- By Captain Rich Madden

February 15, 2012 will be a date many in the maritime security industry will remember for a long time. It was the day that the first innocent deaths were laid at the feet of an armed security team in the Indian Ocean. During a routine transit 22 nautical miles off the West coast of India, the embarked security team onboard the Italian oil tanker Enrica Lexie opened fire on a fishing boat that was apparently approaching their vessel. In the aftermath, 2 unarmed Indian fishermen were killed.

Armed security teams have become more prevalent in the Indian Ocean Basin and the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa (GOA/HOA) region due to the explosive rise of Somali piracy since 2007. With increased piracy in the Gulf of Guinea off and in Southeast Asia, it seems you might find them onboard a vessel almost anywhere.  One of the greatest concerns with putting armed security onboard a vessel is responsibility; Responsibility for weapons laws – responsibility for taking lethal action and ultimately, responsibility for deaths or injuries.

On February 15th, P&I (protection and indemnity, i.e. insurance) broker Marsh USA announced a new insurance facility to support the rapidly developing maritime security sector. Whether it was fortuitous or poor timing, it certainly shows that there is concern in boardrooms over a company’s liability with onboard security teams – particularly when they are armed.

This incident off the coast of India, tragic as it is, highlights many of the stickier subjects of maritime security. One of these is that the security team in question was Italian military, not a private contractor. When discussing the difference between embarking military personnel versus private contractors, much of the conversation must come down to the chain of command. Having military security teams onboard vessels is not new – Portuguese and French fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean have had military security onboard for years. The U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC – not to be confused with the Mediterranean Shipping Company) has embarked U.S. Navy security personnel onboard their vessels, dependent on their area of operation. In the case of MSC vessels, the security team detachment’s chain of command did not run through the master of the vessel. Instead, it operated under its own rules of engagement (ROE), while consulting with and advising the master. In at least one instance, this culminated with the scaled escalation of force against a fishing vessel, with the deck watch officer/mate on watch or master not being consulted.

In the case of the Enrica Lexie, what was the chain of command?

After defining the chain of command, the next topics that must be covered are the ROE and steps for a scaled escalation of force. The particulars of the Enrica Lexie incident are unknown, but there will seldom be an instance where a security team jumps directly to lethal force. A scaled escalation of force always starts with the lowest level of force, with additional force added until the threat is eliminated. Eliminated has an ominous overtone, but may include a suspicious vessel turning away or otherwise proving that they are not a threat. The presence of a security team alone may be enough to dissuade robbers or pirates. If not, the next step may be to indicate you are watching them – searchlights, laser “dazzlers” or activating anti-piracy water hoses along the ship’s side may have an effect. Non-lethal measures may be tried next – there are various systems available, but the many prefer the Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD). The LRADs effectiveness is not so much its ability as a non-lethal weapon, but in its versatility in weeding the truly committed perpetrator out from the fishing vessels and for its ability to be recorded by the vessel data recorder (VDR).

In the event your security team has to take lethal action, you will want to be able to prove to authorities and your company that a scaled escalation of force was used. A thorough investigation of the Enrica Lexie incident should include a review of the VDR data to demonstrate the actions taken.

While military security teams are an asset onboard a vessel in a high threat area, it would appear that on the Enrica Lexie, they were also a liability. Part of the difficulty with military security teams is the chain of command, but may also continue to the level of training and experience of its members. Simply put, private contractors are there to protect the company’s asset, with no other bosses or agendas with which to deal. Many companies offering vessel security services have joined organizations such as SAMI or IAMSP that provide vetting and guidance. It would be highly recommended that any company, vessel or master hiring a vessel security company do the proper research on those companies and regulations thereof.

No one wants to find out, as the pirates are coming over the rail, that the security company you hired wasn’t all it was cracked up to be.

Dear Sirs,
Please be advised that on 28/11/2011, we have received from the Ministry of Defence their letter dated 21/11/2011 and also the Naval Operations Department’s letter dated 3/12/2011 instructing with the following:

1. The Egyptian Government forbids the presence of any Weapons / Armed Guards on board of commercial vessels as per the rules and regulations of the International Maritime Organization.
2. In case of the presence of weapons on board commercial vessels calling at Egyptian ports, the Masters shall lock the weapons in a safe compartment on board and issue a certificate stating these weapons and delivering it to the pilot in waiting area, the certificate shall include a confirmation from the Master that weapons will be delivered to Port Police Forces once berthed to be locked after being inspected by the police forces and to be returned back to vessel before departing the port.
3. In case of not adopting the above regulations, the vessel will not be permitted to enter the port.
4. In case of vessels transiting the Suez Canal, the Port Police Forces will be receiving the weapons from the transiting vessels at points of entrance inland and will be returned back to the vessel at point of departure.
5. In case of presence of weapons on board vessels in territorial waters or in ports in waiting areas or during transit of the Suez Canal, the Master and crew will be in violation of the Egyptian Laws under which the vessel will be under arrest together with the Master and crew and the persons holding the weapons without permits and the law number 394 of the year 1954 and its amendments will be applied. This violation will be attended by the General Prosecutor where a Police Verbal Process will be issued accordingly.

Please apply these regulations provided by Ministry of Defence accurately and notify all shipping companies and agencies and all Masters of vessels calling at Egyptian Ports.

Yours Faithfully
Head of Maritime Transport Sector
( Signature )
Admiral / El Sayed Hamed Hedaya

Source of Information:
Ahmed Raafat
Egyptian Marine Insurance Consultations & Services
Alexandria ,Egypt
emics@emicsegypt.com

RFA Fort Victoria hands over 14 suspected pirates to the Seychelles for prosecution, image courtesy Royal Navy

A group of pirates caught by a Royal Navy operation in the Indian Ocean will face justice in the Seychelles.

RFA Fort Victoria – part of NATO’s counter piracy task force Operation Ocean Shield – has handed over 14 suspects to the islands’ authorities for prosecution.

The fourteen Somalis were captured on January 13 by Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel embarked on RFA Fort Victoria.

The suspected pirates, who were known to have been operating in the Indian Ocean, were intercepted on board a hijacked Yemeni fishing dhow.

They were found to have a variety of pirate paraphernalia and weapons on board, including rocket-propelled grenades and hand-grenades.

This is the culmination of four months of operations for the UK Counter-Piracy Task Group based on Fort Victoria and under the command of Captain Gerry Northwood.

“This has been a long four months of intensive counter-piracy operations during which time we have captured more than 30 pirates for prosecution and rescued 44 merchant mariners from the hands of the pirates.

“This success has been echoed by other NATO units engaged in counter-piracy operations and the handover of these 14 suspected pirates to the Seychelles authorities will contribute to ensuring the waters of the Indian Ocean become a safer place for all mariners.”

The "RHIB" with the suspected pirates is lowered on the RFA Fort Victoria. These suspected pirates face prosecution in the Seychelles for piracy. Image courtesy Royal Navy

Foreign Secretary William Hague said:

“We are very grateful to the Seychelles for their agreement to prosecute these suspected pirates. Their commitment to the fight against piracy has helped avoid a situation where these individuals were not held to account for their actions.

“In a few weeks time the London Conference on Somalia will discuss how the international community can tackle the many problems faced by Somalia, including piracy.

“Today’s agreement on the transfer of alleged pirates demonstrates what can be achieved through international co-operation and commitment.”

Danish ship HDMS Absalon, another NATO ship conducting counter piracy operations in the Indian ocean was also in the Seychelles, handing over four suspected pirates to the Seychelles authorities.

Jeffrey Milstein, image by Barbara Veiga

On August 2nd, 1939 Albert Einstein wrote a letter to then President Roosevelt stating, “A single bomb…carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”  This threat remains as real today as it was in 1939.  The majority of the public and even Congress fear the threat of a major attack will come hidden inside one of the thousands of boxes that arrive via container ships into our ports every day.

In response to this fear, we create many different container security initiatives and trade partnerships against terrorism in order to limit our exposure and screen as much as possible before the vessel even arrives on our shores.  Unlike a container ship, where there are many hoops to jump through to hide something nefarious in a box, the engine room of an oil tanker is a much easier place to hide the nefarious box as it would be much less scrutinized and much harder to keep track of.  That being said, tankers are obviously part of many inspected and scrutinized programs.  One might suggest however, that tankers provide more of a threat than container ships as they are part of a tramp shipping market (tramp trade is a market which does not have a fixed schedule, itinerary or published ports of call) where routes and schedules can’t be analyzed by think tanks.  More often than not, cargo may not even be sold on a tramp ship or discharge orders given until weeks after a vessel leaves the load port.

Even more unpredictable than a tankers route would be a commercial fishing vessel’s route, which may rely upon the “good feeling” for which location a fishing boat captain might take.  While the methodology of fishing routes is likely easier to figure out than the schedule of a tanker, one thing is for sure: Fishing vessels have the ability to go uninspected and unhindered in their daily operations which make them the perfect threat vector to the fragile state of the maritime industry.

In addition to the fragile state of the maritime industry, a recent study completed at Oxford University reports:

“Fish, sharks, whales and other marine species are in imminent danger of an unprecedented and catastrophic extinction event at the hands of humankind, and are disappearing at a far faster rate than anyone had predicted.  Overfishing has cut some fish populations by more than 90 percent”.

The threat vector, the history on port security, terrorism, piracy and how it all relates to the U.S. maritime industry and the reasons why such threats are not being addressed were spelled out in Part 1, “Terrorism, Pirates, and blowing the whistle on Commercial Fishing Before it Causes the Next Big Attack”.  In part 2, the goal is to explain what happens if this threat continues not to be ignored, as well as how we can start to solve this by being proactive, rather than reactive after a devastating attack to the nation.

What happens if the threat continues is not addressed?

After the terrorist attack of 9/11, the airline industry went into a financial tailspin.  By 2005, four of the nation’s five largest carriers — Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways — filed for bankruptcy protection.  The nation’s 10 largest airlines combined lost an estimated $29 billion between 2001 and the first six months of 2011, and the cost and convenience of airline travel for all were grossly impacted forever.  While 9/11 had nothing directly to do with our ports, it actually impacted the maritime industry more than any other event in the history of maritime including the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 and subsequent OPA 90 regulations.  After 9/11 the U.S. demanded the International Maritime Organization (IMO) set forth regulations for securing vessels and facilities, which ultimately gave birth to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code.  This was developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, now known as the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulations.  Its full provisions came into effect on July 1, 2004 after what was an unbelievably fast and comprehensive implementation process for an industry that rarely saw the likes of vulnerability assessments, development of security plans that included passenger, vehicle and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identification procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment, fencing and increase in guards.

US Flag off back of boat in NY Harbor, photo by Jeffrey Milstein

The driving force behind all of this change was not an attack on the Maritime Transportation System (MTS), but actually a “perceived threat”.  Now imagine if an attack actually took place in the maritime domain within the U.S. interior that directly affected the citizens of our nation, not just economically but with considerable loss of life as it happened when the planes crashed into the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  How would the industry and government react to the future handling of operations and how maritime security is conducted if an actual Transportation Security Incident (TSI) were to happen within the one of our 361 U.S. ports?  More importantly, how would the citizens of our country react?  Aviation is a necessity for travel and it was heavily impacted by a fear of people to fly securely even though  it was often their only choice. The effect on the public’s faith in the cruise industry, which is not a necessity for vacation and transit, would be devastating if there were an attack in maritime that translated to a realistic perceived threat against the cruise industry.  Ultimately the industry would rebound, however it would likely suffer from a significant reduction in attendance for quite some time.

One could only speculate how cost-prohibitive security measures would become and how much of an impact a nationwide sustained heightened Maritime Security Level (MARSEC) 2 or 3 condition would have on our economy and to the global markets.  In 2008, USCG Admiral Thad Allen told us that the U.S. maritime transportation system adds $700 billion to the U.S. economy annually, calling it “the lifeblood of our economy.” He later cited as an example that when a labor dispute shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in 2003, the American economy suffered losses estimated at $1 billion per day. With a terrorist attack you would have to add the possible costs in infrastructure damage and relative expenses for a recovery in order to reconstitute trade and commerce to that $1 billion per day loss to truly see how devastating an attack would be.

If we continue on the same path, and a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) is caused with significant loss of life or economic impact directly resulted from a fishing vessel, both the fishing industry and the maritime industry will be grossly impacted.  Fishing vessels would no longer have access to docks in and around ports, security zones would be established affecting fishing vessels ability to continue to operate.  It is even possible all commercial fisheries within the U.S. EEZ would be temporarily halted.  At first, it sounds unlikely, however look at the temporary and permanent impacts to drilling after BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster, and to vessel crew shore leave after 9/11, and to single hull vessels after the Exxon Valdez spill, etc.  While this would be great for our oceans to get some time to regenerate and repopulate, the economic stability in our country would suffer a critical blow because of job losses and massive inflation of food costs.

The unfortunate state of Congress and the federal government today is that rules and regulations for security are often not endorsed or pushed through until a significant amount of people die first.

This means in order for the majority of our bills, regulations, and guidelines to be written and threats to be taken seriously by our legislators, they have to be written in the blood of those who died because of an incident.

Strangling the Maritime industry

After the events of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, OPA 90 increased the commitment that industry had to make to be prepared for an oil spill response.  By increasing the industry’s accountability, many important steps were made in establishing a more environmentally sensitive maritime environment.  Three major items that came out of this incident were the implementation of the USCG document “Certificate of Financial Responsibility” (COFR), requirement for Vessel / Facility Response plans, and the establishment and identification of Qualified Individual’s (QI).

It took many years for the proper requirements and safety measures to fall into place after the Exxon Valdez spill and for them to not be considered a nuisance or cost prohibitive measure by the maritime industry.  At this point, those same measures that the industry pushed back on that provided a cleaner and safer environment are now a standard part of doing business and have been streamlined with everyday activities.  This being said, the USCG, with the implementation of MTSA, made a large step in the same direction with security measures as OPA 90 did with safety measures, but many still feel push-back in relation to costs for implementation and upgrades in security.  It is extremely rare for organizations to invest money into securing themselves against something that they may themselves see as a perceived threat if there are no regulations requiring them to do so.  One of the main contributing factors for this is the constant fear of what will come next and how that will affect ship owners and facilities in a market that is already suffering some of the lowest shipping rates in the past few decades.

If an attack were to happen now, causing more stringent regulations, it might just be almost impossible for many companies to bounce back from given the state of the industry today.  Considering the state of the Euro, countries like Greece, which have a significant stake in the maritime world, would not be in any position to start reorganizing or investing into new equipment or requirements.   Because charter rates are so low in some sections of the industry, we are seeing things we never saw before like traders chartering Very large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and anchoring them offshore for a year fully laden with cargo rather than entering into new tankage agreements at facilities.  We have even seen what some considered “graveyards of ships” anchored in Indonesian ports waiting for cargos.

The industry needs an environment for ship owners to want to go over and above and be willing to try innovative methods for security rather than living in the current state of fear waiting for the next set of restrictive regulations or event to be written that will cost excessive amounts of money to comply with.  Ship owners, facility operators and the crew who effectively have their boots on the ground everyday more often than not, know how to better secure their interests than the legislators writing these bills and using them to attach ear marks that are in most cases laughable.

How we can start to solve this?

As a port agents, we see gaps every day that potentially leave the door open for a myriad of plausible scenarios for a terrorist planning attacks on our country.  But what we don’t see is the regulations and laws to close many of the gaps that actually already exist.  No one wants to reinvent the wheel, they just want to put their name on something that doesn’t cost billions, doesn’t impact voters and doesn’t take long to achieve.  There’s no such thing as proactive, just reactive, even when the requested result is not possible.  For example, the “9/11 commission recommendations act of 2007” requiring 100 percent screening will likely not be achieved unless a box blows up and then somehow or another it will be achieved, even if it slows the maritime transportation system to a screeching halt.  MTSA as described earlier was in response to 9/11 and we achieved 100 percent total transformation of all U.S. ports in six months from the date of implementation.  That’s historic, but that was in reaction to the events of 9/11, 100 percent screening wasn’t.  The concept of 100 percent screening came from the 9/11 commission report which was completed three years after the attack and it didn’t become a priority until it hit the congressional floor 3 years later.

In the case of commercial and recreational fishing, it is an industry that is already exposed and already has laws and regulations governing them, yet overfishing, poaching, and unenforced regulated fishing continue to be an open threat vector and continue to bring us closer to an extinction event.  Commercial fishing vessels are given quotas and specific instructions to what they can fish, how they can fish, when they can fish, and with whom they can fish.  Are we inspecting these vessels when they arrive on the dock to confirm they are doing what we license them to do?  Do we track their routes, and do we ensure everything is on par? To take it a step further and possibly a bit overboard, do we know if they are going offshore and meeting with foreign vessels or going to foreign ports or being hijacked or being used to run guns and weapons, drugs, or other nefarious purposes?  The answer to all of these questions is a resounding NO. But, what we do have is laws in place allowing us to inspect, search and penalize these same vessels for breaking the rules.

We already have a system in place to take the fear of threat out of an entire industry; we have a system in place to fine and penalize those breaking the rules, which would subsidize the force needed to enforce the regulations.  There are people breaking the laws, we know this because our oceans are emptying at catastrophic rates.  These vessels should be a part of the system, they should be required to carry AIS regardless of their size and be monitored by a fisheries enforcement agency.  They should have to report their arrivals through a system similar to the electronic notification of arrivals (ENOA) to the USCG National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC); they should have to be boarded by a DHS agency upon arrival.  They should have to pay an inspection fee and be penalized if they are breaking the laws that were created to protect bio-diversity and the oceans that cover the majority of our planet.

The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), which provides a clear picture that we do not know how to defend against the small vessel security threat, is currently posted on the internet for potential terrorists to see in a 57-page document on DHS’s website.  This strategy “harmonizes related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within DHS, and lays the groundwork for DHS cooperation across the broad small vessel stakeholder base”.

The problem with this strategy is there is no clear concise way to deal with or resolve this issue.  We must stop trying to address all small vessels as the same and start identifying ways to take pieces out of the equation little by little in order to whittle down this massive undertaking.

There is a significant difference between the threat posed by a standard recreational vessel and a commercial fishing vessel.  Commercial fishing vessels are crewed with several experienced people who are prepared to handle rough weather, be offshore for long periods of time, and are willing to take chances.  While some recreational boaters may be much more experienced than commercial crew, the reality is that most recreational boaters go out for the day, the weekend, or a specific time period as a vacation and they can be tracked and patterns can easily be identified as to what might be a threat or not.  However, commercial fishing vessels and even private chartered party boats and day trip vessels are not as easy to track.  The ease at which a person can join one of these private vessels to fish for the day is startling.  While the vessel crew is required to have a Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) with background checks by the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), there is no requirement for ID checks, record keeping or vetting of guests who board.  This allows for a great starting point for would-be terrorists to collect intel on our nation’s ports.  Intel can easily be collected on the vector of fishing vessels but also on the shipping patterns in a given port as well.  Many of these daytrip fishing vessels pass through ports, choke points and regions where someone could pretend to fish for the day or for a few weeks and get into regions where they otherwise could not see the flow of traffic from the water instead of behind a fence and scrutiny from the land.

Stay tuned for the third and final chapter to this series: “Who is responsible for enforcement of our fisheries, who should be responsible and how we can save our oceans from extinction while proactively protecting our nation from terrorism”

By Jeffrey J. Milstein, Moran Office of Maritime and Port Security (MOMPS) 

There are many different types of possible terrorists, but the simplest definition for the successful ”terrorist” is: one supported by an organization capable of significant funding, providing training and with the foresight to plot scenarios dedicated to causing mass casualties and impact.  That being said, if someone is dedicated enough to give their life for a cause, they want one hundred percent confirmation of a target or as close to that as possible.  Every terrorist wants to be the next Bin Laden and not to be some fool who showed up at the wrong spot and blew himself up.  Because of this, a terrorist may spend as many as five to ten years planning for an attack.  However, if they arrive on site for a dry run before the big day and find the attack might not be successful, then it’s back to square one and on to planning for the next identified weak target.

Recreational vessels operate in close proximity to a docked containership, photo by Jeffrey Milstein

People often forget that what makes a threat is not just the idea; it’s the possibility of a proven vector of threat (i.e. method, path or tool that utilizes the threat to perpetrate an attack).  Anyone can come up with the good idea, just look at the thriller section in Netflix and you will see that.  What makes a threat vector realistic is the idea itself and the probability of success.  If the probability of success is high and can be proven, the idea holds water and we have a problem.  For example, anyone screaming “Nuclear attack!” needs to take into consideration that nuclear weapons are not so easy to obtain and smuggle, and they’re even harder to make, maintain and ensure they work.  Furthermore, there needs to be validity as to where purported weapons of mass destruction have come from.  For example, even though a Nuke would cause ninety billion dollars in destruction the probability of this type of attack is so low that it creates a vector value below the benchmark needed to consider it a daily threat.  However, something that could be made much easier like a dirty bomb, which could still cause considerable destruction, is more of a realistic threat once divided by the probability.

So, with this said, why aren’t most gaps or weaknesses identified as a threat vector?

The real answer is there isn’t enough time in the day to tackle the unbelievable quantity of gaps and weakness we face in our ports, and then check them against the chances of probability or possibility.  The truly dedicated, overworked men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) are the most underfunded branch of the U.S. Military and can’t do the job on their own.  In a perfect world, the best way to test probability of a possible threat is via covert operations as Richard Marcinko did in 1984 with the establishment of the Naval Security Coordination Team OP-06D, or more commonly known as “Red Cell”.  Lack of funding however, and an embarrassing lack of understanding from our legislators and regulators of how the maritime industry operates means these types of operations are rarely conducted, and when they are, they’re usually in a vacuum.  Because of this, Congress opts to try and tackle the low-hanging fruit and the topics that will generate the most publicity.  More often than not, they do not consist of things that we need the most protection from, just those things that might not kill a bill before Congress or in some cases need to be attached to something to make it more “interesting” in order to help to get support and be passed.

A perfect example of this is the “Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 or more commonly known as the “Safe Port Act,” which was an act of Congress in which an online gambling measure was added at the last moment.  You may be asking yourself, what does internet gambling have to do with port security for the entire nation? -It doesn’t. It was added because the bill could not get enough support and was going to be killed on the floor until this measure was added.

Fortunately the bill passed, however it’s  an embarrassing example that a bill that includes things like the creation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), establishment of interagency operational centers for port security, the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), Container Security Initiative (CSI), requirements for foreign port assessments, the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (CT-PAT) and possibly the most important the creation of a new agency within the DHS called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) wasn’t important enough for Congress until someone decided that they wanted to stop internet gambling.

In a time of great economic uncertainty, it may be controversial to point out that a profitable industry is affecting their own sustainability by blatantly overfishing our oceans while at the same time exposing us to great risk, but everyone has a right to know.  The fishing industries, both recreational and commercial, not only pose one of the greatest threats to the maritime industry, but they provide the single most realistic proven threat vector to our nation and citizens.  Before we get too far into this, let’s start with a brief history on port security, terrorism, piracy and how it relates to the U.S. maritime industry.

The first possible example of a maritime attack that impacted the US was on September 13, 1814 when the British fleet staged an attack on the Port of Baltimore (they identified this as the most strategic attack point in the country).  However, they were stopped at Fort McHenry by a much smaller weaker force that used the Port as a defensive position and created their own security protocols to protect it, thus providing the first real example of Port Security in our nation’s history.  Unfortunately, this is indicative of how we will address future maritime security issues: reactively, not proactively.

Next came the following:

• 

  Achille Lauro: Attack on a Cruise ship on October 7th, 1985 that resulted in the death of an American Passenger Leon Klinghoffer who was pushed in his wheel chair off the side to his death by hijackers.  The impact of this incident marked the beginning of Port Security regulations and requirements on the cruise industry and the first set of regulations of its kind to affect the maritime industry in general.

• USS COLE: Attack on a US Navy Vessel on October 12th, 2000 in the Port of Yemen.  A fishing vessel laden with explosives rammed the US Naval vessel in the Port of Aden killing 17 and injuring 39 US sailors.
• 9/11: Caused the total closure of the Port of NY/NJ as well as full scale waterborne evacuations and port recovery operations in order to bring the port back on line and resume the flow of commerce in the U.S.
• Oil Tanker Limburg: small boat attack on a VLCC on October 6th, 2002.  It should be noted that this attack did not take place on a U.S. vessel or in a U.S. port, but that it was intended to disrupt the global oil trade and flow of commerce in the U.S.  While the impact state side was minimal it caused considerable consternation among tanker operators.  Although the bombing killed only one member of the Limburg’s crew, it caused insurance rates among shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the next month after the attack.
• Mumbai attack: November 26, 2008.   Terrorist hijacked and murdered crew on the Indian flagged fishing vessel “MV Kuber” from a Mother vessel “MV Al-Husseni” a fishing vessel in order to enter India by sea and perpetrate a three day long attack at over 10 highly populated, land-based locations in the Indian city of Mumbai, terrorizing the country and killing over 170 people.  Again, this was not an attack on the U.S., but it is clearly a blueprint for possible attacks on U.S. soil.
• Piracy off the coast of Somalia:  A total lack of government and stability in the region compounded by toxic dumping and foreign overfishing off the coast of Somalia were the main contributing factors that pushed many Somalis to take part in piracy.  Piracy in the Gulf of Aden began as fishermen sought to force out commercial fishing vessels that were illegally decimating the eco-system in Somali waters. The Gulf of Aden was at one point one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world.  Boats mainly from Europe and Asia illegally reaped over $350 million worth of fish per year from the region, depriving the local fishermen of the career that supported and fed their families and destroying the marine life that thrived since the beginning of time.  As fishing in this area was not monitored or controlled, fishermen utilized invasive and illegal methods which included such things as drift nets and undersized tight nets, which were designed to catch everything in their path including very young fish, thereby ensuring no hope for a future marine ecosystem.  Without regulation and enforcement, fish populations were totally decimated, painting a picture that easily shows how this could start in other impoverished coastal countries with limited governments.  Any place where too many individuals fish the same waters, the ecosystem collapses, and in this particular case Somalis who could have once made their living fishing turn to piracy as an alternative.

In most cases piracy doesn’t relate to terrorism, but as terrorist see the value of piracy and how it can raise funds towards extremism, piracy becomes a viable market for them to either invest in or exploit.  Piracy is no longer just plain robbery.  It has become an elaborate network of operations designed to extract enormous quantities of ransom. “Ransom amounts have increased to an average of $5.4 million per ship from just $150,000 five years ago” as stated by Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma at an international symposium in New Port, Rhode Island.  The admiral went on to explain that there is a distinct nexus between piracy and terrorism.  Al-Qaeda linked militants Al-Shabaab and pirate gangs are increasing their cooperation as they become more in need of funding.  Up until now, pirates have used the ships they hijack to collect ransoms.  If terrorists continue to find their way in to this industry we may see ships used as weapons or as threats to countries by opening manifolds and dumping product into ports, waterways or marine rich coastal environments.

There is a reason why you probably haven’t heard about this before and why many politicians have no interest in resolving the issue. Recreational fishing supports a million jobs, pays $45 billion in wages and has an overall economic impact of $125 billion in the United States annually.  NOAA reports state that the international trade in coastal and marine commercial fisheries contributes 70 billion annually to our nation’s economy.  One million jobs are associated with the U.S. commercial fishing industry yielding over 32 billion in income.  An example is that over two billion pounds of Alaskan Pollock alone are caught in the U.S. EEZ yearly, that’s just one species of thousands of different species that are caught on a daily basis.

Recreational fishing is seldom thought of as a major industry, but clearly it accounts for good paying jobs and contributes millions to the economy, not to mention 40 million fisherman buying fishing gear, gasoline, licenses, hotel rooms and boat equipment.  This also has quite an impact on the nation’s economy.

To understand the magnitude of the challenge of determining and resolving the threat vectors we need to look at the physical environment.  The United States has more than 95,000 miles of maritime coastline; 361 ports, including eight of the world’s 50 largest by volume; and 10,000 miles of navigable waterways on which approximately 15 million small craft operate routinely.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports there are 13 million registered US recreational vessels, 110,000 fishing vessels and over 100,000 other commercial small vessels.  The rest are many more which are unregistered.

As you can imagine, it is impossible to keep an eye on this group of small vessels.  DHS estimates there are approximately 68,000 foreign vessel arrivals a year, all of which are monitored through a system called AIS (Automated Identification System) which is similar to the FAA’s air traffic control.

Recreational vessels are not required to carry AIS and the majority of commercial fishing vessels just happen to fall below the size requirement for AIS.  As a result, there is currently no way to add them to the system.  We are currently having a difficult time handling inspections on the 68,000 vessels a year that require inspection, how can we even consider understanding how to manage over 13 million vessels that may come and go every weekend?

Foreign recreational vessels calling on the US are covered by the “Pleasure Boat Reporting System” (PBRS) which is based on boater self-reporting.  During fiscal year 2006, only 70,000 boater foreign arrivals were recorded in this US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) controlled system.  CBP states that “Conservative estimates suggest that these reporting figures represent only a fraction of the actual international boater traffic, especially given the ease with which boaters operate in these waters.”

So what is the threat vector from these small vessels? 

Well, it’s easy; Terrorists could exploit the maritime domain via small boats in many different ways. The most serious and likely threat is the already common Waterborne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED) attack, used in the USS Cole and Limburg attacks.  Second, vessels could transport terrorists onto American shores at locations where they will not be inspected or checked.  Third, small vessels could be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.  Fourth, small vessels could be used for a strategic attack to gain access to our shores for small arms attacks in populated regions as is what happened in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

What is the impact of a maritime terrorist attack? 

The ability to use the maritime domain for mass casualty is very clear; just look at any of the major ports in the US and how they are situated in comparison to the local community and major assets in their particular region.  In New Jersey alone, there is what is considered to be the most dangerous two mile stretch in America from Newark Airport to Port Elizabeth.  New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the country and on this particular two miles of land there are hundreds of potential terrorist targets including chemical plants, chlorine gas plants, rail yards, rail lines, refineries, an international airport, and the third largest port in the country.   An attack in these two miles could bring lethal harm to more than 12 million people within in a 14-mile radius, not to mention shut down the entire transportation system.  These areas are open to attack and small recreational vessels are allowed within, and are able to dock at, locations within this two mile stretch.  In addition, people are permitted to fish off of public piers somehow mixed within the commercial infrastructure of this area.  So it’s not an oddity or even seen as suspicious to see small boats and random persons in and around this area.  To make matters worse, just a few miles away from the “most dangerous two miles” there are public boat ramps right in the middle of the channel within 100’ to 500 feet’- of some of the largest petroleum facilities and vessels on the eastern seaboard.

Stay tuned for part 2 “Overfishing ourselves out of the Maritime industry and defense of the Homeland” where the dots are connected and you understand why they have to be written in blood to work.

gCaptain Note: Via our friends in West Africa, it’s certainly clear that this list only scratches the surface of what’s really going on out there, but here’s what’s been reported via official channels…

TOGO:

• A chemical tanker experienced an attempted boarding on 24 September at 0130 UTC while anchored in position 06:01N – 001:15E at the Lome Anchorage. Two small boats approached shipside, the duty officer told them to move away, but was ignored. Later, two more boats approached the vessel from the stern and secured themselves to the ship’s rudder. The master informed the Togo Navy, which responded and detained all four boats. Nothing was stolen from the vessel. (IMB)

RED SEA:

• Chemical tanker (GINGA BOBCAT) experienced an attempted boarding and was fired upon one skiff with an RPG, 28 September at 1258 UTC while underway in position 14:02N – 042:53E, approximately 70NM southeast of Ras Isa, Yemen. Entire attack group consisted of 3–4 skiffs, each with 4–5 pirates onboard. The vessel was damaged and had a hole in the inert gas room. Vessel did not have a security team. The master took evasive maneuvers, pirates chased the vessel for 15 minutes, and the pirates aborted their attack. (UKMTO, IMB)
• Chemical tanker (LIME GALAXY) experienced an attempted boarding by two skiffs on 28 September on 1159 UTC while underway in position 14:18N – 042:50E, approximately 53NM southeast of Ras Isa, Yemen. Pirates fired upon the vessel, one pirate attempted to board it with a ladder, the master raised the alarm and engaged in evasive maneuvers, and the pirates aborted the attack. The vessel did not have a security team. (UKMTO, IMB).
• Cargo vessel (CS CIHAN) boarded by pirates on 25 September at 1342 UTC while underway in position 14:09N – 042:49E, approximately 62NM southeast of Ras Isa, Yemen. The pirates boarded the vessel and damaged it by firing upon it. The crew stopped the ship when the attack occurred and retreated to a citadel for about 3.5 hours before they left and discovered no pirates onboard. The vessel had no security team. (Operator, UKMTO)

Weather Forecast for 29 SEP–5 OCT 2011

A. GULF OF ADEN: As the SW Monsoon season comes to an end, winds are out of the east-southeast at 5 – 10 knots with seas ranging from 1 – 3 feet.  EXTENDED FORECAST: Winds will remain light to moderate from the east-southeast at 10 – 15 knots and seas will remain minimal through 5 OCT.

B. SOMALI COAST/NORTH ARABIAN SEA: An area of high seas (5 – 7 feet) and moderate winds (SW 15 – 20) remains along the northeastern coast of Somalia through the waters around Socotra Island.  Seas and winds decrease slightly along the southern Somalia coast. Conditions in the Arabian Sea and the waters off Oman and Pakistan will range from 3 – 5 feet with moderate SW winds of 10 – 15 knots.  EXTENDED FORECAST: The conditions off the northeastern coast of Somalia will remain moderately impacted through 5 OCT.  Winds and seas will continue to be increased as the effects of the SW Monsoon slowly draw to an end.  Expect seas 2 – 4 feet and winds SW 8 – 12 through 5 OCT in the waters off Oman and Pakistan.

C. INDIAN OCEAN: Moderate south-easterly winds (15 – 20 knots) in the Indian Ocean have increased seas (5 – 7 feet) south of the equator and along the Kenya and Tanzania border.  EXTENDED FORECAST:  Through 5 OCT, expect moderate winds of 15 – 20 knots to persist causing moderate impacts through the Indian Ocean and Mozambique Channel, to include waters off Kenya and Tanzania with seas increasing to 7 – 9 feet in areas south of the equator as early as 1 OCT.

D.  SURFACE CURRENTS: Currents within the Somalia Basin, Gulf of Aden, and into the Indian Ocean remain variable with most areas having average speeds of less than 2 knots.  A region of increased speed up to 4 knots occurs from 5S to 11N along the Somali coast.

On December 21st, 2004, former President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 that stated:

It is critical that the United States develop an enhanced capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain as early and as distant from our shores as possible by integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems into a common operating picture accessible throughout the United States Government.

This past Wednesday, gCaptain was invited on board the presidential yacht Sequoia to witness the forging of a unique alliance aimed at increasing the maritime security of the United States.

Comprised of the National Maritime Law Enforcement Academy (NMLEA), the National Association of Small Boating Law Enforcement Administrators (NASBLA), and the Moran Office of Maritime and Port Security (MOMPS), this this alliance was established to help support a government funded, maritime security training program at Florida State University (FSU) called PortStar.

To that end, both the US Coast Guard and commercial maritime industry were closely consulted to ensure that what is being fielded is designed to meet or exceed Industry and Law Enforcement Port Security Requirements under the 33 CFR’s.

A bit of background…

Maritime port security is a complex beast because it involves a number of different entities, each with their own set of unique capabilities.  For example, during a crisis in a maritime port, local law enforcement and perhaps fire department resources are easily called to action, however the other immediate resources, who have first-hand understanding, a.k.a. domain awareness of the port, such as the local commercial industry, first responders, vendors, ship agents, and port partners, may not get fully integrated or brought to bear until it’s too late.

This program is designed to bridge the gap between industry (MOMPS and NASBLA), law enforcement (NMLEA), and academia (FSU).

Rear Admiral Jim Watson, the US Coast Guard’s Director of Prevention Policy explains,

NMLEA, NASBLA, and MOMPS each provide essential expertise in waterside security and work with US Coast Guard Captains of the Port as force multipliers. So, I’m particularly excited about the new security and training alliance signed this week. Benefits include deployable training and on-line training developed at Florida State University in accordance with USCG standard practices.

In supporting the program at FSU, MOMPS brings with it almost 75 years of ship agency, maritime consulting, and emergency response expertise while working with many of the worlds most prominent ship owners, operators, facilities, charterers, brokers and government agencies.   Facilitating this program with MOMPS, the NMLEA was originally created to assist State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies with the most leading edge maritime law enforcement training programs available beyond USCG and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

The NMLEA has a history of working with training facilities such as MITAGS in Baltimore, however, MITAGS is a one week in-class course.  Portstar, on the other hand, offers the Facility Security Officer course online as well as instructor-led, but with the additional in-the-field practical element with MOMPS.  This final element is where the true results of the training need to be for some to get the most effective solution and is one of the cornerstones of this program.

But why is MOMPS particularly suited to support the NMLEA?  Mr. Robert Wells, Director of the NMLEA responded to our inquiry stating:

Admiral Paul Pluta, Advisory Board Member, highly recommended Mr. Jeffrey Milstein [MOMPS Operations Manager] as a trusted and learned individual as to Port Security matters.  Per the Admirals recommendation, I first met Jeffrey and his staff when we worked together on a major port facility security assessment.  I found Mr. Milstien to be every bit the professional the Admiral described.  Given this and the relationship that developed over this past year, NMLEA believes that MOMPS has more than proven to be the organization to assist in the Portstar rollout and provider of unique innovative technologies and services to the extended community that NMLEA brings to the table.  In addition to Portstar, the Academy is prepared to review and certify MOMPS training programs that are presently in place and/or being developed.  As to Port Security audits/surveys and other related port security assessments, we believe that MOMPS and NMLEA are in a position, when needed, to field representatives to law enforcement and industry and uphold the highest standards of each of our organizations comfortably. MOMPS is a CRITICAL component to this alliance due to the many points shown above, as well as its large role and connection to many of the world’s shipping companies and the majority of the facilities contained in US Ports. Their depth of experience, and the fact that much of their staff work in the capacity of a port agent for thousands of vessel port calls a year, ensures that all work and training is done from a real-time playing field of operations and law enforcement.

As for NASBLA’s contribution, Cesar Morales, Senior Maritime Domain Awareness Analyst and occasional gCaptain contributor from Delex Systems provides us some insight:

From a maritime domain awareness perspective, this project represents a significant effort in addressing gaps in our maritime security capabilities.  By leveraging the knowledge and understanding of the small vessel community that NASBLA represents, and applying this understanding to training applications that can be easily accessed by maritime stakeholders,  we get a step closer to achieving ‘effective understanding’ of activities in the maritime domain.  It will be these stakeholders, representing both federal and public interests, that will be the most effective tools in combating maritime threats.  Ultimately it is this type of training and public-private partnership that will allow for effective resiliency, response, and recovery from any incident on the water, which is the objective of maritime domain awareness.

In conclusion, Mr. Wells discusses the overall impact this alliance, and the PortStar program, has to the maritime industry:

“Increased Port Security Awareness and affordable certified training.  

Portstar has the ability to be the most affordable and comprehensive certified training program on the market.  Why?  It was born of a $6.2 million Dollar Taxpayer Grant from DHS to Florida State University.  That allows NASBLA/NMLEA, Non Profit Organizations, and MOMPS, a for-profit organization with kindred goals and objectives that is able to roll Portstar out to industry for pennies to the dollars.  Given this unfunded mandate as it were under the CFR’s, and given that Industry is all about the bottom line, Portstar is a cost effective, superior program that is not only certified by MARAD/DHS, but facilitated by those who have made a career in the maritime law enforcement and Port Security industry.  If there is any question as to this, just take a look at who designed Portstar, and those responsible for its roll out and management.  The degree of professionalism simply cannot be beat, and only matched with a considerable cost and effort.

In this, the 10th anniversary of 9/11, the NMLEA looks back and reflects on the words of president Bush.  He challenged those who have served, to give back to the Nation.  Those members of NMLEA and NASBLA were doing that pre 9/11, and given the charge of Admiral Siler, former USCG Commandant and First Advisory Board Chairman before his passing in 2007, “to always continue the good work of NMLEA”, and continue to serve those who serve and protect.  We feel Admiral Siler would be proud of this alliance and the potential to make such a profound contribution to the Nation’s Port Security Challenges.  I know all us around the table now, believe this alliance will serve to continue the good work that has been done, and to do so on a much greater scale thanks to NASBLA and MOMPS.”

Follow these organizations on Twitter at:
MOMPS: @Port_Security
NASBLA: @NASBLA

Despite the best efforts of the world’s navies and EU NAVFOR in particular, piracy in the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas shows no sign of abating. Quite the contrary, according to a report released by the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre in July this year. Of the incidents reported, over sixty per cent were conducted by pirate gangs operating off the coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea. Indeed, the attacks were becoming more violent and pirates were taking much greater risks, the IMB stated.

The success of Somali pirates has not gone unnoticed by criminals in other parts of the African continent.

Since May this year, there have been increasing reports of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and off the coast of West Africa. The incidents prompted the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre to issue a specific warning in June, citing eight attacks off Cotonou, Benin. Since then, the number of attacks has increased significantly, although it’s virtually impossible to accurately gauge the amount of pirate activity due to insufficient reporting from the region. One security analyst told Reuters that, “In Nigeria it is estimated that approximately 60 percent of pirate attacks go unreported”*.

The Gulf of Guinea is regarded as an important, emerging trade hub, spanning a dozen countries from the tip of Northwest Africa to Angola in the South. It is a valuable source of oil, and pirates in the region are currently targeting diesel and oil tankers in particular.
According to a Reuters report*, the Gulf of Guinea produces more than 3 million barrels of oil a day, equivalent to 4% of the global total. This oil is ultimately destined for Europe and the USA, while some sources suggest that the USA will be receiving up to 25% of its oil supplies from the region by 2015*.

With so much potentially at stake it is perhaps remarkable that little is being done on the international stage to combat piracy in the region. Local coastal defences are seen as weak, while the coastline itself is craggy and offers a variety of hiding places for potential attackers. Although thus far, only 27 or so attacks on vessels in the area have been reported by the IMB, the actual number incidents may be far higher, thanks primarily to the definition of ‘piracy’.

Somali pirates operate a ‘blue ocean’ form of piracy, attacking vessels in international waters, which in turn means their crimes are legally recognised as “acts of piracy”. The attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Nigeria occur in national or coastal waters, and therefore do not legally qualify as “acts of piracy”. Semantics aside, if armed men board your vessel and threaten your crew and cargo, it is hard to not call it an act of piracy. However, the law is the law.

At its most basic, piracy off the coast of Somalia can be seen as having a clear root in economics and the inevitable outcome of a failed nation state dating back 20 years. Piracy or, more correctly, criminal attacks upon vessels in the Gulf of Guinea region is simply that: maritime banditry in an area insufficiently protected by the world’s navies. Intelligence sources on the ground are now seemingly acknowledging that the attacks in West Africa are very different in tone to their Somali counterparts. A report carried by the Associated Press quoted Bergen Risk Solutions, a Norway-based consultancy:

“Our investigations indicate that the organised group responsible is based in Nigeria and has high-level patronage in that country,” it said, with prominent Nigerians having often been accused of involvement in the lucrative black market for oil and fuel.  This cargo, Bergen suggests, has been sold in: “several West African ports, possibly including Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire and Port Gentil in Gabon.”

What the experts cannot say with any certainty, however, is why there has been such a surge in attacks in recent months. For instance, the international community has not seen a significant, proportionate fall in such incidents in Nigeria. With no international naval presence at the ready, it falls upon local agencies, such as the Benin Navy, to provide assistance. It has further been suggested that a number
of shipping companies won’t even call them in, for fear of increasing their insurance premiums.

A report on businessday.co.za suggested that, ‘insurance items due to piracy have doubled the costs of transporting goods past the Horn of Africa,’ and there is no reason to believe that West Africa and the GoG should be any different in terms of insurance risk.

In response to the recent spate of activity, Bloomberg* carried a report on August 5, stating that The Joint War Committee, which represents Lloyd’s of London underwriters and other insurers, extended a war-risk zone for Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer,
and included waters off neighbouring Benin and listed the areas as higher-risk for shipping. The Nigerian risk zone now extends to 200 nautical miles (230 miles) offshore.

While the entire region is experiencing significant mineral wealth, it falls upon governments to ensure that this wealth is redistributed amongst the population or, to quote Reuters, “…the temptation to take a slice of the goods passing under their noses on the way to the richer world may prove irresistible for some.”

It would seem clear that the world’s governments, and particularly those countries whose energy usage relies upon imports from the area, could make a significant difference to piracy in this region. At present, the area to police is significantly smaller than that in the
Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean, which EU NAVFOR vessels regularly patrol, but the level of violence being used by pirates in their attacks in the GoG region is causing deep concern amongst international bodies such as the IMB. A concerted effort by the world’s navies, in league with countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin could nip the problem in the bud, long before it escalates to proportions rivalling Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.

On August 5th, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced that plans had been tabled for maritime administrations in Togo, Republic of Benin and Nigeria to meet with relevant stakeholders to deliberate on ways of enhancing maritime safety in the region*. A spokesperson for Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Lami Tumaka, stated that the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Centre (RMAC) is equipped with the Automatic Identification System (AIS), Radar and video cameras.

The spokesperson said that the AIS identifies all vessels with the AIS transponders onboard, while those without the AIS are tracked with Radar while video cameras provide live pictures of all vessels along the Nigerian coastal waters. While the statement may reassure some ship owners, it is also true that many vessels turn their AIS transponders off to reduce the threat of attack from pirates in the Indian Ocean*, and there is no reason to expect vessels in fear of attack by bandits in the GoG will behave differently.

An immediate solution to the problems being experienced by seafarers in the area would not appear to be on the horizon. This, however, is a work in progress. In the meantime, the job of securing cargoes, crews and corporate reputations will likely fall upon the private security provider, meaning insurance discounts and a significant sense of relief in both boardrooms and bridges.

- By David Rider, Neptune Maritime Security

About Neptune Maritime Security:

Founded by decorated, former members of Her Majesty’s elite Special Boat Service (SBS) and supported by a team of international maritime legal experts, Neptune Maritime Security offers the kind of capabilities only the world’s most elite commercial maritime security specialist can provide. With over 30 years of experience in the field of amphibious counter-terrorism, Neptune Maritime Security’s team of highly trained, highly motivated specialists are supremely qualified in the area that concerns shipping companies most: safeguarding crew, cargo and corporate reputations For further details, please visit www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com.

Sources:

http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/analysis-pirates-eye-share-of-gulf-of-guinea

http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFRISKGG20110705?sp=true

http://feraljundi.com/maritime-security/maritime-security-the-gulf-of-guinea-and-piracy/

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-04/piracy-spurs-insurers-to-extend-nigeria-war-risk-zone-add-benin.html

http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/imo-coordinates-plans-with-the-nation-others#

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/on-states-hitech-radar-small-vessels-dont-exist/826817

On July 29th the crew of the Motor Tanker Pavit made a Mayday call off the coast of Oman and were quickly rescued by local authorities but no attempt was made to salvage the ship which authorities assumed had sunk. A month later the same vessel washed ashore on a popular beach in Mumbai India.

India’s Director General Shipping, SB Agnihotri, said an investigation had been launched into how the MT Pavit ran aground on Sunday. “We will in our inquiry be looking at this particular issue,” he said on Tuesday amid national concerns about maritime security, which had been overhauled after terrorists used ships to enter Mumbai and launch a deadly attack on the city in 2008. “We are looking at these 100 hours when the detection has not happened.”

While the authorities did not take action until hours after the ship grounded, the Mumbai Police did receive a call about the tanker from local Fishermen who spotted the 77-metre-long vessel sailing without lights and drifting, at 10 pm on Saturday, July 30.

Work has begun to salvage the Panama-flagged ship, which can carry up to 1,000 tonnes of cargo, and contact has been made with the vessel’s owners and insurers, says Indian authorities. Top priority for the salvage is the recovery of the 10 tonnes of fuel oil and 10 tonnes of gas oil the vessel was carrying but no signs of a spill have been reported at this time and because the ship merely drifted local salvage teams are hopeful that the vessel can be pulled out, undamaged, during the next high tide.

The Indian Navy, who is responsible for the country’s maritime security, has been ordered to submit a report and identify the reason this ship drifted so long undetected.

It has been prepared by a Working Party staffed by experienced small boat sailors representing the following organisations: the Royal Yachting Association, the Cruising Association; the Ocean Cruising Club; the Royal Cruising Club and the World Cruising Club. The Working Party has drawn on information and advice provided by the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), an initiative established by EU NAVFOR (EU naval force) Operation.