Home so going to watch, thanks for the link Blisters, while I’m at it: what the hell happened to the Coast Guard? These people use to be the most honest and honorable people I came in contact with, regulatory and rescue. Now we have a pin head at the hearings telling the crew of the DWH that they had to stay on site 36 hours and watch their rig burn because the boat they were on was necessary to search for the 11 missing, such arrogance of the CG to say there were no assets they could have sent out there to get those boys into port, had to stay there and be debriefed by them and watch their rig burn because it was the CG, what a bold face lie to cover-up a big mistake and insulting to the crew members who told that excuse by the little CG pin head. I see the pin-head isn’t in charge of the hearings today, GOOD, but it still doesn’t answer the question of what’s happened to the CG that someone like him could ever gotten to a position of responsibility.
probably not i think they had to take the hurt to another rig to get a chopper
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/...k/7164227.html armed and dangerous;Expect them to seek jail time;violations to be directed at even top corporate officers;whether bribes were paid to regulators
kwCharlie (August 23rd, 2010)
Key issue that came out today: Transocean was NOT compliant with Federal BOP testing requirements.
Other thing that surprised me: Paul Johnson, Transocean's Rig Manager, was not called until the rig was on fire. So, unlikely there had been a major disagreement on the rig about the pressure testing results and/or displacement procedures; if there had been he would most likely have been called.
Have up to now only heard half of Johnson's testimony.
Notice how the quickest answer he gave was the big no to if the BOP had been modified?
How about the 2 page alert from the North Sea!!! Had Transocean properly disseminated this alert about a Dec 2009 well control incident in the NSea then the incident would most likely not have happened (at least folks would have been more alert during the displacement).
Also thought Johnson lacked class saying he had no clue abouth the well design, etc., and was not copied on BP's morning reports. He just did not want to get involved; that's the issue. He went daily to BP's office and was present during their morning call with the rig and all subcontractors and should have gotten a bit more involved.
The BP lawyer was also a clown; how can you hire and be represented by such a person?! The last lawyer was much better getting the point across about Transocean's alert...
Wow; it is transparent now that Transocean has a major issue.
kwCharlie (August 24th, 2010)
Steve Gordon who represents Doug Brown is just brilliant!!!
Brilliant or just another educated gCaptain reader? I say both but you decide:
North Sea Blowout
Glomar Java Sea
gCaptain Member Profile: Jones Act
New Orleans Lady (August 24th, 2010)
New Orleans Lady (August 24th, 2010)
He also tried to show that Transocean has grown too quickly with too many mergers: this has caused problems getting procedures, cultures, etc. to 'gel'.
The other thing that he showed was that Transocean's person-in-charge procedure made no sense during the quick major well control incident.
cmjeff (August 24th, 2010), New Orleans Lady (August 24th, 2010)
This Judge, is ver disruptive!!!
Any thoughts ? Seems taking the 5th , would elicet one to be a "guilty party"
Big issue for Morel: this way he can not dispute any of the statements made about him or are still going to be made (i.e. let's hear what Gagliano (Halliburton) has to tell us about the warnings he gave Morel.
One thing about this morning: Winslow said he did not think that the VIP visit caused any issues but everyone offshore knows that VIP visits are disruptive and was probably a contributing factor since there is less focus on the well. Sounds also like Transocean (and all other Drilling Contractors) need to tell their onshore supervisors not to take control when they are offshore during an emergency.....; they need to ensure that they have better qualified folks out there (especially Masters!!!!!).
New Orleans Lady (August 24th, 2010)
Biggest news is that the investigation Board has discovered that 80bbls were lost during the cement job (and only circa 55bbls of cement were pumped!!); so a CBL should have been run! But the rig somehow did not see/report that 80bbls were lost and reported no losses!
Other thing was that the most important issue about this cement job (gas flow potential) was only stated on page 18 with a figure on page 23 in Halliburton's Optisim Report. The report also did not have an Executive Summary highlighting this risk. This risk should have been incorported in the CBL flow chart and should have been a CBL decider (i.e. if less tan 22 centralizers are run then a CBL must be run).
New Orleans Lady (August 24th, 2010)
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