Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[company man 1]

We don't know that the Seal Assy was correctly positioned. We don't know that the flow was coming from the Annulus. It may be that it's coming from the main bore. These are the questions facing the crew at that time. Hindsight, on our part is a luxury. All they know is that they have a leak. Space out the TJ and Close the Rams. Prepare for Shear. Read pressures on the Choke, and assess where the gas is coming from. If it's the Annulus, see if we can establish bullheading flow. If not, the dilemma develops. What next, and next, and next. We have control of our vessel and all hands are secure. It may have been possible to allow the gas to migrate. After all, there's a weak zone which will break down first and possibly stop any further influx by maintaining BHP. It depends on the volume of gas that came into the well.
It may be that as pressure builds up we are able to bleed off small amounts to allow the gas bubble to increase in size thus reducing the impact when it sits under the WH/BOP.
There's always action we can take.
If for some reason, the volume allowed in is too great we better get that BOP closed asap. And Shear. We're still safe, and the vessel is too.
Remember, DWH isn't the only vessel that's had to deal with gas entering the well. You get a kick and you form a plan to fight it. And, that action is understood by all crews. It doesn't require hindsight.

Using the benefit of hindsight I am telling you that no matter what they did on surface it doesn't matter & until you admit that, then you're being ignorant by choice. The fact is they could not lubricate & bleed & they could not use the driller's method of relief because every time they pumped up on the seal assembly from the top it would set back down in the bore & you know that. The rest is symantics & you know that. So quit it. If you are nearly the smart guy you say you are you know where the well was flowing from & any other crap you come up with is just reaching for the moon & you know that too.

[pumpjack hand]

Read my previous two posts & explain to me how, assuming they would have shut in at the very beginning, they could have killed this well. There was simply no way to do it without running in with wireline under pressure & shooting perfs. This would have taken time to get tools & men on location. During this time, the gas migrating up the 9 7/8" would have surely blown out the rupture discs on the 16" & blown out of the 16" & this well would be flowing out of control without a wellhead on it.
Edit: No matter how you slice it & dice it, it all comes back to cause. The cause of this accident was in changing from a tieback system to a tapered string after running rupture discs in the 16" casings & not cementing to the shoe of the 18" to isolate that. The other mechanisms BP chose to ignore led to a blowout one way or the other. I have been trying to explain this for weeks, but now I feel my words are hitting home.

If you are saying they didn’t have the tools to avert dying on the drill floor under worse case scenario, then I say they shouldn’t go to the drill floor until you give them the tools. These wells are only going to get more difficult. Let them know they have the tools.

[alcor]

Read my previous two posts & explain to me how, assuming they would have shut in at the very beginning, they could have killed this well. There was simply no way to do it without running in with wireline under pressure & shooting perfs. This would have taken time to get tools & men on location. During this time, the gas migrating up the 9 7/8" would have surely blown out the rupture discs on the 16" & blown out of the 16" & this well would be flowing out of control without a wellhead on it.
Edit: No matter how you slice it & dice it, it all comes back to cause. The cause of this accident was in changing from a tieback system to a tapered string after running rupture discs in the 16" casings & not cementing to the shoe of the 18" to isolate that. The other mechanisms BP chose to ignore led to a blowout one way or the other. I have been trying to explain this for weeks, but now I feel my words are hitting home.

The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We'd need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don't want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you've pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there's a will there's a way.

There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.

[company man 1]

If you are saying they didn’t have the tools to avert dying on the drill floor under worse case scenario, then I say they shouldn’t go to the drill floor until you give them the tools. These wells are only going to get more difficult. Let them know they have the tools.

Once this well was drilled to TD & the decision made to run casing the tools were a proper casing design & a proper cement job followed by a CBL run to confirm. I guarantee you they would have eventually run a CBL no matter what. I guarantee you the rig costs on that CBL run wouldn't have been free. I guarantee you it would have been against another AFE for completion instead of drilling. Just think this all may have occured because someone was worried about an AFE.

[company man 1]

The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We'd need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don't want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you've pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there's a will there's a way.
There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.

I am glad to know you understand well control basics. That does not change anything. This well started coming in when gas started migrating & changing places with the mud. As they would have allowed the bubble to expand more gas influx would have taken its place & you would have the same conditions that caused the occurance. I wish they would have caught it sooner & I wish they would have at least bought themselves more time, then we may not have been having these fun times over the last several weeks. But whether you admit it or not, This well was going to blow out once the gas started migrating up the hole. From the blowout Kasol showed the video of I believe this one would have been several times wors & possibly could have capsized the whole rig & killed everyone. Whether it happened at 21:50 or 0200 the next morning it was coming & I think deep down you realize that now. You can driticize the crew all you want for not running the game plan, but a hail mary at that point when you're already down by 3 touchdowns just doesn't get it.

[company man 1]

The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We'd need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don't want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you've pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there's a will there's a way.

There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.

When you have a flow path to pump. Have you never been on a job with a sand up & tried to pump in the well & couldn't but the well could flow all day long back at you? We know the casing seal assembly was tested & that was done right. There is now way they could have done that if the casing seal wasn't seated.

[alcor]

For those of you who don't know how to perform a negative test on the Seal Assy here's some relevant information:
We have 14 ppg mud in the well.
We run our drillpipe to 8300 ft.
We close our BOP.
We have SW in the Choke line.
We line up to Halliburton Cement unit down the Choke.
We equalise pressure by applying the difference in Hp of SW and 14 PPG mud to 5000 ft, which is 1404 psi.
Halliburton is reading 1404 psi on his guages.
We open the Choke line Failsafe valve.
No increase will be seen.
We bleed off 250 psi every 5 mins and observe for an increase in pressure.
If, at any point a pressure increase is seen, we have a leak.
We immediately re-establish full control of the well by getting Hallib to pump up to 1404 psi.
We know we have a leak.
BP's problem.
How much gas did we allow to enter the Wellbore. The same volume the cementer bled off to go from one 250 psi interval to the next, a small amount, no more than a quarter Bbl. This may migrate.
We have established there is a leak somewhere in the well.
We don't have a crystal ball. We don't know where the leak is. But, we have re-established full control of the well, despite any irregularities that may exist in the well, despite any componenets that may have been what some consider to have been run 'on the cheap'.
The point is that we, TO, have full control of the well and the vessel is safe.

From this point on, if we're being badgered into taking other action then we are fools to even consider it.
No. Fullstop.

This well would never have blown out if the correct procedure for conducting a negative test had been in place.
Does anyone know what TO's published procedure for negative testing is?

[company man 1]

For those of you who don't know how to perform a negative test on the Seal Assy here's some relevant information:
We have 14 ppg mud in the well.
We run our drillpipe to 8300 ft.
We close our BOP.
We have SW in the Choke line.
We line up to Halliburton Cement unit down the Choke.
We equalise pressure by applying the difference in Hp of SW and 14 PPG mud to 5000 ft, which is 1404 psi.
Halliburton is reading 1404 psi on his guages.
We open the Choke line Failsafe valve.
No increase will be seen.
We bleed off 250 psi every 5 mins and observe for an increase in pressure.
If, at any point a pressure increase is seen, we have a leak.
We immediately re-establish full control of the well by getting Hallib to pump up to 1404 psi.
We know we have a leak.
BP's problem.
How much gas did we allow to enter the Wellbore. The same volume the cementer bled off to go from one 250 psi interval to the next, a small amount, no more than a quarter Bbl. This may migrate.
We have established there is a leak somewhere in the well.
We don't have a crystal ball. We don't know where the leak is. But, we have re-established full control of the well, despite any irregularities that may exist in the well, despite any componenets that may have been what some consider to have been run 'on the cheap'.
The point is that we, TO, have full control of the well and the vessel is safe.

From this point on, if we're being badgered into taking other action then we are fools to even consider it.
No. Fullstop.

From this point the gas continues to migrate up the hole into the annulus. It eventually goes beyond the rupture disc pressure in the 16" It ruptures the disc between the 16" & the 18" casing shoe. It contiues to gather & increase pressure until it reaches 13,000 PSI & blows out from below the shoe uncontrolably until reaching the surface. It creates an enormous bubble so big it capsizes the rig & the stand by boat. all on board are thrown no telling where. The well now flows uncontrolably into the Gulf of mexico at God only knows what rate & very few if any people survive the capsizing of the vessel. That is a very likely scenario & you know it. Does anybody have that video of Kasol's to repost?

[alcor]

The duty of the driller and logger is to observe and control volumes in the well. If this is not done then we may as well quit drilling. Volume and pressure are everything in our business.
If some idiot tells you to carry on regardless of your concerns, quit. And, contact MMS straight away if your company don't back you up.
Does this mean we need drillers who can interpret what volume gain and pressure gain means?
You bet your sweet ass we do.

All operations are controlled.

[alcor]

From this point the gas continues to migrate up the hole into the annulus. It eventually goes beyond the rupture disc pressure in the 16" It ruptures the disc between the 16" & the 18" casing shoe. It contiues to gather & increase pressure until it reaches 13,000 PSI & blows out from below the shoe uncontrolably until reaching the surface. It creates an enormous bubble so big it capsizes the rig & the stand by boat. all on board are thrown no telling where. The well now flows uncontrolably into the Gulf of mexico at God only knows what rate & very few if any people survive the capsizing of the vessel. That is a very likely scenario & you know it. Does anybody have that video of Kasol's to repost?

Incorrect. Our 1/4 Bbl of gas has to be allowed to expand. We monitor the SICP on the Choke guage and bleed off as required at surface to ensure the WH integrity is not compromised. Our weak zone may help if the volumes are small, in that the bubble will expand on its own. The casing will not be ejected from the well. The Rams are closed, and pressure above and below the Seal Assy/Hanger are the same if a leak exists.

[company man 1]

The duty of the driller and logger is to observe and control volumes in the well. If this is not done then we may as well quit drilling. Volume and pressure are everything in our business.
If some idiot tells you to carry on regardless of your concerns, quit. And, contact MMS straight away if your company don't back you up.
Does this mean we need drillers who can interpret what volume gain and pressure gain means?
You bet your sweet ass we do.

All operations are controlled.

I won't argue this point with you again since you haven't even attempted to tell me I'm wrong. You, as well as Pumping Jack as well as Alf as well as Kasol and any others who have first hand experience on a rig all know that the way I explained it is the way it was going to happen. There was no choice. This well was either going to blow inside or outside of the 16" casing when the gas started migrating. The underbalance didn't cause the migration. It just revealed it. The cause wasn't well control failure during displacement, although I certainly agree with you that it didn't help. The cause was putting nitrous oxide on 1500 horse power car without any breaks then telling the driver to put the pedal to the metal because it was all ok. In this case was the driver wrong for not checking the breaks first? You have that point, but it didn't matter because he got in the middle of the track with cars going around him at over 200 miles an hour & it was either drive or get run over. But either way he was going to crash. Those choices were made days before this blowout occured.

[company man 1]

Incorrect. Our 1/4 Bbl of gas has to be allowed to expand. We monitor the SICP on the Choke guage and bleed off as required at surface to ensure the WH integrity is not compromised. Our weak zone may help if the volumes are small, in that the bubble will expand on its own. The casing will not be ejected from the well. The Rams are closed, and pressure above and below the Seal Assy/Hanger are the same if a leak exists.

Keep trying.

[alcor]

I won't argue this point with you again since you haven't even attempted to tell me I'm wrong. You, as well as Pumping Jack as well as Alf as well as Kasol as well as Kasol and any others who have first hand experience on a rig all know that the way I explained it is the way it was going to happen. There was no choice. This well was either going to blow inside or outside of the 16" casing when the gas started migrating. The underbalance didn't cause the migration. It just revealed it. The cause wasn't well control failure during displacement, although I certainly agree with you that it didn't help. The cause was putting nitrous oxide on 1500 horse power car without any breaks. Those choices were made days before this blowout occured.

We'll have to see what the volumes were during the cement job to verify your migration statement. And, what the well volumes were for the 18 hours after the cement job. Did TO report any volume increase? No. Then we have to accept that no gas was in the well until displacement of SW took place. Show me evidence to back up your statement, that migration was already occurring. If you have it and TO aren't aware of it then TO are in bigger trouble than originally suspected. I don't believe there was any migration. I believe, movement of hydrocarbons from the Reservoir into the well occurred when the well went underbalance, when the SW displaced the 14 ppg mud.

[alcor]

I won't argue this point with you again since you haven't even attempted to tell me I'm wrong. You, as well as Pumping Jack as well as Alf as well as Kasol and any others who have first hand experience on a rig all know that the way I explained it is the way it was going to happen. There was no choice. This well was either going to blow inside or outside of the 16" casing when the gas started migrating. The underbalance didn't cause the migration. It just revealed it. The cause wasn't well control failure during displacement, although I certainly agree with you that it didn't help. The cause was putting nitrous oxide on 1500 horse power car without any breaks. Those choices were made days before this blowout occured.

If the bubble is left to migrate and the volumes back as it migrates are ignored there's a good chance that the casing Hanger would have blown out.
Now, you answer my question:
Who is responsible for volumes and pressure observation on the rig?

I won't tell you you're wrong because I don't want this to flare up. I want to explore what's happened. I want to keep it clean. If I'm wrong then tell me.

[company man 1]

We'll have to see what the volumes were during the cement job to verify your migration statement. And, what the well volumes were for the 18 hours after the cement job. Did TO report any volume increase? No. Then we have to accept that no gas was in the well until displacement of SW took place. Show me evidence to back up your statement, that migration was already occurring. If you have it and TO aren't aware of it then TO are in bigger trouble than originally suspected. I don't believe there was any migration. I believe, movement of hydrocarbons from the Reservoir into the well occurred when the well went underbalance, when the SW displaced the 14 ppg mud.

The well was sealed once they bumped the plug & released from the hanger. There was no way to detect migration until they negative tested. The migration was obviously there. That was a clear indicator the cement hadn't held & that gas was swapping out with the mud. At that point its game over because you don't have isolation between the 9 7/8" & the 16". Since you don't have isolation & the 16" is booby trapped with rupture discs that are rigged soewhere below rated burt pressure, once they go, then its onto the 18" & the uncemented section at 3800' below the mud line. Once pressure gets high enough it blows out around the whole well head & comes in like the blowout video Kasol showed only a whole lot harder than that. Do you deny this could happen?

[company man 1]

The well was sealed once they bumped the plug & released from the hanger. There was no way to detect migration until they negative tested. The migration was obviously there. That was a clear indicator the cement hadn't held & that gas was swapping out with the mud. At that point its game over because you don't have isolation between the 9 7/8" & the 16". Since you don't have isolation & the 16" is booby trapped with rupture discs that are rigged soewhere below rated burt pressure, once they go, then its onto the 18" & the uncemented section at 3800' below the mud line. Once pressure gets high enough it blows out around the whole well head & comes in like the blowout video Kasol showed only a whole lot harder than that. Do you deny this could happen?

How many times do you need to me to tell you you were right about the mistakes of the crew & the company man? Now you may at least admit that I can be right about the other outcomes no matter what they did. BTW, you might want to hit your little knees tonight & pray that some bastard/bastards on a beach don't do the same thing to you without you even knowing it.

[alcor]

The well was sealed once they bumped the plug & released from the hanger. There was no way to detect migration until they negative tested. The migration was obviously there. That was a clear indicator the cement hadn't held & that gas was swapping out with the mud. At that point its game over because you don't have isolation between the 9 7/8" & the 16". Since you don't have isolation & the 16" is booby trapped with rupture discs that are rigged soewhere below rated burt pressure, once they go, then its onto the 18" & the uncemented section at 3800' below the mud line. Once pressure gets high enough it blows out around the whole well head & comes in like the blowout video Kasol showed only a whole lot harder than that. Do you deny this could happen?

How much gas was in the Annulus?

[OldHondoHand]

If the bubble is left to migrate and the volumes back as it migrates are ignored there's a good chance that the casing Hanger would have blown out.
Now, you answer my question:
Who is responsible for volumes and pressure observation on the rig?

I won't tell you you're wrong because I don't want this to flare up. I want to explore what's happened. I want to keep it clean. If I'm wrong then tell me.

One thing you conveniently forget, Alcor, was that the pitbull Vidrine and his Houston handlers had already browbeaten some of the crew into submission. In my humble opinion. BP was dictitorial on this rig, and nobody dared to cross him/them. So interpretations and objections and reconsiderations and concerns for safe operations were completely subsumed to The BP Wrecking Crew. That's why I doubt you are a real floor hand. You obviously know the textbook stuff about well control, but you give absolutely no considerations to REAL WORLD working environments. You're a suit, Dude, and the quicker you admit it, the better your words will make sense. But for now, anybody who has worked for tyrants knows how far they can push it before they are put on the next boat back to the beach.

[company man 1]

How much gas was in the Annulus?

Enough to blow the rig to kingdom come. The better question is where did it come from & why was it allowed to leave there?

[alcor]

How many times do you need to me to tell you you were right about the mistakes of the crew & the company man? Now you may at least admit that I can be right about the other outcomes no matter what they did. BTW, you might want to hit your little knees tonight & pray that some bastard/bastards on a beach don't do the same thing to you without you even knowing it.

I've woken up to the rig shaking! There's danger in this line of work. Fortunately, I get a handover with both drillers on the rig and we debate what can go wrong. I would never suggest we have operated 100% correctly and on occasion have lined up Choke Manifold incorrectly. We now have new procedures in place which means that if you open a valve anywhere on the Choke or standpipe manifolds we confirm the line-up with pressure of 150 psi. I'm not complacent and realise things can get hairy. That's where we need all parties on the rig working together. But, there are one or two drillers you have to keep an eye on.