Some years ago in a now defunct navy journal an article was written about what people think when they fall overboard. Several predominant factors were recognized: (1) Do they know I am overboard? (2) What are they doing? (3) How can I help my rescue? After some study and research the following was gleaned:

a. Most victims that fall overboard and are not recovered because their location is not known.

b. Some recovered bodies showed signs of exhaustion rather than drowning.

c. Recovered victims that remained afloat and conserved energy and remained in a position near the wake were recovered soonest.

It was determined that if the person falling overboard had knowledge of the search and rescue procedures it could increase the victims chances of recovery.

Therefore the following was developed:

INSTRUCTIONS IF YOU SHOULD FALL OVERBOARD.

1. Immediately upon notification that some one has fallen overboard or is missing the international signal for man overboard will be sounded on the ships whistle: three blasts (the letter O in the international Morse code) and a vertically fired flare will be launched. A radio message will also be transmitted on area and international frequencies.

2. If you are in sight, the ship will return to your position by the most expeditious means. This may mean simply turning around and coming to you, or if you are not in sight or it is dark or foggy, by using a Williamson Turn to retrace the ship’s track and then start a search for you.

3. Do not panic or try to swim to the ship. Use your shirt, coat or pants to make a flotation pillow.

4. WHEN THE SHIP ARRIVES AT THE START SEARCH POSITION IT WILL BLOW TWO VERY LONG WHISTLE

BLASTS AND LAUNCH A SMOKE FLOAT. The ship will then commence a search for you and will return to that smoke float every 15 minutes and sound a very long blast, and then resume searching.

5. You should swim towards the Start Search Point regardless of what the ship does. Do not swim after the ship.

6. Following these instruction will greatly improve your chances of recovery and can expedite the search.

7. If you need any further clarification ask questions now.

It is recommended this notice be posted on all department bulletin boards.

This article was written by Captain John Denham, a veteran of 66 years maritime experience in seamanship, ship handling, navigation, piloting, and education. he is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

It is safe to assume that most sea farers at one time or another have wanted to be a captain; command a ship, boat or vessel at sea. If this goal is pursued in government service it is achieved by committees in a selection and promotion process and in the private sector, a license is required followed by a less complicated purpose-biased process. Being a product of both processes, two essential elements are recalled: 1.Except in rare circumstances noone becomes a ship’s captain without expressing the desire. 2. In preparation one must display interest, knowledge and ability and be recommended.

As a youngster at sea, command was beyond my thoughts. I was involved in a great war in which survival was primary. By 1944 the drudgery of deck seamanship and hours of boredom with occasional periods of excitements created a yearning to move up. Standing around in a cool, well ventilated pilot house for four hours seemed ideal. Many shipmates had become officers as opportunities were available for experienced seaman. By wars end I was an officer with experience, along with some thousands of others.

Shortly after, jobs at sea were a matter of luck; one day a shortage next day a surplus. However, the government needed experienced sea going officers in both the Navy and USCG. The academies and programs did not satisfy the fluctuating need. The U.S. Merchant Marine Naval Reserve (DML) served two purposes: provided the merchant marine with naval knowledgeable mariners and the Navy with a resource of experienced mariners if needed; a corollary to the concept with medical persons.

The secret to succeeding is not alone in the seeker, but also in the finder; the one who recognizes the hidden talent, sees a person that wants to move-up, maybe a captain, but mostly a possible leader and has the raw material to achieve. As I look back not all seniors were talent scouts, some, unfortunately were discouraging and resentful of any identifying traits. However there were many exceptionally clairvoyant shipmates, officers, captains, admirals, seaman and cooks that were mentors and are remembered. They help as one stumbles, they take extra time, provide encouragement and appropriately apply kicks. Some candidates display no early signs of brilliance or exceptional ability, just sparks of dedication and persistence and later interest, study, inquiry and observation..

The sea always called me; any job at sea was better than a job ashore. My navy experience is best recalled because it is recorded in evaluations and records and in the memories of interested persons. As an Ensign USNR, DM on active duty in a fleet oiler I was superfluous although I had years of experience. I spend a year being an assistant to almost everyone however, my commanding officer, a senior navy Captain noticed. Soon I was utilized as an underway OOD in formation steaming. A competent, trustworthy watch officer on the 0000-0400 is a Captain’s dream After an adventurous cruise to sea I was encouraged to request destroyers.

In destroyers I was again assigned to time consuming and wasteful employment as an assistant. The Squadron Commodore relied on the ship’s Executive Officer for navigation and weather information; otherwise a competent officer he was not skilled. Again my knowledge and skill was recognized and I was “loaned” to the SQUAD DOG when the division deployed and traveled overseas. I did well as an OOD and Navigator. In 1950 I was ordered  to a Pacific Fleet destroyer in Korea. By 1953 I had impressed four senior Captains, four commanding officers, been promoted to Lieutenant junior grade and acquired some everlasting friendships (important). In departing from the oiler and two destroyers I departed with a clean slate i.e., no unfinished business or hidden problems. My replacements were well briefed and understood what they inherited, as did the C.O. (Evaluations were written after one departed.

Where ever I went my USNR status was no problem but seniority was. I was always several years junior, but some how my Captain’s found a slot for me. Seniority is a navy problem that probably stalls many careers. When the Korean thing ended I was in excess and returned to the merchant marine only to be “overstowed” by licensed masters mariners. I was promoted, demoted, relieved, discharged and rehired but some how always employed on a ship. As a Lieutenant, USNR, Merchant Marine Naval Reserve while at sea I was selected for augmentation into the U.S. Navy.

Steady employment with career opportunities was foreign to me and a shocking revelation. My life and expectancies had changed overnight. One day I was a merchant marine officer unloading coffee in San Pedro, California and the next day I was a Lieutenant, USN ordered to report as Commanding Officer USS ESTERO AKL 5. This unexpected selection was probably based on four years of outstanding evaluations by three navy Captains and three Commanders and “the needs of the service.” A later review showed no other documentation.

During the next 20 years I learned a number of critical selection criteria.
1. It is more effective to impress his advisors than it is the boss.
2. Share the honors, it is noted.
3. Heroism is rewarded, outstanding performance acknowledged and recorded and misconduct punished, each according to the merits.
4. If it is wrong don’t look for blame, seek solutions.
5.There are no “off-the cuff,” “not for publication” or “ between us” comments with anyone.
6. Competition ends at burial.
7. Real friends are unsuspected.
8. The last word is YES SIR!

Lastly command is not a reward, it is an investment by well meaning persons.

No matter what is preserved or kept safe, it costs money! In my past life I shared my useful abilities with the U.S. Merchant Marine and the U.S. Navy. I shipped in 12 merchant ships and served in 7 navy ships, commanding 3. In each I came away with lessons that today I share in VOX OCEANUS articles, a dozen published pieces and three novels. What little wealth I acquired is from my retirement from the Navy, the California Maritime Academy, employment as a pilot, consulting, and wise investments thereafter. So, I ask myself, who do I owe?

Recently I joined the Navy League, Merchant Marine Chapter; became a life member of the Tin Can Sailor Inc., and the Military Officers’ Association for reasons I do not recall. Any writing I do is gratis; I get pittance from my books, but my personal communications has increased; some is favorable. But mostly I am targeted to help support worthy causes, and, there are many of them. The dilemma faced is which ones and how much?

Locally, in the San Francisco area including the popular river ports of Sacramento, Stockton, Benicia, Martinez, Vallejo and bay ports of Richmond, Oakland, Alameda and Redwood City there is an abundance of memorial maritime artifacts to which I owe allegiance. Proudly they host a navy aircraft carrier, a submarine, a maritime museum, a liberty ship, a victory ship, a presidential yacht, and I believe in the Reserve Fleet we have a USCG light ship and a battleship seeking a home. At one time or another I served with or had a relationship with these vessels or their enshrined kin. I enjoy their sight, smell and feel. Memories abound when I step aboard. As a mate, I recall the vertical ladders in cargo holds, the hours in pilot houses standing watches, thinking, checking the magnetic compass, winding the chronometers, the morning coffee, the call to Fore & Aft, and landing cumbersome gangways. I often wake at 0330 for watch.

My navy days constantly remind me of years of learning, it never stopped regardless of duty, rank or stations; every day a lesson. And always people needing help, or helping, and a few that just didn’t give a damn, but all shipmates.

How does one preserve memories? The abundance of reminders makes it difficult. But there is a means to help preserve these historical remains of the great ships and memories. In every profession there are organizations, associations, chapters, clubs and groups that frequently meet to celebrate survival. Committees spend great effort to select sites of interest and reasonable places to gather. The maritime brethren (military, naval, marine, nautical all such ilk), if joined together and cooperate and coordinate plans to conduct their reunions and historical celebrations at seagoing memorial sites, such an abundance of funding could significantly provide needed support for the deserving endangered memorials and help the local populations that have undertaken their stewardship. It is a means to a useful end that can care for our sea going heritage before it is scrapped. No craft is so small, vessel too large or crew too old to be without memories.

S O S = Save our ships. John

After a career at sea and a period of piloting I tried a tour in academia. I was surprised to find that maritime academies, along with other educational institutions were using classrooms furnished with middle school furnishings and tools. Are we teaching kids or future professionals I thought? Mostly the furnishings are still in use. If you treat students like kids, they will act like kids. Therefore, tools and the environment are important.

Involved in continuing education, simulators attracted me. At Marine Safety International, then the fore runner in maritime simulation the concept of simulation (make believe with electronics) was interesting, but unreal. Nature can not be simulated. For the next 10 years I visited simulators in Kings Point, New London, Piney Point, Toledo and San Diego. Each facility emulated the other and the concept of instruction was the same and teaching was partially effective. A critiques of students indicated, it’s great, but not the same.

Why doesn’t simulation prepare one for the real experience?

Looking at the COSCO BUSAN pilot house I could not recall any simulator with a similar physical arrangement. A collection of students will have a collection of pilot house arrangements in mind and therefore make believe is initiated. The installed bridge equipment in most cases is unfamiliar and therefore another make believe is instigated etc.

Simulation serves excellent purposes when used to rehearse procedures or test theories, things that are not well known, and specially ship characteristics, tactical diameters in specific conditions and human responses to critical situations. Acceleration and deceleration rates/times are not reliable due to the possible human response factor. I found that using simulation to display a critical maneuver as an illustration is excellent. A competent instructor can interject critical information as it occurs (or in advance) and implant a learning experience without the confusion of interpretation. Most want to be as good as the best. An example that I used: “I am about to show you a simulation of how old Charley Brown approaches the turn and rounds the bend at PotreroTurn to Richmond Inner Harbor.” Shown once, or more as needed with some comments on key points, delivered the lesson.

While engaged with a computer driven problem one is constantly shifting from real experience and computer generated displayed data.

For $1,000,000 American President Lines instituted a three day work shop for all ship masters and promising chief mates and invited USCG, educators and lawyers to attend. The attendees (Captains, mates, visitors and consultants) were divided into small groups and each was given a real accident problem to resolve (prevent and analyze). Some simulation was provided by video tape of simulated scenes of the situation. Realism was stimulated because it was factual.

The final critiques of each workshop indicated an awareness that the master and pilot/ watch officer relationship was essential for safety in critical situations and that masters or persons in charge should act responsibly. Simulation training as presently practiced fails in this most important facet of ship operations management; implant thinking as a process and experience by example.

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He is also author of The Assistant and DD 891.

By John G. Denham

I am impressed with the significant improvements that large diesel engine manufacturers are making in reducing offensive emissions, improving operational efficiency and cutting costs. When the “Firecracker Engineers” put their mind to it, it happens. Government is putting a lot of pressure on engine exhausts; the bigger the engine the more political pressure. Owners want more speed and efficiency and less cost. I have not observed any government involvement except to increase standards. The diesel engine manufacturing guys have addressed faster, more powerful, cleaner, efficient and less costly engines admirably, but there is another problem that effects operations: minimum speed.

The minimum speed limitation is an operational safety factor when maneuvering in confined, congested and special maneuvering areas. Rule 6 of the International and Inland Rules:

“Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed…” A gold mine for maritime lawyers.

The Pacific Maritime Magazine May 2008 issue’s feature article “Large Marine Diesel Engines” exemplified:

“APL recently ordered eight MAN B&W 14K98ME-C7 two stroke low-speed crosshead engines …will generate 115,000 bhp at 105 RPM …to be installed in eight new 10,000 teu container ships.”

As advertised the operating range of similar behemoths maybe as low 45 RPM and as high as 120 RPM. With direct drive and an efficient propeller the probable minimum speed may be 5.0 knots. Persons piloting such vessels may need to stop and start the engines any number of times due to circumstances; the engines are usually started with compressed air. Therefore knowing the quantity of consecutive start and stops is essential as an operating factor. There are two navigation considerations that must be resolved while en route: the safe speed of advance and the hydrodynamic effect of the vessel’s movement; the greater the speed the greater the effect. So far, ship handlers have developed procedures to reduce the speed of advance but as the engines become more powerful the solutions will be less effective.

While transiting a narrow channel there are three sub-factors involved that need to be considered to safely proceed: the bow wave, suction effect and the wake; all relate to speed and displacement. The details and an excellent explanation are provided in Caryle J. Plummer’s “SHIP HANDLING IN NARROW CHANNELS; Cornell Maritime Press.

Large direct drive diesel ships may have as many as 10 or 12 consecutive starts if the propeller is free rotating, but less if backing (need more air). Of greatest concern is an emergency full astern from full speed ahead; the air pressure may not be adequate to counter the propeller rotations.

Therefore, the ship owner must not only consider the environmental impact and economical advantage, but the cost of additional tugs and support services when entering congested and confined water. JGD.

NOTE – This article was first published in June of 2008.

John Denham is a retired USN Captain, Licensed unlimited Master and Pilot, maritime academy teacher,and author with extensive experience as a marine consultant. He writes for Pacific Maritime Magazine and is the author of The Assistant and DD 891.

By John G. Denham

In my naval experience I hated inspections more than storms. Most of the inspectors were knowledgeable, competent but tended to harp on what they knew and nit-picked technical items the average sailor barely understood. There were two exceptions: the Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) and the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). The ship was either determined ready and capable or it was not. I played several roles in those processes and gleaned an important lesson: a ship operates best when Policy, Attitude and Procedures are in sync.

Every ship at sea operates within some form of policy, be it the companies or the Master’s. The policy normally dictates the attitude in which procedures are executed. Success starts with a realistic policy. A policy that demands 100% effort all the time has little chance of success, whereas a reserve margin for emergencies provides probable achievement. If one can not pick-up the beat, the race may be lost.

The maritime situation today is rapidly changing; sailors are technicians, ships are mechanical, electronic packages of modern technology, the old buckets are disappearing, replaced by behemoths with a hand full of people in charge. Modernization and maximum-efficient processes are the order for survival.

Competency is not accomplished overnight or is a high test score an indication of skill. Competency, knowledge, skill, and experience are hard to acquire and are increasing in demand. There are groups, organizations and societies of highly qualified and experienced ex-mariners, licensed masters, captains, mates and engineers that have left the sea and sought employment in related trades and associated professions. Some have formed companies that provide special services to shipping companies e.g., pollution prevention, personnel and vessel manning, license and certification preparation, insurance, cargo operations, ship handling, navigation and seamanship etc.

Those specialized interventions provide a needed service and are used by many to resolve specific needs, but the product is not integrated with the whole; the leak is fixed but the cause remains.

In a problem solving task with a major containership company, the sea officers, “because it is impossible that any other description of men, who have not had an opportunity being often at sea, can perform a proper judgement on this important subject.” a quote from Commodore Harry Truxtun, U.S.Navy 1775, were collected, presented the problem and requested to identify the cause(s). They quickly espoused a consensus and a solution. The cause was poor ship management and the solution involved training and a dialogue with management. A company policy was initiated, attitudes were changed and procedures modified, a training program was initiated. and later verified.

To verify the effectiveness, at sea evaluation of operational procedures were conducted by recognized experienced professionals that included immediate guidance cemented the new standardized procedures. On the job discussions and demonstrations, were conducted; although limited to bridge operations they were reflected in all ship operations. From each ship some better processes were gleaned and passed on to others. Throughout, management supported the process. Opposition was experienced and therefore demonstrations and discussion were added until compliance was accepted. The whole was individually improved.

Although not initially construed to be a total ship management panacea, the evaluation process with the proper team can influence and improve safety at sea and maximize efficiency. The tools are available and the time is right. Within the world wide maritime community i.e., an insurance company, a school, a survey and or classification society, but not government, should establish a Safety at Sea Evaluation and Proficiency Service for all merchant marines with a dedicated purpose ” To improve the daily operations of vessels at sea and effectively implement modern safe procedures in all ship board functions.”

By John G. Denham

A gathering of 132 maritime and related afficionados of the California ports, harbors and maritime facilities met in Sacramento on the 12-14 May and were exposed to political, bureaucratic and professional views on the business of directing, managing and surviving in today’s economic and environmentally challenging environment.

Sponsoring this specialized professional symposium was big player CHEVRON, the ports of LA/LB, San Diego and the U.S. Propeller Club and also supported by the Ports of Humboldt Bay and Santa Cruz who joined with a dozen other involved contributors.

Bunked down at the luxurious Hyatt hotel, in the shadow of the state capitol the 2 ½ day 9th California Maritime Leadership Symposium informed the crowded assembly to an inside view of the daily, annual, short and long term operations for California’s eleven sea ports. Dave Hull, the CEO of Humboldt Bay Harbor Recreation and Conservation District and chairman of the California Maritime and Navigation Committee (CMANC) a major sponsor, introduced the attendees to a time more exciting than “24″ on Monday night TV.

The first morning sessions were dedicated to panel discussions by over a dozen practicing experts that reviewed California’s proposed new water laws and regulations, emission laws and regulations and proposed habitat and species protections laws effecting the ports, harbor and waterways of California.The afternoon sessions complemented the morning’s effort with more experts discussing “greening” strategies for inland and off shore waters. The day ended with the feeling that wildlife and the environment were well taken care of and the ports and harbors would compensate.

Day two started with Senator Alan Lowenthal, Senate Transportation Committee, explaining the political difference between fees and taxes; it is just money until you try and spend it. He urged the audience to communicate ideas and concerns to their representative and announced that the 11% legislature confidence rating was not very encouraging. Thereafter, the day’s panels provided informative responses to the previous day’s doubts with detailed explanations of profiles of California ports and harbors and their needs.

The late afternoon session was concluded with an analysis by Steve Heminger of the federal Metropolitan Transportation Commission and fellow member Tom Skancke explaining the possible distribution and guidelines for stimulus funds for the national transportation system initiated by President Eisenhower. The critical need for an improved national transportation system was explained and the lack of funding and support emphasized.

After two days, one is left with several thoughts:

1. Elected officials are concerned and aware but not knowledgeable.

2. The solution of the environment-economic situation is viewed as stimulus money.

3. Government looks to funding as a pinata.

4. There is relief coming, but it is not on the horizon in California.

5. The environment has priority over economics.

6. There are plans for almost everything, but they are on hold until situations improve or stimulus funds arrive.

7. There are newly invented words and acronyms for every problem.

8. There is, and always will be, conflict between local, state and federal solutions.

9. No symposium will succeed without at least one reception; more is better.

10. The major impediment to improved operations is congestion.

Noted was the lack of any presentation by the City/County of San Francisco and a not noticeable representation of the U.S. Merchant Marine, although the U.S. Navy League, Merchant Marine Council was represented. Any attendee claiming continuous education credits should be granted 2 units.

Recently three ponderous documents have been published  that may eventually affect pilotage, ship management and hopefully bridge resources management (BRM): USCG report on the allision involving the COSCO BUSAN; NTSB report on the same and the public submission by John Meadows and K&L lawyers representing pilot John Cota.

In examining the reports I arrived at the conclusion that the author(s) are mostly legal people, and therefore compose legally but not nautically. In my up-bringing, I was exposed to a knowledgeable senior officer named that assigned me to review a collision report. “Normally,” he said, “I seek an officer with some personal experience in these thing, but they don’t seem to be around much, therefore as you seem to be somewhat involved. Look this over. Pick out the B.S.” He felt the best experts on accidents were those with actual experience. In three earlier published articles the conduct of bridge team management was presented, the procedures for handling pilots was discussed and the role of persons in command was explained. I have experienced all that and at times did not do too well. Since I have learned a lot from others’.

The NTSB and the USCG have compiled more data than an entire class at any law school could digest in a year; most is relevant, but in the attempt to present all the facts it’s thicker than the fog on 7 November 2007. And by the way, “49 USC section 1154(b) precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.” I am impressed with the volume, but wonder how many trees were dropped to promulgate the pages of analysis, conclusions and findings which took almost  two years and may not be admissible.

Having perused (I actually read all three), I noted what I call a land-man conception about the role, duties, and responsibilities of ships’ pilots and the relationship with ship captains. Pilot liability is not mentioned as it scares the pilot, because most persons working as pilots favor the understanding that a pilot is usually not held liable because something goes amiss. In the past the accepted ruling was a pilot is responsible only for his personal negligence and that must be affirmatively shown. To hold the pilot liable, he or she must be shown to have been negligent and since negligence is the cause (sine qua non) of the liability the burden is upon the one alleging it. Therefore in the reports the word negligent (ence)  is sprinkled freely.

California regulations affirm for the SFBP “While the pilot is on board the navigation of the vessel devolves on him.” And,

When a pilot goes aboard a vessel, the pilot becomes a servant of the vessel and its owner and operator. Nothing in this division exempts the vessel or its owner or operator from liability to persons or property for damage or loss caused by the vessel or its operation on the ground that (1) the vessel was piloted by a pilot, or (2) the damage or loss was incurred as a result of the error, omission, fault, or neglect of a pilot.

U.S. Regulation 33CFR Section 164.11. lays the conduct of the navigation and management of the vessel on the  Master and assigns a less onerous responsibility to the person directing the movement of the vessel, however that person can not be expected to fix the vessel’s position and plot it on a chart and conn the ship.(1) [a]. Foreign flagged vessels are exempt, therefore, Cota by California regulation is it.

The USCG and NTSB both agree the pre-departure exchange is essential in this case.  NTSB: “ (2) the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure master/pilot exchange  and a lack of effective communications sailing conference during the accident voyage”. USCG: “2. Contributing to the cause of this casualty was the failure of the pilot and master to conduct a proper pilot-master exchange  prior to getting underway —“. Included in the alleged “accident preventing exchange”  the USCG added that (Cota) “arrived at the vessel more than one hour before departure and had plenty of time to discuss his own  plans with the master.”  As there is only one route to the sea it would appear a plan would be redundant, but the visibility and equipment operations were  discussed as was the exchange of ship-pilot and pilot-ship information.

The departure of COSCO BUSAN from berth 56 in Oakland can not be accomplished without the explicit approval of the Master, regardless of weather. Only the ship talks to the crew; the pilot may mouth the words, but the Captain authorizes them.

Restricted visibility, near-zero visibility, foggy, fog, heavy/dense fog or safe speed  have no specific dimension, and are interpretative. 1/4 mile visibility at Oakland can be greater or less elsewhere. Being able to see both sides of the Oakland Estuary is not  restricted visibility for an experienced pilot, but most pilots  know that it may worsen , or improve as time and distance change.  The USCG  states, “ Prior to, and at the time of the casualty, participants in the VTS reported visibility in the Bay as low of 350 feet. And, while waiting to undock, COSCO BUSAN delayed for an inbound tug and barge to pass. Fog is a weather condition, not a restriction. It is a common view amongst pilots, based on cumulative experiences, that fog is manageable but an undisciplined foreign crew lacking language understanding is a hazard.

COSCO BUSAN’s full sea speed is rated at 25 knots. In-port maneuvering  RPM are limited to 65 ahead and astern and the maximum speed recorded  prior to the allision was 10 knots by an electronic source. It’s not understood how a conclusion on safe speed was achieved without the availability of the maneuvering characteristics for  a deep loaded COSCO BUSAN in shallow water.

The  USCG report indicates the COSCO BUSAN did not have a BRM in place from the time underway until the allision. ”The Master, third officer and an able seaman were on the bridge with the pilot.”. A minimum of three ships officers are needed to accomplish the BRM duties while navigating in congested waters.(1)[a]. Once underway the Chief Mate or Second Mate were available.

The Master of COSCO BUSAN accepted the “compulsary” pilot on board with the expectation of utilizing his experience, knowledge and skill as a ship handler and expert in local waters. The pilot was justified in expecting the owners, master and crew of COSCO BUSAN to provide professional, reliable performance and support including navigation, equipment operation and ship management as per 33CFR Section 164.11. The exchange between master and pilot as described in section 2.1 of the USCG report is not uncommon and happens often without ill effect.  Many pilots and masters have indicated they are not impressed with BRM and officious ship’s personnel. The court cases relating to ship captain’s responsibility vs pilot duty is replete with controvers.

An important challenge by K&L lawyers refers to 33CFR Section 95.045 General operating rules for vessels inspected, or subject to inspection, under Chapter 33 of Title 46 United States Code:

While on board a vessel inspected, or subject to inspection, under Chapter 33 of Title 46 United States Code, a crewmember (including a licensed individual),  pilot, or watchstander not a regular member of the crew:

(a) Shall not perform or attempt to perform any scheduled duties within four hours of consuming any alcohol;

(b) Shall not be intoxicated at any time;

(c) Shall not consume any intoxicant while on watch or duty; and

(d) May consume a legal non-prescription or prescription drug provided the drug does not cause the individual to be intoxicated

The USCG report infers the San Francisco VTS did not  fulfill its stated mission:

To coordinate the safe and efficient transit of vessels in San Francisco Bay in an effort to prevent accidents and the associated loss of life and damage to property and the environment. We execute our mission by:

MONITORING vessel movements,
INFORMING mariners of other vessels and potential hazards,
RECOMMENDING courses of action when we see a situation that the mariner may not have seen, and
DIRECTING the outcome of situations when necessary to prevent disasters

Further, “The VTS does not routinely direct  and control  the  movements of  vessels. In normal, conditions  the VTS notifies participants of—contacts deemed to be a hazard, and information about safety —in areas of restricted visibility.  When visibility decreases  to less than 1.0 mile VTS reports all vessel radar contacts that may affect another vessels transit. The VTS can , when necessary, issue measures or directive to vessels to enhance navigation and vessel safety—:”(1)[d]

The lookout is a person, instructed, and stationed where he or she can best fulfill that duty, it appears the Bos’un and the Chief Mate were maintaining a lookout, but were not the lookout. It is prescribed that  maintaining a proper lookout by all available means appropriate includes all person in a duty status, but does not replace the lookout.

The report states,” At the time of departure, the bridge management team was composed  of”The Master, third officer and an able seaman were on the bridge with the pilot,” and  the pilot (who had the conn. 15). Addendum 15 states:: The person with the “conn” is the person giving the engine and helm commands.  —the Master—-had the ultimate  authority and responsibility for the vessel.” It appears that California and the U.S. are not in sync, whereas the . The IMO STCW Section B affirms:

The master of every ship is bound to ensure that watch keeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch, keeping in mind the bridge resource management principles stated in part 3-1 of section B-VIII/2 of the STCW code. Under the master’s general direction, the officers of the navigational watch are responsible for navigating the ship safely during their periods of duty, when they will be particularly concerned with avoiding collision and stranding (1)[a]

The media has been less than accurate whereas it was reported Cota was the pilot, “at the helm,” “steering the vessel” and Captain of the COSCO BUSAN.

Among the several missing items considered  germane to the investigation is:

1. a statement or reported observations  whereas Cota showed any signs of intoxication or drug impairment;

2. as the vessel recently departed the LA/LB area it would seem appropriate to inquire into the ships performance in that port;

3. a copy of the COSCO BUSAN maneuvering characteristic data in shallow water and in a loaded condition

4. a copy of SFBP Harbor pilot card.

Alerts have been issued to the involved parties: vessel owners, operators, mariners, pilots, port authorities and government. Accidents occur, and will continue, investigations will be conducted, evidence and testimony collected, meetings will be held and hopefully all parties can participate, followed by  analysis and conclusions and eventually, published findings. Do not expect any significant change to occur until the owners, operators, sea going folk, pilots and port authorities join and resolve the human errors factor. Non-compliance is slovenly seamanship. JGD

(1) [a] Organizing and Managing the Bridge team. USNIP, September 1994

[b]The Care and Feedign of Ship’s Pilots. USNIP, August 1993

[c]Why Ddin’t SlowDown. USNIP, January 1996

[d] : A Word on Vessel Traffic Service. . gCaptain.com. Feb 19, 2008

The weather was raining and windy with some fog from Cape Flattery as far south to Astoria, Oregon. The sea was running high from the northwest being pushed by a 10-20 knots westerly wind. We were heading south and picking up cargo in any port that had a pilot and berth; final port, Valpariaso, Chile. What did not fit in the holds was stored on deck. S.S. Santa Flavia was a war time C2 cargo ship, 16 knot, 5 hatch stick and boom freighter. To go forward, one could only go on the starboard side. Try as we may, we could not build a catwalk on the port side forward of number 2 hold. We waited an hour for the  Gray’s Harbor pilot as the bar was breaking but at 0430 we saw the white over red light and had the pilot on board. “Full ahead Cap, We got’ta run the seas and ride the swell. Might roll a bit, But she’ll fit.” Ordered the pilot.

“Johnny you go for’ard and stand by the anchors, Make ‘em both ready,” the Captain ordered. I could feel the throb of the propeller as it neared the surface and felt the ship plowing into the running sea. At first I was looking down on  the bridge then it was up in the sky. We rolled to starboard and hung there a bit and then, quicker, rolled back to port. Not a comfortable feeling. It was dark. The sea was alive with foam as spray passed over the foc’sle and a couple of seas rolled up the main deck. I looked aft and estimated we were nearly through the Port Chehalis Reach as I could see channel lights ahead and some lights of Westport.

My feet slipped and I grabbed for the brake on the windlass as the ship rolled to starboard. I felt I could reach out and touch the water. I heard a sound I never heard before; the cargo had shifted. As best determined we rolled 30 degree and slowly inched back to 15 degrees and settled there The phone rang and the captain yelled, “Let go Johnny, let go!”  The main engine was shut-down; the generators were off line and the emergency generator was in operations. For all purposes we were not under command and underway. It was hours before plans were complete and local officials allowed the ship with its starboard list was to berth. Existing on board with a list is more difficult than standing up in a hammock. Once alongside the damage was evaluated; over 50% of the number 4 and 5 hold, below deck, upper ‘tween deck cargo had to be re-stowed; moved ashore, inspected and reloaded.  One example of the forces involved was a 100 pound sack of granulated flour was propelled from the port side to the starboard side a distance of 64 feet was impaled on a stanchion. It took two longshoremen to free it from a stanchion. In 5 days Santa Flavia was underway  for Portland, Oregon. I remember Hoquiam, Washington.

Bye Bye Buoy

By John Denham

The recent sinking of the “SF” Sea Buoy by possibly a large foreign-flag container ship causes more concern about ship management. In recent published articles we  expressed concern about the size of ships and engines, simulator training and both management policy and ship management. All heralding the virtues  of “the ordinary practice of seamen” i.e., Bridge Resource Management.

The predictions for casualties in 2009 are not encouraging as they indicate more errors caused by humans. January 2009 started with the question: How does a modern container ship operated by a leading maritime shipping company with the latest navigation equipment allide with  a sea buoy located in a separation  zone in a precautionary area? Obviously it takes a lack of team work and coordination. The secret to “making a buoy” successfully is to establish a steady bearing and decreasing range.( Rule 7 (d) (I) sound familiar?)

An examination of a possible scenario might help.  The COSCO BUSAN is used as an excellent example of a typical modern containership in a probable loaded condition, however reportedly the suspect vessel was light loaded and was  52 feet more in LOA.

Photo courtesy COSCO-HANJIN

An observer should note, in the example, the navigation bridge is well aft, the stem is almost 600 feet forward, and as configured, there is approximately 15 rows of boxes, some  5 high in between the bridge and the forward mast. The line of sight from the Navigation Bridge extends the line of sight beyond the bow  by almost three ship lengths i.e., or about 2700 feet or 900 yards. The top of the Pilot House  radar antennae will probably detect a radar return from a lesser distance.

The suspect vessel’s line of sight was significantly better. Without  a fore-deck full of containers and only a slight drag one might see at least one ship length beyond the bow, however the radar reception was probably beyond the visual line of sight.  The “sea buoy” is three miles from the main ship channel entrance buoys #1 and #2; the pilot cruising area is half-way between. It was dark. It is assumed there was no attempt to allide with the navigation buoy and therefore the person(s) directing the navigation were not aware of its location, indicating either a lack of a proper lookout and a failure to maintain a proper navigation plot and an ineffective management of bridge resources( BRM).

The following scenario is possible:
On departing the bar channel between  Buoy#1 and #2 the pilot slowed in order to disembark on the port side on a south westerly heading; putting wind and sea to starboard. The advance and transfer of the maneuver would place the ship about 1.5 miles south west of the channel entrance and about the same distance from the sea buoy that is almost to the west. Bound for Asia on a great circle track and advised  to pass the sea buoy to starboard, the ship apparently headed  for the North Outbound Traffic Lane. Speed was increased to “Full Ahead” and a course direct to the Northern Outbound Lane ordered. Rudder was applied, probably without thought for the significantly large  course change at less than normal sea speed  and the advance and transfer that would head the vessel directly toward the sea buoy. Without  an alert bridge team and lookout the ship allided with the sea buoy, probably without notice. The first awareness was probably from the Engine room.

USCG released picture of the recovered, damaged sea buoy show a vertical puncture in the lower portion of the 32 foot buoy indicating a probable puncture by a propeller blade caused by a light loaded ship contacting and dragging the sea buoy it until was submerged.
The probable errors made are:

1. The ship’s exact position was not known after   the pilot departed.
2. The advance and transfer of the ship was not considered when ordering a very large course change in a light loaded condition at reduced  speed.
3. The position of any hazards ( sea buoy) was not determined.
4. A proper  lookout was not posted and the bridge watch was not situationally aware.

Each item alone is a minor infraction of proper seamanship; all four coupled together create a major failure in ship management.
The Port Agent for the pilots, Pete McIsaac confirms the pilot disembarked on a south by west heading and advised the Master to pass the Sea Buoy to starboard. The pilot boat’s electronic data and the visual observations by the operator reported the buoys active location  before the ship passed and that  it was no longer visible after  the outbound ship passed.

A  typical mistake is to consider a departure with less command attention than an arrival. The same hazards exist except in reverse order. The distraction and confusions occurring in the change of operational status ( in port maneuvering, at sea operations, limited visibility, significantly increased surface contacts etc., demand increase attention by “the person direction the movement of the vessel.”  A”sack”in football mostly occur when the quarterback does not adequately evaluate the defense. Again, the result of a gigantic vessel with an improperly functioning crew, lacking situational awareness and disregarding the ordinary practice of seamen. JGD

UPDATE:

The Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun – January 22, 2009

Report of December 30, 2008. Commissioner Moloney explained that a SF buoy was reportedly struck by an outbound vessel after a pilot disembarked. Commissioner Osen suggested that this issue be discussed at a later date after receipt of the Coast Guard’s report. Mr. Ross Wheatley, representing the United States Coast Guard, was present in the audience and informed the Board that the Coast Guard had identified the vessel to be the OOCL LONG BEACH. He further informed the Board that this incident is currently under investigation. This item will be kept on the agenda until the Coast Guard’s report is available and has been reviewed. (Document Link)