Our friends at Telstar Logistics, with a tip from gCaptain member DH, bring us mega ships, planes and photos in their recent post A Very Big Airplane Helps a Very Big Cruise Ship Get a Very Big Engine Change. They write:

The cruise ship Carnival Spendor just entered the big drydock in San Francisco, where she will undergo major repairs — including an engine replacement. Ouch!

Remember the Carnival Splendor? That’s the infamous ship that spent four days adrift last November after an onboard fire disabled her propulsion 200 miles south of San Diego. With 3299 passengers and 1167 crew trapped aboard, the US Navy diverted the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan to provision the stricken ship with food and supplies. (Fresh shrimp cocktails for the buffet? Delivered by the Gipper??)

All kidding aside, it was a bad scene.

But now it’s time to make the ship new again. It will cost $56 million and take 4 to 6 weeks, but in the end the Carnival Splendor will get a new diesel engine and two alternators. The new motor arrived via a gigantic Antonov An-124 that landed on Saturday at San Francisco International Airport.

Click HERE to continue reading and for a link to the photos.

Photo credit: flickr user AGrinberg

In August 2009, Fleet Management agreed to pay a $10 million criminal penalty after pleading guilty to federal charges of water pollution and falsifying documents.

More on this story at the San Francisco Chronicle

San Francisco’s 2010 Fleet Week kicked off today with the Blue Angels performing “Circle & Arrival” maneuvers over the entire Bay.  Not many people were out, so it was a good chance to catch what seemed like a private show on a beautiful San Francisco day.  We caught this shot above near Crissy Field.  They must have passed 50 times in the course of two hours, and I can still hear them circling above as we speak.  What we were really waiting for was the USS Makin Island to transit underneath the Golden Gate, but couldn’t figure out if we were too late, or too early.  There were a a few USCG cutters out, along with a nice fire boat and various fast rescue boats.

For those of you that are going to be in or around the Bay Area, their are events going on all weekend long.  Try to make it out tomorrow if you can.  You’ll get the full show without the crowds.

For a full calendar of events, CLICK HERE and be sure to continue after the jump for a few more shots from today.

Earlier today, the National Transportation Safety Board released its final report on the allision of the M/V Cosco Busan with the Delta Tower of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge on November 7, 2007, resulting in the release of 53,500 gallons of fuel oil into San Francisco Bay.

The final report reflected sentiments expressed at the NTSB’s hearing on the accident in February as well as opinions reflected here on gCaptain.  This included determination of probable cause, in which the Safety Board cited three factors:

1. the pilot’s degraded cognitive performance from his use of impairing prescription medications;
2. the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure master/pilot exchange and a lack of effective communication between the pilot and the master during the accident voyage, and;
3. the master’s ineffective oversight of the pilot’s performance and the vessel’s progress.

Contributing to the cause of the accident, the Board cited:

1. the failure of Fleet Management Ltd. to adequately train the Cosco Busan crewmembers before the accident voyage, which included a failure to ensure that the crew understood and complied with the company’s safety management system, and
2. the U.S. Coast Guard’s failure to provide adequate medical oversight of the pilot in view of the medical and medication information that the pilot had reported to the Coast Guard

New Recommendations

As a result of the investigation, the Safety Board made the following safety recommendations.

To the U.S. Coast Guard:

1. Propose to the International Maritime Organization that it include a segment on cultural and language differences and their possible influence on mariner performance in its bridge resource management curricula. (M-09-1)
2. Revise your vessel traffic service policies to ensure that vessel traffic service communications identify the vessel, not only the pilot, when vessels operate in pilotage waters. (M-09-2)
3. Provide Coast Guard-wide guidance to vessel traffic service personnel that clearly defines expectations for the use of existing authority to direct or control vessel movement when such action is justified in the interest of safety. (M-09-3)
4. Require mariners to report to the Coast Guard, in a timely manner, any substantive changes in their medical status or medication use that occur between required medical evaluations. (M-09-4) Supersedes M-05-5
5. Establish a mechanism through which representatives of pilot oversight organizations collect and regularly communicate pilot performance data and information regarding pilot oversight and best practices. (M-09-5)

To Fleet Management Ltd.:

1. When assigning a new crew to a vessel, ensure that all crewmembers are thoroughly familiar with vessel operations and company safety procedures before the vessel departs the port. (M-09-6)
2. Provide safety management system manuals that are in the working language of a vessel’s crew. (M-09-7)

To the American Pilots’ Association:

1. Inform your members of the circumstances of this accident, remind them that a pilot card is only a supplement to a verbal master/pilot exchange, and encourage your pilots to include vessel masters and/or the officer in charge of the navigational watch in all discussions and decisions regarding vessel navigation in pilotage waters. (M-09-8)

Previously Issued Recommendations Reclassified in The Report

To the U.S. Coast Guard:

M-05-4
Revise regulation 46 CFR 10.709 to require that the results of all physical examinations be reported to the Coast Guard, and provide guidance to mariners, employers, and mariner medical examiners on the specific actions required to comply with these regulations.

Safety Recommendation M-05-4, previously classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” is reclassified “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action” in the “Coast Guard Medical Oversight of Mariners” section of the report.

M-05-5
In formal consultation with experts in the field of occupational medicine, review your medical oversight process and take actions to address, at a minimum, the lack of tracking of performed examinations; the potential for inconsistent interpretations and evaluations between medical practitioners; deficiencies in the system of storing medical data; the absence of requirements for mariners or others to report changes in medical condition between examinations; and the limited ability of the Coast Guard to review medical evaluations made by personal health care providers.

Safety Recommendation M-05-5, previously classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” is reclassified “Closed—Acceptable Action—Superseded” in the “Coast Guard Medical Oversight of Mariners” section of the report.

Download full report

Image via sfexaminer.com

A massive 328-foot crane arrived in San Francisco Bay last week to start working on the Bay Bridge’s eastern span project.  The crane, called the “Left Coast Lifter“, was built specifically for the Bay Bridge project in Shanghai, China and is the biggest floating crane ever to hit the west coast.  It arrived aboard the MV ZHEN HUA 22 and passed under the Golden Gate bridge en route to Pier 7 in Oakland, where it will be tested before being moved into position at the Bay Bridge.

The crane’s boom is 328 feet long, weighs approximately 992 tons and is capable of lifting over 1,800 tons of materials.  At a height of about 30 stories, the West Coast Lifter will tower 150 feet over the existing bridges roadway.

To read the evidence click HERE.

First revealed on gCaptain’s Professional Mariner Forum (LINK) last week, the news is now official… John Cota, pilot of the Cosco Busan, has plead guilty to charges and faces jail time. The San Francisco Chronicle tells us:

The pilot of the container ship that struck the Bay Bridge in 2007 and spilled 53,000 gallons of fuel oil pleaded guilty today to federal water pollution charges in an agreement that calls for him to serve two to 10 months in prison.

Capt. John Cota, 61, admitted in a San Francisco courtroom that he acted negligently in piloting the 901-foot-long Cosco Busan in a heavy morning fog Nov. 7, 2007. He also admitted failing to disclose all the prescription drugs he was taking when he renewed his federal and state pilot’s licenses in 2006 and 2007.

But his negotiated plea agreement nearly fell apart when a prosecutor read a lengthy account of Cota’s alleged misdeeds and his lawyer protested that it was full of inaccuracies.

“An incompetent, untrained crew and mistakes by the Coast Guard” contributed to the accident, defense attorney Jeffrey Bornstein told U.S. District Judge Susan Illston.

Illston reproached Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Schmidt for “arguing for the grandstand,” but accepted Cota’s guilty plea to misdemeanor charges of violating the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Act. She scheduled sentencing for June 19.

Besides imprisonment, the plea agreement includes a fine of between $3,000 and $30,000. Cota, a vessel pilot for 26 years, has surrendered his license and said in his plea agreement that he would not reapply until January 2010. Read More…

The question remains… What are the implications for the maritime industry?

Read gCaptain’s series topic links:

• John Cota
• Cosco Busan Incident

Bye Bye Buoy

By John Denham

The recent sinking of the “SF” Sea Buoy by possibly a large foreign-flag container ship causes more concern about ship management. In recent published articles we  expressed concern about the size of ships and engines, simulator training and both management policy and ship management. All heralding the virtues  of “the ordinary practice of seamen” i.e., Bridge Resource Management.

The predictions for casualties in 2009 are not encouraging as they indicate more errors caused by humans. January 2009 started with the question: How does a modern container ship operated by a leading maritime shipping company with the latest navigation equipment allide with  a sea buoy located in a separation  zone in a precautionary area? Obviously it takes a lack of team work and coordination. The secret to “making a buoy” successfully is to establish a steady bearing and decreasing range.( Rule 7 (d) (I) sound familiar?)

An examination of a possible scenario might help.  The COSCO BUSAN is used as an excellent example of a typical modern containership in a probable loaded condition, however reportedly the suspect vessel was light loaded and was  52 feet more in LOA.

Photo courtesy COSCO-HANJIN

An observer should note, in the example, the navigation bridge is well aft, the stem is almost 600 feet forward, and as configured, there is approximately 15 rows of boxes, some  5 high in between the bridge and the forward mast. The line of sight from the Navigation Bridge extends the line of sight beyond the bow  by almost three ship lengths i.e., or about 2700 feet or 900 yards. The top of the Pilot House  radar antennae will probably detect a radar return from a lesser distance.

The suspect vessel’s line of sight was significantly better. Without  a fore-deck full of containers and only a slight drag one might see at least one ship length beyond the bow, however the radar reception was probably beyond the visual line of sight.  The “sea buoy” is three miles from the main ship channel entrance buoys #1 and #2; the pilot cruising area is half-way between. It was dark. It is assumed there was no attempt to allide with the navigation buoy and therefore the person(s) directing the navigation were not aware of its location, indicating either a lack of a proper lookout and a failure to maintain a proper navigation plot and an ineffective management of bridge resources( BRM).

The following scenario is possible:
On departing the bar channel between  Buoy#1 and #2 the pilot slowed in order to disembark on the port side on a south westerly heading; putting wind and sea to starboard. The advance and transfer of the maneuver would place the ship about 1.5 miles south west of the channel entrance and about the same distance from the sea buoy that is almost to the west. Bound for Asia on a great circle track and advised  to pass the sea buoy to starboard, the ship apparently headed  for the North Outbound Traffic Lane. Speed was increased to “Full Ahead” and a course direct to the Northern Outbound Lane ordered. Rudder was applied, probably without thought for the significantly large  course change at less than normal sea speed  and the advance and transfer that would head the vessel directly toward the sea buoy. Without  an alert bridge team and lookout the ship allided with the sea buoy, probably without notice. The first awareness was probably from the Engine room.

USCG released picture of the recovered, damaged sea buoy show a vertical puncture in the lower portion of the 32 foot buoy indicating a probable puncture by a propeller blade caused by a light loaded ship contacting and dragging the sea buoy it until was submerged.
The probable errors made are:

1. The ship’s exact position was not known after   the pilot departed.
2. The advance and transfer of the ship was not considered when ordering a very large course change in a light loaded condition at reduced  speed.
3. The position of any hazards ( sea buoy) was not determined.
4. A proper  lookout was not posted and the bridge watch was not situationally aware.

Each item alone is a minor infraction of proper seamanship; all four coupled together create a major failure in ship management.
The Port Agent for the pilots, Pete McIsaac confirms the pilot disembarked on a south by west heading and advised the Master to pass the Sea Buoy to starboard. The pilot boat’s electronic data and the visual observations by the operator reported the buoys active location  before the ship passed and that  it was no longer visible after  the outbound ship passed.

A  typical mistake is to consider a departure with less command attention than an arrival. The same hazards exist except in reverse order. The distraction and confusions occurring in the change of operational status ( in port maneuvering, at sea operations, limited visibility, significantly increased surface contacts etc., demand increase attention by “the person direction the movement of the vessel.”  A”sack”in football mostly occur when the quarterback does not adequately evaluate the defense. Again, the result of a gigantic vessel with an improperly functioning crew, lacking situational awareness and disregarding the ordinary practice of seamen. JGD

UPDATE:

The Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun – January 22, 2009

Report of December 30, 2008. Commissioner Moloney explained that a SF buoy was reportedly struck by an outbound vessel after a pilot disembarked. Commissioner Osen suggested that this issue be discussed at a later date after receipt of the Coast Guard’s report. Mr. Ross Wheatley, representing the United States Coast Guard, was present in the audience and informed the Board that the Coast Guard had identified the vessel to be the OOCL LONG BEACH. He further informed the Board that this incident is currently under investigation. This item will be kept on the agenda until the Coast Guard’s report is available and has been reviewed. (Document Link)

COSCO BUSAN. Captain Sun and Pilot Cota have created an awareness that bad thing can happen and that determining responsibility and fault(s) is evidently not simple. The suspects are government, officials, owners, managers, operators, public committees, associations and the primary target, ship board persons. How many errors were committed may not be known, but the probability that only Captain Sun and Pilot Cota are alone responsibile is suspect.

Since America was only a gathering of colonies, commerce has been the sustaining life blood of economic and political survival. To impede commerce with redundant and useless laws, a political solution, is to deny growth and deter competition. There is a need for the maritime community, local, regional, national and international to clean-up their respective acts. Pilotage, in general as a service, not just a business is in a universal state of confusion as to qualification, competency and what is acceptable seamanship. Money alone is not the panacea, personal dedication and skillfullness come to mind.

As an accepted process licensed pilots, in most cases are found competent by virtue of their tested local knowledge. Licensed officers are also examined and based on a percentage score, licensed. That process has been historically accepted , however reliability and proficiency in the myriad of tasks required to be performed is not. A master, acting as co-pilot may not be equally qualified or competent as the person directing the navigation of the vessel, and therefore errors in judgment may be overlooked. The public is unaware and yet public safety is of concern. How many similar errors are repeated before the law of averages kicks in?

The history of pilotage is replete with cases where mandated local licensed pilots were not considered competent to moor and undock vessels; a specialized skill. Not to say they were not, but owners and managers were concerned and cautious; and they pay the bills.

The comparison of the pilots role versus the masters alludes to the increased burden for masters while the duties of pilots has changed little. Both are presently compensated at their worth, but in any grouping there is an average. Each has undergone various forms of training and then turned lose to practice, essentially without evaluation. Although copious dollars are spent on training individuals, the bridge teams may not be. An untrained team lacking discipline is a gang. Although not specifically pronounced the role of owners, managers and operators must include responsibility for any failure to verify that employees are qualified and competent and perform in the manner required by rule. A vessel found undermanned, crewed with unqualified persons or lacking operational proficiency is unseaworthy and local authority, as a matter of public policy, should be responsible to detain it. – John Denham

Historically pilots don’t assume liability for incidents occurring regardless of fault. This is the case because historically a pilot’s job was to serve as a local advisor, expert in the location of reefs, buoys, current patterns and the flow of traffic within a port. The handling of the ship and command of the crew was left to the person that knew them best, the captain. So what has changed?

First ships and cargo have been standardized. In the past ships brought every cargo needed to sustain the businesses located in and around a port city. Fuel, raw material, imported goods and the myriad of miscellaneous material needed for the growth of an American city floated in on the hulls of a wide variety of vessels. Today ports specialize in certain types of cargo. Industrial cities have bulkers arriving daily while energy hubs, with refineries and pipeline terminals, primarily welcome tankers. Oakland’s specialty is containers and the city welcomes boxes that leave daily on trucks and trains bound for the warehouses of America’s retailers.

Not only do individual ports welcome similar types of ships the vessels themselves are closely matched. Naval architects have shared ideas and small domestic shipyards have long since been driven out of business by a much smaller number of large overseas yards that can put together ships at a rate approaching that of World War II. The vessels they build not only look alike but have similar handling characteristics and docking features.

Pilots have also taken on a larger number of tasks. The pilots of San Francisco Bay were at one point responsible only for bringing vessel from the bar to an area close to the dock. Docking pilots moored the ships. This is still done in many ports like New York and serves to limit the number of skills and thus training, experience, etc… required.

While the daily experience gained by pilots on similar types of vessels, combined with additional tasks increasing their knowledge of vessel dynamics their counterparts, the ship captains, have seen a different reality. Tracking of ships, satellite communications, professional weather routing and other advancements have resulted in increased oversight and management of a captains duties. Regulatory changes have resulted in an increase in paperwork all needing the masters approval and oversight. The amount of time available to learn the capabilities and shortcomings of a ship and her crew.

Pilots and ship captains have also diverged in one other aspect, training. The result of ship incidents and the subsequent investigations spark motivation for change and the need for more training more often than not tops the list of recommendations for improvement. While improved training of crews is desperately needed we must look at how the training of captains and pilots differ. Captains are regulated by a multitude of domestic and international authorities each requiring a specific courses that must follow a set curriculum. Companies often increase the amount of training with internal courses organized by ship managers and Human Resource departments.

Pilots, on the other hand, are regulated by local authorities who look to pilot commissions to dictate requirements. These commissions are often populated by the very pilots they seek to regulate creating a minimum standard much lower than that required of a captain. This does not sound like the a positive dynamic but, in ports with truly competitive pilot application processes, the bar is raised at the point of entry obviating the need for training and regulation to address the lowest common denominator. Pilots are also highly visible in their local communities and subject to high levels of personal scrutiny when incidents occur. John Cota’s wife, for example, was a Peteluma councilwomen well know in political circles. The self desire to be seen as skilled professionals and enjoyment of a loose regulatory structure, not fear of incarceration, drive a desire to be good at what they do…. This drives training structures that work.

I won’t dive too deep into the differences between the two training structures but I will say that once required training is completed by a ship’s captain there often is not the budget, time or energy to participate in training that exceeds the bare minimum. The oversight of this required training limits the freedom of maritime schools to offer unique solutions or even change course when new ideas are introduced within the community. Pilots have the opportunity to work closely with training providers to tailor courses to their needs and have more freedom to seek non traditional means of training.

With daily experience gained on similar types of ships, improved training and self regulation it was only a matter of time before the proficiency of our nations pilots past that of captains in navigating inland waters. Captains have increasingly relied on this experience to get their ships docked safely.

So with pilots becoming increasingly more proficient and new technology continually being developed to assist them how could the Cosco Busan allied with the Bay Bridge?

Like the large majority of catastrophic events caused by man it’s an insidious compilation of events that cause the incident. This error chain leaves many to blame but I feel compelled to highlight the primary failures and, yes, assign blame. So here goes; the individual most responsible for the incident has yet to be named!

John Cota made two crucial errors; a willingness to proceed (even rush) under adverse conditions and refusal to fully utilize resources available to him, namely electronic charting systems. Captain Sun also made two critical mistakes; acceptance of the position and willingness to proceed on the day of the incident. The high level of proficiency and low incident rate of our nations pilots helps to explain Cota’s decision and Captain Sun’s trust of his decision to proceed that morning but does not explain either’s willingness to proceed knowing one important fact; the entire vessel crew was replaced just two weeks prior.

It is rarely disputed that one of the greatest recent advancements in the safe operating of vessels has been the industry’s embrace of Bridge Resource Management but how can a bridge team operate using these principals if they have not had time to explore each others strengths and weaknesses? How can a team learn a vessel with only two weeks aboard her? And how can team members share vessel and interpersonal knowledge if there is no continuity?

John Cota made critical errors that directly resulted in the incident but the most profound error he shares equally with Captain Sun; a lack of courage. In regards to Captain Sun the profanity of this decision is compounded by the mariner shortage which provides ample opportunity for mariners to leave companies that make unwise decisions. For Captain Cota it’s making the decision to work aboard a vessel with no hope of fully utilizing BRM despite having a pilot association with a history of supporting pilots who stop unsafe jobs.

Despite all the differences pilots and captain’s share two similarities beyond their proficiency in moving large objects; a lack of courage and unwillingness to embrace changing times . The real failure, however, rests with the individual who’s final approval was required to sweep aside the need for continuity and replace the entire crew of the Cosco Busan in one single sweep. Unfortunately, he is unlikely to ever stand trial. The best we can do is extend the concept of BRM to broader ship management. It’s not until captains broaden their horizons from the ship’s bridge to vessel & intercompany resource management that incident rates will once again fall.

-John

___________________

Note: I was reluctant to write this article but strong imputes came with the US Coast Guards issuance of NAVIGATION and VESSEL INSPECTION NAVIC NO. 04-08 (details HERE). Upon discovering that John Cota took various medications under the care of a qualified physician it was soon clear this issue would be pushed by the Coast Guard brass. gCaptain asked a number of Coast Guardsmen and industry leaders about the impending regulation and we were told repeatedly that a list of medications and conditions would not be published, just guidance for medical professionals. We are deeply concerned that this NVIC and the push to give VTS power to override a captain’s decision are progressing while the true causes for the incident are not being published. If you disagree with any points mentioned here or see other underlying problems I ask you to leave a comment below or contact me directly at 805-456-8644.  -John