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Thread: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

  1. #817
    Brad Wehde is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    This is also where I was going, depending on what was down there. I think that there are many ways to get this done. I am very creative and inginuitive but I don't have much information to go on. Assuming that the drill pipe is fixed in the BOP then this needs to be cut to get the LMRP off, or the riser disconnected from the Flex joint. So lets say you used this hot tap to cut through the drill string inside the riser close to the connector. Then you could disconnect the riser from the Flex joint. Now you have a clean coupler (except for a portion of the drill string) and then again from the side with a similar clam shell device attach a device like i have with a valve and then close it.
    Would it also be possible to have this collet connector attached to a valve (in the open position) and just drop it over the top if you had a guide to help it in place. Things to consider with this method is the flow, pressure and volume of material coming from the BOP. this is where a guide and press would come into play. You would have to deal with getting it over the top of the drill string and then onto the connector. This is why I was thinking about my first idea first.
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  2. #818
    company man 1 is offline Top Contributer Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Have you been able to contact anyone with BP about your idea? It is guys like you who throughout history made or came up with most of the tools that are used in this business. As far as containment goes, using hay ( from the hay guys) instead of chemical dispersants sure looks a lot cheaper, more effective & is obviously safer. I just hope when guys like yourself talk someone with some stroke is listening.
    Quote Originally Posted by Brad Wehde View Post
    This is also where I was going, depending on what was down there. I think that there are many ways to get this done. I am very creative and inginuitive but I don't have much information to go on. Assuming that the drill pipe is fixed in the BOP then this needs to be cut to get the LMRP off, or the riser disconnected from the Flex joint. So lets say you used this hot tap to cut through the drill string inside the riser close to the connector. Then you could disconnect the riser from the Flex joint. Now you have a clean coupler (except for a portion of the drill string) and then again from the side with a similar clam shell device attach a device like i have with a valve and then close it.
    Would it also be possible to have this collet connector attached to a valve (in the open position) and just drop it over the top if you had a guide to help it in place. Things to consider with this method is the flow, pressure and volume of material coming from the BOP. this is where a guide and press would come into play. You would have to deal with getting it over the top of the drill string and then onto the connector. This is why I was thinking about my first idea first.
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    peakoilerrrr is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    In the field of nuclear power[electrical] generation, the term "safety-related" essentially covers any equipment/activity that could affect the ability to shut-down the reactor.

    Note this involves ANY consequences that COULD affect THE PUBLIC, as distinct from a worker getting a splinter or crushed finger. E.g., that is why basic emergency planning begins by pre-supposing a 20-mile radius effect.

    Also note that ANYONE can call the NucRegCom 24/7 to report any safety-related matter..."anonymously" or not. It will get atttention.

    Seriously? Well, there are many 100's of carbines/cameras routinely on-site 24/7 in safety-related areas. In this industry, dangers and complexity have a long experiential history...which is also why there is recognition that no activity is ever the same as before...because time and conditions never exactly repeat.

    E.g.--only after long experience under special conditions did the fact of Flow Accellerated Corrosion suddenly become recognized as causing pipe-walls to become thinner. It is a phenomena different from usual corrosion syndromes wherein liquid flow can "wipe" atomic layers off a metal wall, highlighting the always-present imperfections [as distributions of atoms] in metal lattice, at the micro level, of metal alloys. Perfectly spec'ed pipe suddenly has random thin spots. Surprise! So unknown [surprises] events are planned for in some fashion so as to limit consequences. Deepwater drilling in the GOM needs a new planning mindset to match possible consequences. [like fail-safe BOP-type arrangements; pre-drilled kill wells; engineered hardware that accepts emergency control mechanisms].

    The GOM crisis is a CONTROL-FAILURE.
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  4. #820
    Brad Wehde is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Company Man 1, thanks. I did submit this idea to the Deepwater response suggestion form. I am sure that if I had more to go on we may be able to come up with a viable solution. I don't know where else to turn but to post my ideas wherever I can find to post them.... Thanks for your support.
    Brad
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    pa-ta-sa is offline gCaptain Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Too much arguing... haha

    1 thing I think we all agree on about BP.

    While they look at these posts to get all of the expert's suggestions and points of view, they need to hire all those lawyers that have put all the "are you hurt from BP spill?" ads.
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  6. #822
    company man 1 is offline Top Contributer Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Quote Originally Posted by peakoilerrrr View Post
    In the field of nuclear power[electrical] generation, the term "safety-related" essentially covers any equipment/activity that could affect the ability to shut-down the reactor.

    Note this involves ANY consequences that COULD affect THE PUBLIC, as distinct from a worker getting a splinter or crushed finger. E.g., that is why basic emergency planning begins by pre-supposing a 20-mile radius effect.

    Also note that ANYONE can call the NucRegCom 24/7 to report any safety-related matter..."anonymously" or not. It will get atttention.

    Seriously? Well, there are many 100's of carbines/cameras routinely on-site 24/7 in safety-related areas. In this industry, dangers and complexity have a long experiential history...which is also why there is recognition that no activity is ever the same as before...because time and conditions never exactly repeat.

    E.g.--only after long experience under special conditions did the fact of Flow Accellerated Corrosion suddenly become recognized as causing pipe-walls to become thinner. It is a phenomena different from usual corrosion syndromes wherein liquid flow can "wipe" atomic layers off a metal wall, highlighting the always-present imperfections [as distributions of atoms] in metal lattice, at the micro level, of metal alloys. Perfectly spec'ed pipe suddenly has random thin spots. Surprise! So unknown [surprises] events are planned for in some fashion so as to limit consequences. Deepwater drilling in the GOM needs a new planning mindset to match possible consequences. [like fail-safe BOP-type arrangements; pre-drilled kill wells; engineered hardware that accepts emergency control mechanisms].

    The GOM crisis is a CONTROL-FAILURE.
    That is why I'm so irritated. Your points are great, and as I said before, I agree with an across the board on a stop work responsibility program. There is no way in HELL, upon failing a negative test I would have gone one step further on that sight. In fact, I find it unbelievable that the driller, pusher, OIM, or any other BP people on location allowed that well to be circulated out with seawater without running a CBL first. And for damn sure, I wouldn't have allowed any mud to be transfered to the work boat without knowing that well was DEAD with a cement plug on top & stack disconnected.
    However, if there isn't a price to pay when willful neglect of warning signs & objections by others are made, policy by itself is useless. It isn't right that those who respect the rules & understand why they are there are associated with lunatics?
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    peakoilerrrr is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Oh well, 70 years ago we could at least make a wildcat strike [union-wise]. Now, not so much...
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  8. #824
    Oil_and_Gas_person is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Quote Originally Posted by company man
    they have the smartest people in the world working on this thing & I asked how can the smartest people in the world not realize that square objects are NOT capable of holding pressure?
    You keep harping on this. Do your really think that BP (and other) engineers don't understand Pressure-Vessels-Fundamentals 101? The box was to act as a funnel -- it was never intended to hold pressure.

    Please give these guys a bit more credit. They may be human, but they are not morons.


    Okay, that out of the way -- you are absolutely correct that the only thing that will force the oilfield trash out, and bring the oilfield to a highly technical and professional level, is jail time. And not just jail time for the grunts -- jail time for the executives who pushed: "hurry up! hurry up!"

    An oil company paying a ten million dollar fine is no big deal. An executive spending one year of his life in prison IS A BIG DEAL to them.
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  9. #825
    alcor is offline Top Contributer
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Quote Originally Posted by Corky View Post
    Alcor,

    Just curious, by your comments you seem to feel this type of "cowboy" activity is the norm in the GoM. Is that your assertion, or am I just reading something into your comments which is not there? To be honest, I have been flabbergasted at the way the picture is coming together. If I had heard of this incident occurring without being informed of the location, I would have picked several other global locations prior to the GoM. I haven't worked extensively in the gulf until my current job & I am a consultant now so I do not spend large amounts of time on any single rig. Based on your experience, is this type of attitude still pretty prevalent here in the GoM? I know several senior company men around the world who have stopped working in the GoM because they were tired of the "constant micromanagement, oversight & second guessing by the office". You know how that is though, may just be sour grapes on their part because they did not want to follow company policies. Would appreciate your thoughts on this.

    Thanks
    When a well plan is designed by an Operator it is the duty of the Authority in that country of operation to either reject, sanction or offer acceptable proposals which meet the 'Barrier Philosospy' required to drill without incident. All play a part in the development of the Resources. Where they don't play a part the outcome can be somewhat alarming.
    Those who reject onshore involvement in the planning and sanctioning of procedures are living in the dark ages. Modern wells, and well design, have become much more complicated over the past 15 years, particularly offshore wells.
    My fear is that the 'All Powerful' Co Man (Cowboy), continues to use his authority on the vessel without outside consultation. We can continue down the path that's littered with shortcuts or we get our well plan and stick to it. And, that well plan should include all possible outcomes, all scenarios before the operation begins.
    Next step is to have 'civilised' meetings with the crews, where the common operational goals are understood by all, and anything overlooked can be presented and considered.
    This culture change means that many of the 'old' practices will not be tolerated any longer.
    In the case of the DWH, it is becoming clear to me that one or two individuals offshore are responsible for this whole debacle. Why? Because, they don't know how to conduct Well Testing, and worse, they didn't know how to interpret the results. And, that is unquestionable.
    CBL, should have been run. Who convinced onshore to send the Schlumberger hands home? Who convinced them that the tests were successful? Not Halliburton.
    I hear of heated debate occuring on the rig for 40 mins concerning the outcome of tests. We should have contacted ALL the onshore authorities, so that, one man's test could be scrutinised onshore by independent parties. Then a good decision can be made. And, who cares if it takes an extra 6 hours to get a decision. We're supposed to be waiting on cement.

    When the time came to displace, and SW was displaced down the pipe and up the Annulus to the top of the BOP, Annular Closed. Who made this ridiculous decision? Town? Who interpreted it and carried on? The well was not secure. With the Annular closed DP pressure read 1400 psi. Wake up Co Man! Your well is already telling you you've taken the beginnings of a kick, and it's now most likely above the BOP. The pressure, if you care to work it out should have read 1000 psi in the case of a dead well.
    Who gave the order to open the Annular and continue circulating. Why was the Driller not presented with expected pressures with the well shut in after this initial displacement?
    Someone ordered them to open the Annular, and to continue displacing the Riser to SW......while backloading to boats.
    Who was it? And who didn't stand up to him and point out that pressures were wrong.
    You need people in positions of Authority to seek input/counsel from all walks of life. It's a very sad outcome to this well and to too many others. The industry needs to change. I believe BP have that change, but I'm not sure it's filtered through to AMOCO.
    There's a 'Cowboy' attitude in the industry which has to be ousted.
    We need regulation, and we need counsel. We don't need micro-management, but we do need to form good reasons for pursuing one procedure rather than another, and that often requires many minds working together.
    All blowouts are preventable.
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  10. #826
    Brad Wehde is offline gCaptain Crew Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Does anyone know if the annular is functional or not?? I heard that it was damaged when someone closed it and then tried to move the drill pipe with it shut. If it is closed then the oil is only flowing through the drill pipe. Can't they test this by injecting a dye into the bottom of the BOP. If if comes out immediately then most likely the annular is not closed.
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  11. #827
    company man 1 is offline Top Contributer Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    There you go pounding the all powerful company man. I've got news for you. I've been consulting or companymanning for 5 years,. Before that I was a service hand & rig hand for almost 25 years. I have told the company men I worked for to F>>> themselves plenty of times & refused to do a job if they thought they were gonna do something as stupid as they had planned.
    I would say I've done this in my career about 50 times & I have had them attempt to get revenge 3 times. the other 47 or so times they thanked me or quietly realized we did the right thing not taking a short cut that would have either caused great unnecessary risk or messed up a well. The two almost always go hand in hand. The fact is they needed someone to be a cowboy because they were being blindly led to their own deaths by the blessing of someone a hell of a lot higher than a company man. How do I know, I are one.
    Edit: Using stop work responsibility, I have been shut down on jobs by boat captains, crane operators, supervisors, & even roustabouts & floor hands maybe as many times & almost every time they were right & I acknowledged their thoughtfulness & thanked them publicly for looking out for OUR welfare & the good of the job.
    Quote Originally Posted by alcor View Post
    When a well plan is designed by an Operator it is the duty of the Authority in that country of operation to either reject, sanction or offer acceptable proposals which meet the 'Barrier Philosospy' required to drill without incident. All play a part in the development of the Resources. Where they don't play a part the outcome can be somewhat alarming.
    Those who reject onshore involvement in the planning and sanctioning of procedures are living in the dark ages. Modern wells, and well design, have become much more complicated over the past 15 years, particularly offshore wells.
    My fear is that the 'All Powerful' Co Man (Cowboy), continues to use his authority on the vessel without outside consultation. We can continue down the path that's littered with shortcuts or we get our well plan and stick to it. And, that well plan should include all possible outcomes, all scenarios before the operation begins.
    Next step is to have 'civilised' meetings with the crews, where the common operational goals are understood by all, and anything overlooked can be presented and considered.
    This culture change means that many of the 'old' practices will not be tolerated any longer.
    In the case of the DWH, it is becoming clear to me that one or two individuals offshore are responsible for this whole debacle. Why? Because, they don't know how to conduct Well Testing, and worse, they didn't know how to interpret the results. And, that is unquestionable.
    CBL, should have been run. Who convinced onshore to send the Schlumberger hands home? Who convinced them that the tests were successful? Not Halliburton.
    I hear of heated debate occuring on the rig for 40 mins concerning the outcome of tests. We should have contacted ALL the onshore authorities, so that, one man's test could be scrutinised onshore by independent parties. Then a good decision can be made. And, who cares if it takes an extra 6 hours to get a decision. We're supposed to be waiting on cement.

    When the time came to displace, and SW was displaced down the pipe and up the Annulus to the top of the BOP, Annular Closed. Who made this ridiculous decision? Town? Who interpreted it and carried on? The well was not secure. With the Annular closed DP pressure read 1400 psi. Wake up Co Man! Your well is already telling you you've taken the beginnings of a kick, and it's now most likely above the BOP. The pressure, if you care to work it out should have read 1000 psi in the case of a dead well.
    Who gave the order to open the Annular and continue circulating. Why was the Driller not presented with expected pressures with the well shut in after this initial displacement?
    Someone ordered them to open the Annular, and to continue displacing the Riser to SW......while backloading to boats.
    Who was it? And who didn't stand up to him and point out that pressures were wrong.
    You need people in positions of Authority to seek input/counsel from all walks of life. It's a very sad outcome to this well and to too many others. The industry needs to change. I believe BP have that change, but I'm not sure it's filtered through to AMOCO.
    There's a 'Cowboy' attitude in the industry which has to be ousted.
    We need regulation, and we need counsel. We don't need micro-management, but we do need to form good reasons for pursuing one procedure rather than another, and that often requires many minds working together.
    All blowouts are preventable.
    Last edited by company man 1; May 23rd, 2010 at 03:49 AM.
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  12. #828
    company man 1 is offline Top Contributer Greenhorn
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    Default Re: Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

    Quote Originally Posted by alcor View Post
    When a well plan is designed by an Operator it is the duty of the Authority in that country of operation to either reject, sanction or offer acceptable proposals which meet the 'Barrier Philosospy' required to drill without incident. All play a part in the development of the Resources. Where they don't play a part the outcome can be somewhat alarming.
    Those who reject onshore involvement in the planning and sanctioning of procedures are living in the dark ages. Modern wells, and well design, have become much more complicated over the past 15 years, particularly offshore wells.
    My fear is that the 'All Powerful' Co Man (Cowboy), continues to use his authority on the vessel without outside consultation. We can continue down the path that's littered with shortcuts or we get our well plan and stick to it. And, that well plan should include all possible outcomes, all scenarios before the operation begins.
    Next step is to have 'civilised' meetings with the crews, where the common operational goals are understood by all, and anything overlooked can be presented and considered.
    This culture change means that many of the 'old' practices will not be tolerated any longer.
    In the case of the DWH, it is becoming clear to me that one or two individuals offshore are responsible for this whole debacle. Why? Because, they don't know how to conduct Well Testing, and worse, they didn't know how to interpret the results. And, that is unquestionable.
    CBL, should have been run. Who convinced onshore to send the Schlumberger hands home? Who convinced them that the tests were successful? Not Halliburton.
    I hear of heated debate occuring on the rig for 40 mins concerning the outcome of tests. We should have contacted ALL the onshore authorities, so that, one man's test could be scrutinised onshore by independent parties. Then a good decision can be made. And, who cares if it takes an extra 6 hours to get a decision. We're supposed to be waiting on cement.

    When the time came to displace, and SW was displaced down the pipe and up the Annulus to the top of the BOP, Annular Closed. Who made this ridiculous decision? Town? Who interpreted it and carried on? The well was not secure. With the Annular closed DP pressure read 1400 psi. Wake up Co Man! Your well is already telling you you've taken the beginnings of a kick, and it's now most likely above the BOP. The pressure, if you care to work it out should have read 1000 psi in the case of a dead well.
    Who gave the order to open the Annular and continue circulating. Why was the Driller not presented with expected pressures with the well shut in after this initial displacement?
    Someone ordered them to open the Annular, and to continue displacing the Riser to SW......while backloading to boats.
    Who was it? And who didn't stand up to him and point out that pressures were wrong.
    You need people in positions of Authority to seek input/counsel from all walks of life. It's a very sad outcome to this well and to too many others. The industry needs to change. I believe BP have that change, but I'm not sure it's filtered through to AMOCO.
    There's a 'Cowboy' attitude in the industry which has to be ousted.
    We need regulation, and we need counsel. We don't need micro-management, but we do need to form good reasons for pursuing one procedure rather than another, and that often requires many minds working together.
    All blowouts are preventable.
    I'm going to tell you a story, a very real story that occured on a job I was on around 2003. It was a job for none other than BP out at grand Isle 41. I forget the name of the rig, but they had just rebuilt it because of a blowout & fire. I believe they had one or two guys seriously hurt or killed in the accident.
    Anyway, my company was running the first completion after getting the rig out of the yard. Well, BP thinking they were going to be safer, adopted a policy that no matter what they were doing, they were shutting the work down completely & have safety meetings with both crews for one hour during shift change. I percieved this would be a problem when it came time to perform the job I had to perform. We were fracing w/ 150,000 lbs. of frac gravel in linear gel w/ 9 ppg carrier fluid through the job . We had 17.2 ppg zinc bromide on the annulus of the pipe which was our kill weight fluid & my tools were the isolating device and we had a gravel packer & screen we were fracing around. Knowing once we finished pumping frac sand we would have to reverse out ASAP which is absolutely standard procedure on all gravel pack jobs, I saw the company's adament stance on the safety meetings & so I quietly went & talked to the company man & told him once we start pumping gravel & once we get a sand out we weren't going to be able to shut down reversing out. He asked what my point was & I explained that we needed to arrange the frac job while everyone was on tower or continue reversing & the guys on duty would have to stay at their positions if the time ran long. He told me in no uncertain terms that they would shut down for a safety meeing no matter what they were doing.
    So we start the job after rigging up. THE BP ENGINEER ON THE FRAC BOAT orders the job to start up after they finally finish redisigning the mini-frac & step rate test. I call the boat & try to get them to shut the job down 3 hours until they get the jsa out of the way & I get grief from the ENGINEER & THE COMPANY MAN about costs & they weren't waiting one minute more. I explained to them that once we started we weren't going to be able to stop.
    They told me I would do whatever THEY said or I would loose my job. I said ok & told them I needed to use the bathroom before we started pumping. I went to my room & got my cell phone & brught it up to the rig floor. We started pumping the sand & got a sand out with about 15,000# of sand in the pipe. I had the driller pick up my tool to isolate the pipe & we started reversing w/ zinc holding about 8000 PSI back pressure at the choke. We had been reversing about 5 minutes when the call came & the company man ordered the driller to shut the pumps down. I looked at the driller & asked him did he want to leave 8000 PSI back pressure on the floor with no baby sitters & 15,000# of frac sand at the bottom of the pipe.
    He said hell no, but he had to follow orders, I told him to keep pumping & I' d take care of his orders.
    I called the PROJECT engineer on my cell phone & explained the situation to him & told him that if we didn't get the sand & light fluid out of the pipe & get Zinc all the way back around that with freshly fraced perfs. & 8000 PSI light in the pipe, if my seals gave way we'd have a kick & if the sand fell back down across my ports in my crossover tool which it was going to, we'd have stuck pipe. In other words we were in practically the same exact position as the crew on board the DWH on 4/20/10. Different tools, different fluids, but same circumstances. I told that engineer if he wanted to chance another blowout & kill everybody on the rig let's just shut down & talk safety for an hour while we walk off & leave a bomb with a lit fuse.
    He said continue pumping by GOD! I said not good enough. call your idiots on the rig & explain to them because they're walking around like the gistapo telling everyone how BP is the greatest thing on earth.
    Well 5 minutes later, the comapny man called the rig floor & told the driller to keep his guys on the floor they were excused from the safety meeting. We finished reversing in good shape & the rest of the job went to a Tee. At the end of the job I brought my tickets in his office for him to sign & he told me he had called my company that morning & told them BP didn't want me on any of their locations ever again. I asked him why & he told me I had a COWBOY mentality & that BP operated under a structured invironment & I better change my attitude if I wanted to work for anybody in this busness in the future.
    I strongly shook his hand & thanked him. Taken off guard he asked why I was thanking him & I said because I'm all about structure dude. But when structure & talking safety becomes more important than practicing safety & peoples lives are put at risk, then I don't care to work in that environment anyway. I told him that rules & guidelines are put in place for a reason. That reason is to protect the people working on board the rig & people like myself were highly trained in our fields to make sure that their operations were carried out safely & if he & his colleagues had any sense they would consider that in their decision making from now on. BTW I ended up on another rig 3 months later working for the same guy W/ BP. He told me he thought about what I said & I had a point just make sure it's a TEAM decision.
    THAT IS WHY I HAVE RAILED AGAINST BPs SYSTEMATIC LACK OF RESPECT. Because I know all about it & how a ship as big as theirs can go on the rocks & why its so hard to turn the rudder to avoid situations like this.
    Edit: The moral of this story is STOP WORK AUTHORITY/ RESPONSIBILITY is everybody's business & it is up to EVERYONE to use it!
    Last edited by company man 1; May 23rd, 2010 at 04:01 AM.
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