Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[alcor]

In bed ? with whom ? MMS chicks might be able to help out with this question.

If you have the contact details of any of the MMS Chicks I'd very much appreciate being charmed!

[Orniphobe]

Does anyone know why the Board or CSPAN is not broadcasting the hearings live, like the Commission? Is it just a technical reason? I'd like to hear for myself what's being said instead of relying on the the media's soundbites and interpretation.

[alcor]

Does anyone know why the Board or CSPAN is not broadcasting the hearings live, like the Commission? Is it just a technical reason? I'd like to hear for myself what's being said instead of relying on the the media's soundbites and interpretation.

Is it possible to even see a transcript of the recent days hearings?
And, what does it say about the open forum investigation which was first envisaged?
Perhaps, Wikileaks will provide the answers!!!!!!!!!

[New Orleans Lady]

Far Offshore, a Rash of Close Calls http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...DDLETopStories
A blowout off the coast of Australia left oil flowing into the Timor Sea for weeks. An out-of-control well in the Gulf of Mexico dislodged a 4,000-pound piece of equipment on the deck of the Lorris Bouzigard drilling rig as workers scurried to safety. A gas leak in the North Sea aboard a production platform came within a rogue spark of a Deepwater Horizon-scale disaster off the coast of Norway.
Data from regulators around the world suggest that after years of improvement, the offshore-drilling industry's safety record declined over the past two years.

[alcor]

Has anyone any record of the displacement plan being published.
I would love to know who the authors of the plan are. Swaco? TO? BP?
Was there a pre-job meeting concerning the Displacement plan?
Did the logger attend?
Was he informed of the Active pits? No, I imagine!

Is the OIM responsible to ensure all planning of these events is checked and agreed by him? Did he insist on volume control while displacing the well? We all know he went to bed, but did he oversee a displacement plan that neglected volume control?

[Earl Boebert]

Marathon have published this report of the Macondo well's failure:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/44774623/M...-Macondo-Study

Be quick to read it as it's only intended for Marathon personnel, apparently!

It highlights all the issues raised in the past, but read the final couple of pages where it comments on a 1000 Bbl influx not being interpreted correctly, and emphasises, responsibility and accountability.
"The Driller is ultimately responsible", it says.

Thanks, fascinating stuff. I must confess I am even less impressed with BOP technology after studying it. I still would like to know the deepest depth at which one of these things was ever activated in a real emergency, as opposed to test runs.

Cheers,

Earl

[alcor]

Earl,
In drilling/well control school, we are taught to close in the well as soon as we see an indication of a 'kick', meaning appox 6 Bbl anomaly and we stop to take a flow check. If flow is confirmed we immediately close the BOP. I've never heard of someone attempting to close the BOP with the well full of hydrocarbons. This well is absolutely unique, in that, no-one noticed the influx volume until the well was blowing up the derrick (after a 1000 Bbl influx).
Normally, a Driller has done well to achieve a 20 Bbl influx with the well shut in. We then take action to circulate the Gas/hydrocarbons from the well while maintaining constant Bottom Hole Pressure....in order to avoid a further influx. Then we weight up mud and continue drilling whilst observing for the next anomaly. I'm not sure if people realise how incredible it is perceived by people in the drilling industry, that 1000 Bbls was taken before any action. I am simply dumbfounded!
As to whether we are able to close in and seal the well with the BOP in similiar circumstances of flow on another vessel.......the answer is I'm not sure. The BOP is supposed to close and seal around the pipe or the BSR is supposed to shear and seal. I don't see why this can't be achieved on a flowing well. And, depth doesn't really matter as it can happen on shallow water vessels or land rigs. The only worry about deepwater wells is the fact that gas doesn't normally break out of solution in OBM until about 600 meters (1900 ft) from surface. This means if the driller hasn't seen a 'gain' in pit volumes earlier then we end up with gas breaking out in the Riser. And this does offer major concern, because the gas is above the BOP and heading to the rig without and surface BOP to control it. However, there is the Diverter which can handle anything up to 500 psi. The problem on the Horizon was they weren't lined up to divert overboard. They were lined up to the Poorbuoy degasser.
But, the question remains unanswered after all this waffle. I don't know the maximum deepwater depth that a well control issue has been encountered, but they have occurred.

[New Orleans Lady]

WHAT DID THE MMS KNOW Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire
The <B>finger-pointing begins in the BP oil spill and some fingers may be pointing at the Minerals Management Service:

“Tim Probert, Halliburton’s president of global business lines, plans to testify Tuesday that his company had finished an earlier step, cementing the casing, filling in the area between the pipe and the walls of the well; pressure tests showed the casing had been properly constructed, he will testify.

</B>
At this point it is common practice to pour wet cement down into the pipe. The wet cement, which is heavier than the drilling mud, sinks down through the drilling mud and then hardens into a plug thousands of feet down in the well.
The mud then is removed and displaced by seawater; the hardened cement plug holds back any underground gas.
In this case, a decision was made, shortly before the explosion, to perform the remaining tasks in reverse order, according to the expected Senate testimony of Mr. Probert, the Halliburton executive.
“We understand that the drilling contractor then proceeded to displace the riser with seawater prior to the planned placement of the final cement plug…,” Mr. Probert says in the prepared testimony, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The “riser” is part of the pipe running from the sea floor up to the drilling rig at the surface.
Lloyd Heinze, chairman of the petroleum engineering department at Texas Tech University, agrees that this is an unusual approach. “Normally, you would not evacuate the riser until you were done with the last plug at the sea floor,” he said in an ...... http://patterico.com/2010/05/11/what-did-mms-know/

A worker who was on the drilling rig said in an interview that Halliburton was getting ready to set a final cement plug at 8,000 feet below the rig when workers received other instructions. “Usually we set the cement plug at that point and let it set for six hours, then displace the well,” said the worker, meaning take out the mud.
According to this worker, BP asked permission from the federal Minerals Management Service to displace the mud before the final plugging operation had begun. The mud in the well weighed 14.3 pounds per gallon; it was displaced by seawater that weighed nearly 50% less. Like BP, the MMS declined to comment on this account.
As the heavy mud was taken out and replaced with much lighter seawater, “that’s when the well came at us, basically,” said the worker, who was involved in the cementing process. why was this risk taken? Who would know the outcome? How would they benefit? profit from selling their BP Stocks?? WHO AT BP GAVE THESE ORDERS???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????

[alcor]

Did they plan to underbalance the well by displacing the mud with SW? No, they didn't. Therefore, they never planned to allow hydrocarbons to enter the well during the displacement procedure. They planned for a heavy Spacer to be pumped into a position in the well whereby the well never became under-balanced during this process. The first possibility to become underbalanced was during the negative test. It includes bleeding off surface pressure in stages.
The opportunity to bleed off in a controlled manner in order to check whether or not the cement and hydrocarbon zone was isolated was not performed correctly, and the interpretations of the tests were incorrect. This is when the well became under-balanced, and it should have been performed in a controlled way where volumes back and pressures should be monitored.
If this procedure had been performed correctly, this method of testing the barriers is considered good engineering practice. Do you disagree? Personally, I feel it's a good idea to test the barrier. CBL may show cement is present and no more than that. It doesn't indicate whether or not a seal has been established.
So, let's say we perform the negative test and it fails, do we get a blowout? No. We recognise that hydrocarbons have entered the wellbore, and we take action to correct the situation, either by bullheading the hydrocarbons into the formation or other well control procedures to strip the pipe to bottom and circulate the hydrocarbons from the well in a controlled manner, just like other wells worldwide which have been successfully restored to production requirements. Remedial action would then be taken to ensure a cement barrier successfully isolated the hydrocarbon zone.
But, everything depends on successful interpretation of the Negative Test.
We can't afford for people to fail on this test. But, as long as all know what's going on I don't see any reason not to conduct this test in the same way. I may learn something in the future to change my mind, but my position still remains the same; get competent people to examine the test results.

I'm pretty sure BP didn't decide to take a negative test on the insistance of the OIM. He would have realised that the continued displacement would depend on the outcome of the test. He went to bed, and was not concerned. I'd still like to know the position of the most senior person on the vessel, the OIM.

The fact that it took over 5 hours to figure out how to perform and verify that the test passed is indicative of very poor understanding by all on the vessel. This job should have been performed in one hour. Suddenly, the ongoing celebrations in the accommodation have to be questioned. Both BP and TO failed to assess what had occurred, and from then on the well was in the hands of TO. Would their training of always monitoring volumes prevail, and save the vessel by recognising volume anomalies. No, they failed.

[New Orleans Lady]

Father's Mission: Finding Why Son Died in BP Blast http://www.aolnews.com/nation/articl...osion/19755525

[New Orleans Lady]

Thanks for the explanation, Alcor,,,I learn something, everytime you post!! {did I say that?}

[tengineer]

Did they plan to underbalance the well by displacing the mud with SW? No, they didn't. Therefore, they never planned to allow hydrocarbons to enter the well during the displacement procedure. They planned for a heavy Spacer to be pumped into a position in the well whereby the well never became under-balanced during this process. The first possibility to become underbalanced was during the negative test. It includes bleeding off surface pressure in stages.
The opportunity to bleed off in a controlled manner in order to check whether or not the cement and hydrocarbon zone was isolated was not performed correctly, and the interpretations of the tests were incorrect. This is when the well became under-balanced, and it should have been performed in a controlled way where volumes back and pressures should be monitored.
If this procedure had been performed correctly, this method of testing the barriers is considered good engineering practice. Do you disagree? Personally, I feel it's a good idea to test the barrier. CBL may show cement is present and no more than that. It doesn't indicate whether or not a seal has been established.
So, let's say we perform the negative test and it fails, do we get a blowout? No. We recognise that hydrocarbons have entered the wellbore, and we take action to correct the situation, either by bullheading the hydrocarbons into the formation or other well control procedures to strip the pipe to bottom and circulate the hydrocarbons from the well in a controlled manner, just like other wells worldwide which have been successfully restored to production requirements. Remedial action would then be taken to ensure a cement barrier successfully isolated the hydrocarbon zone.
But, everything depends on successful interpretation of the Negative Test.
We can't afford for people to fail on this test. But, as long as all know what's going on I don't see any reason not to conduct this test in the same way. I may learn something in the future to change my mind, but my position still remains the same; get competent people to examine the test results.

I'm pretty sure BP didn't decide to take a negative test on the insistance of the OIM. He would have realised that the continued displacement would depend on the outcome of the test. He went to bed, and was not concerned. I'd still like to know the position of the most senior person on the vessel, the OIM.

The fact that it took over 5 hours to figure out how to perform and verify that the test passed is indicative of very poor understanding by all on the vessel. This job should have been performed in one hour. Suddenly, the ongoing celebrations in the accommodation have to be questioned. Both BP and TO failed to assess what had occurred, and from then on the well was in the hands of TO. Would their training of always monitoring volumes prevail, and save the vessel by recognising volume anomalies. No, they failed.

Alcor
Surely you know that many OIMs know little about drilling. This is especially true on many drillships where the captain is the OIM. These captains have no business being an offshore installation manager making technical drilling decisions and in actual practice they don't for good reason. However, they are still the senior responsible person on the rig/drillship. I have seen no OIM/captain who I would want making decisions on the drill floor yet the drilling companies and their clients continue to condone this, MMS in the USA seemed to think it's OK too for many years but then they only think what the drilling companies and their clients tell them to think. All you need to be an OIM is to participate in a few rig moves [or have someone sign a paper saying you did], attend a brief school that no one fails and you can be an OIM even though all you have done prior to this was navigate a vessel or in some cases be a DP operator, none of which has anything to do with making daily decisions in the highly technical profession of drilling for oil in the bottom of the ocean. It's corporate structure that would not be tolerated in any other industry.

[alcor]

I may be wrong in this but I believe the OIM on this vessel ordered the drill crew to increase the closing pressure on the Annular in order to seal the Spacer above the BOP.......which had been leaking. He had understanding which makes me assume he came from a drilling background. God knows what made him walk away thereafter! More pressing business or a lack of fundamental control. When things go wrong don't walk away, and if there's an outstanding issue on a negative test that takes more than 5 hours to resolve you need to be supporting the crew on the DF and not going to bed or attending self-congratulatory meetings: "How great am I" crap!
Additionally, if you're the OIM on the rig it doesn't mean you know all details of electrical, technical or drilling expertise. It does mean you must know the Emergency procedures. The analogy can be used as an example with Heyward. He doesn't know what's taking place on 200 wells being developed around the world. He knows they all have to operate according to the offshore industry standards, as per contract, whereby the contractors are responsible for the operation. And, they are led by the OIM. So, he better know what he's doing if he has the responsibility of the vessel in his hands.
And, he attends meetings each and every day. If he walks out of those meetings not understanding risk or operation the he's a fool.

[alcor]

lOOKS LIKE THE BATTLE HAS JUST STARTED, AND THERE'S ONLY GOING TO BE ONE WINNER!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12005240

[New Orleans Lady]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/fr...00/8751392.stm
Rig survivor: 'It was a crematorium'

[New Orleans Lady]

No one wins,,,,not a single person,,,company, country,,,,,because,,,nothing can be equated, to the death of those 11 men, and the grief bestowed on their families, who have the rest of their lives, to live the pain , of their loss.

lOOKS LIKE THE BATTLE HAS JUST STARTED, AND THERE'S ONLY GOING TO BE ONE WINNER!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12005240

I know you feel, the same way Alcor,,,just had to vent,,,my friend.

[rob]

Let's not forget that the OIM also relies on other individuals such as the Senior Toolpusher, Toolpushers, and Drillers to do the right thing. The Senior pusher was a highly experienced individual, as were the executives from Transocean who were on board at the time. It comes down to being able to trust the people you work with to act in the correct manner when given a set of challenges. Obviously training and preparation play a big part in this, and those areas are certainly being scrutinized at the moment, but it would not have been appropriate for an Operations Manager or even an OIM to jump into the finer details of what's happening on the rig floor, unless specifically asked to do so. If the Toolpusher or Driller had asked for additional help or guidance, then yes, but from all accounts, the guys on the Floor thought they had control of the situation up until the final phone call was made to the Senior Toolpusher.

And considering the Horizon was the top-performing rig in the Gulf, there was little reason to second guess or micromanage the drilling department if they said that they had the situation under control.

Just my two cents...

[Jones Act]

....Obviously training and preparation play a big part in this....

They had no procedures for performing a negative test and TO did not disseminate information that there was an operational change in the North Sea Division of TO, effective April 5th in the North Sea only, that should have altered the method the DWH did things on the 20th. This change, as you know, was suppose to be made to the entire Well Control Handbook in the next revision cycle.

I raise just these two points to demonstrate that TO did not train and did not prepare the DWH drilling crew on all it should have. For sure, from all I have come to learn, the DWH was the best cew in the GoM but no one is perfect and when TO, BP or anyone else asks them to perform a task, that crew should be given every bit of information possible to perform it in the least dangerous manner.

[New Orleans Lady]

Minerals Management Service rebuffed Congress on BP Atlantis and offshore drilling concerns before Gulf oil blowout http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2...f-oil-blowout/

[New Orleans Lady]

There are lessons to be learned, from the following story,,,for the MMS From THe TSA,,,See if you can guess, some of them: http://www.gowafb.com/autojuice?targ...3fS%3d13726005 Actually,,,the Dpt. of Interier could learn something,,,