Concordia Disaster - What happened?

[Observer]

Does this pot ever thicken !!

It's Italy.

Every rock you turn over reveals two more.

[cappy208]

Interesting post found from last summer: http://www.cruiseindustrynews.com/cr...-approval.html RINA Granted US Coast Guard US Flag Approval

Thursday, 07 July 2011

GENOA-based classification society RINA has been authorised by the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct plan review and approval and initial and subsequent surveys for U.S.-flagged cargo and passenger vessels. Under the agreement signed yesterday, RINA has received delegation for Load Line, SOLAS, MARPOL, ISM, and Tonnage survey and certification services. The MOA delegating authority and establishing guidelines for co-operation between the USCG and RINA was signed at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington yesterday, by Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft (Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship) USCG and Ugo Salerno, CEO, RINA. Ugo Salerno, CEO, RINA, says, “We appreciate the trust the USCG is putting in RINA, and we salute the good relations and mutual respect we have developed over twenty years. We have focused relentlessly on quality and that has paid off as we have topped the quality table for classification societies as measured by Port State Control performance.” Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, USCG, says, “The signing of this agreement is indicative of the trust and value the U.S. Coast Guard places in our partnerships that promote the safe and secure movement of shipping, people, and cargo across the vast maritime domain.” RINA was the first international classification society to sign a co-operation agreement with the USCG for foreign-flag passenger ships using US ports, and since then has worked hard with the Coast Guard to ensure that US passengers sail on safe ships. Today this new agreement recognises the success of that agreement and makes RINA’s services available to the wider US shipping industry. Massimo Volta, General Manager, America, RINA, says, “Operators of US tonnage will now be able to benefit from the high levels of service on which RINA prides itself. We bring the full range of international classification services to the US market, we also bring a lot of expertise and experience, especially with specialised vessels. And we bring something extra, we bring a special attention to personal service.” One wonders how this will change in light of the excellent damage stability exhibited by the CC.

[cappy208]

I was wondering how tall these ships really are. I found the dimensions on the 'net. 952 x 116 x 46. Well, there was a random thought. How high are these ships really? It would seem that there is a mathematical formula that has been tweaked too much (ala GT openings and admeasurement here in the US).

Looking at this diagram as an example, the "Depth" listed is 46'6". This is the 'molded depth' from keel to the top of the water tight deck. This is about to the embarkation deck. There are NO watertight doors higher than that. (At least in my experience on 3 cruises this is true) There are fire partitions, but no WT doors that high. Further, the upper decks extend well up to approximately 140'! How in ANYONE's calculation can this be acceptable? On a different note, are there any Cruise ship crew here who can elaborate on the movable ballast systems that need to be used to 'dampen' the list from wind, passenger and outside effects? Wondering how much these dampening systems are used. In port? While underway how frequently do they operate? Without them, what is the amount of list that is evident? How much ballast IS used, under normal situations? The CC was on a heading with the wind upon the Stbd side. When she drifted down to Giglio, the wind was on the Port side. Assuming that the ballast couldn't be shifted after main generator loss, how much ballast would be 'on the wrong side'? Since she went from under control (sort of) on the Port tack, to out of control on the Stbd, how much would the list have been 'inherant' due to the automatic ballast becoming non functional?


carnival splendor.jpg

[Sweat-n-Grease]

One wonders how this will change in light of the excellent damage stability exhibited by the CC.

Well, to start, it's going to be difficult to sweep this one under the rug, so to speak, there she squats, on the horizontal, right by a Light House to guard her I suppose for all the world to see, and it looks like she will remain there for quite a spell.

[cappy208]

Well, to start, it's going to be difficult to sweep this one under the rug, so to speak, there she squats, on the horizontal, right by a Light House to guard her I suppose for all the world to see, and it looks like she will remain there for quite a spell.

Sweat-N-Grease: on your browser, how did my last post show? Did the ship picture automatically show up, or was it a link? I can't figure out how to make the picture show up. Unless it just doesn't show up on mine, since I posted it. Tnx

[Heiwa]

Rule #1 in a contact incident of this type is that officers on the bridge immediately close all open watertight doors. The close button is in the bridge panel that also indicates positions of all w/t doors, e.g. green when a door is closed (red =open). It is very easy to push the button! In principle there should be only 2 or 3 w/t doors between manned engine rooms (for the safe operation of the ship) on any passenger ship, but idiotic practice of many stupid (criminal!) flag admins is to fit doors between store and crew compartments so that stores/crew can lazily move horisontally between watertight spaces in lieu of going up/down to pass a watertight bulkhead. The Costa Concordia VDR will tell us what happened to the w/t doors.
Rule #2 may be to start or line up all bilge pumps so that you can pump watertight compartments dry in an emergency. Bilge alarms will tell you if a w/t compartment is dry or not and what to do. All is recorded on the VDR.
The famous ship M/S Estonia didn't have any bilge pumps at all, when she sank 1994 killing 900+ people. http://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htm . She also had 22 w/t doors in 11 so called w/t bulkheads but all doors were always open so that you could go to the toilet = the ship sank like a stone due to small hull leakage. The LSA was 50+ rafts that you should swim to, turn upright and pull yourself into to survive in the icecold water. Tough but SOLAS approved by Sweden, Finland and Estonia.
The Costa Concordia luckily had plenty of lifeboats that were all launched ... but she never sank. Costa Concordia is still 40% above water at Isola del Giglio. So it is very easy to establish why she sank. Were any watertight doors in the aft part of the ship open when she capsized and sank? Then it is easy to show why she capsized and sank. http://heiwaco.tripod.com/news8.htm .

[cappy208]

Rule #1 in a contact incident of this type is that officers on the bridge immediately close all open watertight doors. The close button is in the bridge panel that also
indicates positions of all w/t doors, e.g. green when a door is closed (red =open). It is very easy to push the button!

But not so easy if there was NO electrical power to these. It seems from past posts the engine room was flooded up to at least the lower deckplate almost immediately. AND, if there was clutter in the WT door thresholds they couldn't close/seal anyway. It will be interesting to find out the condition of the doors position when (if) we are allowed to know this info.

In principle there should be only 2 or 3 w/t doors between manned engine rooms (for the safe operation of the ship) on any passenger ship, but idiotic practice of many stupid (criminal!) flag admins is to fit doors between store and crew compartments so that stores/crew can lazily move horisontally between watertight spaces in lieu of going up/down to pass a watertight bulkhead. The Costa Concordia VDR will tell us what happened to the w/t doors.

And if in fact there are WT doors between engine room spaces and the hotel/ crew quarters then RINA should be dissolved.

Rule #2 may be to start or line up all bilge pumps so that you can pump watertight compartments dry in an emergency. Bilge alarms will tell you if a w/t compartment is dry or not and what to do. All is recorded on the VDR.

I'm not sure ANY bilge pump would have been useful in this case. The alternative was Water Tight integrity. Seems lacking. On to the hull design and the inherent stability of the design (or lack therof).

The Costa Concordia luckily had plenty of lifeboats that were all launched ... but she never sank. Costa Concordia is still 40% above water at Isola del Giglio. So it is very easy to establish why she sank. Were any watertight doors in the aft part of the ship open when she capsized and sank? Then it is easy to show why she capsized and sank

There seems to be some debate about the hows and whys of the capsizing and downflooding that occurred. The relationship between the Height to width, stability, and WT integrity is suspect.

To conventional wisdom would indicate that when she grounded on the Stbd side, she should have stopped rolling over. She was supported on the Stbd side, and afloat on the Port. However, is her 'point of no return' so little that the 20or 30 degree list is the Loll? How could this design be approved? Think of ALL the other cruise ships that are designed almost exactly (or just like) this one?!

[Sweat-n-Grease]

Sweat-N-Grease: on your browser, how did my last post show? Did the ship picture automatically show up, or was it a link? I can't figure out how to make the picture show up. Unless it just doesn't show up on mine, since I posted it. Tnx

cappy, your link to the picture shows and it works if one clicks on the link, of course. The image is 4.5" x 1.25 "
I place any image I want to post on the forum on my desktop, on the forum you can use the <go to advance> attribute and upload your picture by using <manage attachments>. I'm sure there are other methods.

[Burong]

Ladies and Gentlemen

I am a lawyer in the UK, not a professional mariner. I know nothing about any Law that might be relevant to this matter either - like millions of other people, I am merely curious about the Costa Concordia incident. Consequently I found this forum and have been reading this thread avidly ever since.

This morning, the Daily Telegraph in the UK have published a short video that they say was partly filmed on the bridge of the Concordia during the hour or so after the initial grounding. The link is below:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...Concordia.html

I have posted this solely because I hope to read what your members make of the video, please.

Thanks

[Sweat-n-Grease]

Ladies and Gentlemen

I am a lawyer in the UK, not a professional mariner. I know nothing about any Law that might be relevant to this matter either - like millions of other people, I am merely curious about the Costa Concordia incident. Consequently I found this forum and have been reading this thread avidly ever since.

This morning, the Daily Telegraph in the UK have published a short video that they say was partly filmed on the bridge of the Concordia during the hour or so after the initial grounding. The link is below:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...Concordia.html

I have posted this solely because I hope to read what your members make of the video, please.

Thanks

Thank you, Sir, for your post.

The first item I noticed no one seemed to know what to do and in what order to do it. By watching the video I can not determine at what point the order to close all water tight doors was issued. Senior Officers struggle to understand what is happening.
The second item, some one mentioned to the Captain passengers getting in the life boats, the Captain replied vabbuo.

It looks like chaos.

[AustralianPilot]

Ladies and Gentlemen

I am a lawyer in the UK, not a professional mariner. I know nothing about any Law that might be relevant to this matter either - like millions of other people, I am merely curious about the Costa Concordia incident. Consequently I found this forum and have been reading this thread avidly ever since.

This morning, the Daily Telegraph in the UK have published a short video that they say was partly filmed on the bridge of the Concordia during the hour or so after the initial grounding. The link is below:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...Concordia.html

I have posted this solely because I hope to read what your members make of the video, please.

Thanks

Burong,

Thank you for this link. Any comments that I offer here are without predjudice as we are relying on a video which has not been qualified in so far as "who said what". This is why the VDR is so vital to the investigation. Remember that cockpit recordings used in aircraft investigations are easily sheeted back to Pilot/Co-Pilot whereas in this instance it could have been anyone offering information to the Master. Herein lies the difficulty.

Clearly, this short video only paints a small fraction of the incident. Ideally we need to see a similar video indicating the efficacy and actions of the bridge team prior to the vessel alliding with Isola de Giglio. The post- allision link indicates a fairly ineffectual team communicating with a Master who is reactive and not proactive. For example.......

Officer: Commander, passengers are getting on the lifeboats spontaneously.
Captain: OK. Fine. Lets let them go to the land.

Now the worrying thing about this video is that this statement and response was made when they were still in deep water yet the footage indicates boats being launched when she is hard aground on the Island.

The tempo of the communications is fairly normal for an Italian bridge team.

To be fair to the Captain, in electing not to drop the anchor in deep water and thus maintaining leeward drift back to the island and shallow water in my opinion minimised the death toll. That was the one good decision that he made and he was damn lucky that the wind was from the northern sector at 12 knots. His action has also afforded the authorities some opportunity of removing the bunker fuel.

Captain: At worst we can sit on the seabed. We will see.

Unfortunately, this will be a watershed for our industry and profession and we can always rely on the weak link to break the chain.

[Tachibana]

Perhaps being the swell guys they are, someone at gCaptain will sniff this one out for us. They might even be able to access that post from our Francophile friend who had the hissy fit?

Let's make a deal. First Cappy208 retracts his anti-French statements. Then, in exchange, I restore the link and English translation.

[GB.Murph]

Ladies and Gentlemen

I am a lawyer in the UK, not a professional mariner. I know nothing about any Law that might be relevant to this matter either - like millions of other people, I am merely curious about the Costa Concordia incident. Consequently I found this forum and have been reading this thread avidly ever since.

This morning, the Daily Telegraph in the UK have published a short video that they say was partly filmed on the bridge of the Concordia during the hour or so after the initial grounding. The link is below:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...Concordia.html

I have posted this solely because I hope to read what your members make of the video, please.

Thanks

Here's a link to a longer version, but unfortunately without any English translation (and I don't speak Italian):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LuB4hSmQ-1I

It's very hard to draw any major conclusions from either the Telegraph's short video with translations, or the longer Italian one.

My observations:

1. The darkened bridge with red lights is unremarkable (for those not familiar with a navigational maritime environment). That's perfectly normal during the hours of darkness, so that the bridge team have reasonable night vision. The mark 1 human eyeball is still a primary navigational tool, used for things such as observing the position of other vessels and very obvious navigational aids such as the large pier lights on the harbour entrance).

2. We really need to see the entire bridge operation from the point where they first left port, to the point where the bridge was abandoned, before we can really properly judge the bridge team as a whole (but it's very clear that the bridge team as a whole failed in multiple critical ways from before the first collision). This video is much too short to draw many conclusions. It also lacks a timecode to let us sync what we are seeing with the facts we know from other sources.

3. After a major event, a certain level of chaos and shouting is really to be expected, as different members of the team review and exchange information. These are complex ships, with a rather large number of different controls and displays on the bridge, and a sizeable bridge team. That said, there does appear to be a bit of a lack of obvious leadership, that's not good in an emergency.

4. "OK. Fine. Lets let them go to the land." (if that's accurate and from Schettino) is frankly dreadful and strongly suggests that the Master and the bridge team were no longer functioning usefully or in full control of the situation.

5. If the talk of closing watertight doors is really quite close (we don't know how the video is edited) to the point where they finally sounded the general alarm and ordered the abandon ship (something which other evidence suggests was fatally delayed), that could be a major contributing factor to the loss of life and the capsize. If the watertight doors were ordered to be closed more than moments after the original impact, I'd describe that as gross negligence.

Edit: 5. Having read and thought some more on this, I've changed my evaluation of the mention of watertight doors in the video to someone on the bridge (Schettino, on the phone to HQ?) confirming that the doors were closed immediately after the first incident, as they should have been. That doesn't mean that they were actually closed sufficiently quickly, just that it's what appears to be claimed in the video. That also doesn't mean that they were all open, just that any open doors would have been closed under emergency control from the bridge. I.e. the video does not include anything conclusively negative regarding the watertight doors.

6. The general shouting on the boat deck when the lifeboats were being launched towards the end of the video, that's frankly unremarkable. In an emergency situation, it's quite normal to shout to make sure you are heard. With the best bridge team and crew in the world, I'd expect an orderly and controlled evacuation to involve a fair bit of shouting and to appear a little chaotic.

[Sweat-n-Grease]

So, what we see and hear in the video is not much help. Not posting negative thoughts, simply no time line is rendered.

[AustralianPilot]

So, what we see and hear in the video is not much help. Not posting negative thoughts, simply no time line is rendered.

Sweat-n-Grease,

That is basically it in a nutshell.

As a practising Pilot, I voice record (digitally with back up to computer) at all times and my DVR is time stamped (from AIS) and date stamped. This automatically time stamps all actions that are undertaken on the bridge inclusive of helm/engine orders in addition to AIS logging and vessel VDR. There is no room for assumption, supposition or doubt.

The fact that CC's VDR is allegedly corrupted allied with the lack of time stamping on this video leads me to the opinion that, what we are deriving from this very short clip, is a group of human beings under significant stress. We are assuming that certain individuals made certain statements.

I don't discount the value of this clip although we need to be a little circumspect on any derivations.

Cheers

AP

[Sweat-n-Grease]

Sweat-n-Grease,

That is basically it in a nutshell.

As a practising Pilot, I voice record (digitally with back up to computer) at all times and my DVR is time stamped (from AIS) and date stamped. This automatically time stamps all actions that are undertaken on the bridge inclusive of helm/engine orders in addition to AIS logging and vessel VDR. There is no room for assumption, supposition or doubt.

The fact that CC's VDR is allegedly corrupted allied with the lack of time stamping on this video leads me to the opinion that, what we are deriving from this very short clip, is a group of human beings under significant stress. We are assuming that certain individuals made certain statements.

I don't discount the value of this clip although we need to be a little circumspect on any derivations.

Cheers

AP

Agreed

Unfortunately it may never be possible to cross all the dots.
Now, I ask, why?

[Sweat-n-Grease]

Let's make a deal. First Cappy208 retracts his anti-French statements. Then, in exchange, I restore the link and English translation.

Allow me to be blunt, stop this shit, if you have an accurate time line then post it.

[GB.Murph]

5. If the talk of closing watertight doors is really quite close (we don't know how the video is edited) to the point where they finally sounded the general alarm and ordered the abandon ship (something which other evidence suggests was fatally delayed), that could be a major contributing factor to the loss of life and the capsize. If the watertight doors were ordered to be closed more than moments after the original impact, I'd describe that as gross negligence.

I've revised my opinion on the significance of the watertight doors being mentioned in the video. I stand by my assertion that it would be gross negligence if they were not closed under emergency bridge control immediately after the first incident, but now think that is fairly likely.

5. Having read and thought some more on this, I've changed my evaluation of the mention of watertight doors in the video to someone on the bridge (Schettino, on the phone to HQ?) confirming that the doors were closed immediately after the first incident, as they should have been. That doesn't mean that they were actually closed sufficiently quickly, just that it's what appears to be claimed in the video. That also doesn't mean that they were all open, just that any open doors would have been closed under emergency control from the bridge. I.e. the video does not include anything conclusively negative regarding the watertight doors.

[GB.Murph]

A new observation on this candid bridge video that has materialised. Throwing this out there to see what others think.

It appears that the bridge team (Schettino, in particular?) had somehow reached the conclusion that only 2 compartments were externally breached. It also sounded like they possibly thought that only 3 of the generators were completely gone, and there might be a chance to start some/all of the 3 in the other compartment. This seems to contradict the published preliminary court testimony of the Chief Engineer and Duty Engineer. It also seems to contradict the visible port side hull damage that we've all considered at some length.

So, did the bridge team really have the opinion possibly up to an hour (and likely at least 30 minutes) after the first incident that the uncontrolled flooding was limited to just 2 compartments?

I'm still strongly of the opinion that the bridge team and Schettino failed in their duty by not declaring an emergency within 15 minutes of the first incident (VHF GMDSS MAYDAY & general alarm to muster passengers). The only delay I see as acceptable there would be a 5-10 minute delay to summon crew to their emergency stations before calling the passengers to muster.

Briefly playing "devil's advocate", I'm wondering if a serious underestimation of the true scale of the damage was a factor. I.e. did they believe in good faith that the ship had not sustained critical damage which had doomed her to founder?

If that forms part of the picture, how could it possibly happen? Did she not have basic bilge high level alarms on all main bilges? Was there some terrible breakdown in communications between the engineers/carpenters and the bridge (and the critical comms should have been possible via both emergency battery power and the emergency generator)? Language barriers (surely not!)?

[cappy208]

If this is true, that the passengers were starting to launch life boats, and the Bridge team was unaware, or dis interested, then that sort of makes the whole picture of who was in charge, what was decided, and when it was decided immaterial.

The management of the vessel was NOT in charge. They abdicated responsibility. Obviously they were unaware of the amount and severity of the damage to the vessel. But, I will say, if I thought my vessel was intact, and somewhat stable, I would not order abandonship either. So this brings the larger question into play. WAS / IS this ship design safe? Is it inherently UNstable? Does it depend upon moveable ballast for its integrity? If this design is found to be actually unstable, what does this say for the whole cruise industry which has dozens of these designed vessels (at least superficially) who would be suspect? For me the question is: Why did the CC list to Starboard and capsize? Especially when she was holed on the Port side, and she was aground on the Stbd. I would hope the RINA investigation is open and forthcoming. But I doubt it will be, and I have never been a real fan of these ship classification societies, since seeing one get bribed (successfully) with a case of scotch.